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Attorney-Client Privilege. North Kingstown School Committee
v. Wagner, 176 A.3d 1097 (R.I. 2018). When a party asserts
attorney-client privilege as to the entire testimony of its attorney,
the privilege should be applied on a question-by-question basis to
ensure that the privilege is confined to its narrow scope.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

James Viner, the Respondent, was a chemistry teacher at
North Kingstown High School. 1 Following the 2014–15 school year,
a former student of Viner’s complained to her mother, who in turn
informed school administrators, that Viner had allegedly engaged
in inappropriate behavior. 2 At the behest of the school committee,
two attorneys investigated the claim by interviewing students and
created a final report of their findings which was submitted to the
school’s superintendent. 3
Viner received a letter from the
Chairperson of the school committee on August 27, 2015, informing
Viner that, at an executive session on August 25, 2015, the
superintendent recommended to the school committee that Viner
be suspended without pay for the 2015–16 school year, after which
Viner should be fired for cause; the school committee accepted the
recommendation. 4 Viner requested a full evidentiary hearing
which took place on December 7, 2015.5 At the hearing’s
conclusion, the school committee again voted to suspend Viner for
the 2015–16 school year and terminate his employment thereafter. 6
Viner appealed this decision to the Rhode Island Department
of Elementary and Secondary Education (RIDE). 7 Pursuant to
1. N. Kingstown Sch. Comm. v. Wagner, 176 A.3d 1097, 1098 (R.I. 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. This “pre-suspension hearing” on August 25, 2015, was preceded
by a “pre-depr[i]vation hearing” on August 24, 2015, which was attended by
Viner, a teachers’ union representative, the superintendent, the school
principal, and the school committee’s legal counsel. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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Viner’s request, the RIDE hearing officer issued witness subpoenas
directed to the two investigating attorneys to compel their
attendance at the RIDE proceeding. 8 In response, the school
committee filed a motion to quash the subpoenas on the basis of
attorney-client privilege in Rhode Island Superior Court, which the
hearing justice granted. 9 The hearing justice entered final
judgment for the school committee on May 23, 2016. 10 Viner
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 11 While that appeal
was pending, the RIDE hearing officer made a final decision to
uphold the school committee’s decision on May 9, 2017.12 On June
1, 2017, Viner appealed the RIDE officer’s decision to the council on
elementary and secondary education (the council) and that appeal
was still pending at the time of this decision. 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The court determined that the issue on appeal was not the
hearing justice’s application of attorney-client privilege to the
particular facts but, rather, his construction of the privilege’s scope,
making it an issue of law that is reviewed de novo. 14 The court
found that, to serve the interest of uncovering the truth, the trial
justice should construe the scope of the attorney-client privilege
narrowly, thus precluding the possibility of blanket applications. 15
The court held that the hearing justice ruled too broadly when he
determined that all testimony from the attorneys was privileged.16
To rectify this error, the court remanded the case back to
Superior Court, where the attorneys could be deposed or testify at
trial.17 There, the hearing justice could make a question-byquestion determination as to the application of the attorney-client

8. See id. These subpoenas were issued under the authority of section
16-39-8 of the Rhode Island General Laws. Id.
9. Id. at 1099.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1100.
15. Id.
16. Id. Part of the hearing justice’s reasoning for so ruling was that the
information which Viner wanted to obtain by compelling the attorneys to
testify could be adduced in other ways. Id.
17. Id.
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privilege. 18 Finally, the court noted that the RIDE officer should
reopen the evidence to allow any non-privileged testimony obtained
from the attorneys and, if the proceeding resulted in a final
judgment under the Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act
(APA), then the aggrieved party may avail itself of the hearing
justice’s decision as a claim of error for later appeal. 19
COMMENTARY

The court is almost certainly correct in holding that the
Superior Court hearing justice was too broad in ruling that all
testimony which might be obtained from the attorneys was
privileged. 20 While the specific holding seems uncontroversial, the
fact that the court heard this case at all is a different story; as
Justice Robinson opined in his dissent, the issue does not seem ripe
for the court to be making any such determination given that
Viner’s appeal to the council was still pending. 21 While the APA
authorizes immediate judicial review of an intermediate agency act,
it does so only when “review of the final agency order would not
provide an adequate remedy.” 22 The problem is thus twofold: first,
it is unclear how Viner would be deprived of an adequate remedy if
the council affirmed the decision of the school committee; second,
Viner might ultimately win his appeal with the council, which
would render this attorney-client privilege issue utterly moot. 23
The court acknowledged the latter of these issues but proceeded to
decide the case, seemingly motivated by the RIDE hearing officer’s
hastiness in rendering a decision without a final ruling on the
subpoenas. 24 Although there is a valid concern in ensuring that
Viner gets a fair shake on his appeal to the council, Justice
Robinson’s advice that the majority should refrain from “opining
with respect to issues about which [it] need not opine” is worth

18. Id.
19. Id. The Rhode Island Administrative Procedures Act is codified at
section 42-35-16 of the Rhode Island General Laws. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1101 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1099 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-3515(a)(2011)).
23. Id. at 1101 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 1099 n.3. The court also perhaps had an eye towards making
this entire process slightly more expedient by foreclosing the possibility of
Viner appealing once more following an unfavorable decision by the council.
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noting. 25
CONCLUSION

The court held that a trial justice should determine whether
there is a valid claim of attorney-client privilege on a question-byquestion basis rather than apply the privilege to an entire
attorney’s testimony without further inquiry. As a result, the court
remanded the case back to the Superior Court to make new
determinations as to the scope of the attorney-client privilege’s
application with regard to the relevant testimony.
Troy Lange

25. Id. at 1101 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (quoting Grady v. Narragansett
Elec. Co., 962 A.2d 34, 42 n.4 (R.I. 2009)).

Civil Procedure. Clifford v. Raimondo, 184 A.3d 673 (R.I. 2018).
A trial justice enjoys a considerable range of discretion in the
approval or denial of a class action settlement. The decision of the
trial justice, with regard to a class action settlement, will only be
reversed upon a finding of abuse of discretion.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In an attempt to address the state retirement system’s funding
deficit, the Rhode Island General Assembly amended the statutes
governing the state pension system in 2009 and 2010.1 Unable to
resolve the fiscal issues with these initial amendments, the General
Assembly passed the Rhode Island Retirement Security Act of 2011
(RIRSA). 2 In order to reduce the state’s unfunded liabilities,
RIRSA established a minimum retirement age for specific employee
groups and reduced cost of living adjustments (COLAs). 3
Additionally, RIRSA terminated annual COLA payments
indefinitely. 4
In 2010, unions representing state employees filed a lawsuit
“alleging that the 2009 and 2010 amendments violated the
Contract, Takings, and Due Processes Clauses of the Rhode Island
Constitution.” 5 In 2012, five additional lawsuits were filed
asserting the same constitutional claims.6 All parties were ordered
to participate in mediation and, in 2014, a proposed settlement was
reached, but the parties were unable to secure the unanimous
approval of all union members that was required to finalize the
settlement. 7 As the litigation continued, three additional cases
were filed, all alleging similar claims, and these lawsuits were
1. Clifford v. Raimondo, 184 A.3d 673, 677–78 (R.I. 2018).
2. Id. at 679.
3. Id.
4. Id. “RIRSA stopped paying annual COLAs ‘until the state’s pension
plans [were] 80% funded overall[,]’ which, as expressed by both sets of plaintiffs
at oral argument in this appeal, is indefinite.” Id. (alterations in original).
5. Id. at 680.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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consolidated. 8
In preparation for trial, “[D]efendants produced more than 700
gigabytes of electronic documents and over four million pages of
documents.” 9 In March 2015, a special master was assigned to
oversee the remaining discovery.10 Shortly thereafter, the special
master announced that all parties, except for one group of plaintiffs,
had reached a settlement agreement. 11
The parties then “filed a class-action lawsuit to implement the
settlement, move for class certification, and appoint class
representatives and class counsel.” 12 In accordance with Rule
23(b)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial
justice granted Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, designated
the class representatives, and appointed class counsel for both
Plaintiffs and Defendants. 13 Additionally, the trial justice granted
the parties’ joint motion for preliminary approval of the class
settlement 14 and approved the proposed method of notifying class
members. 15
In response to the class notification, class members submitted
approximately 400 objections to the settlement agreement and
sixty-nine class members requested to be heard during the fairness
hearing scheduled on May 20, 2015. 16 At the fairness hearing, only
thirty-five of these class members appeared before the court. 17 The

8. Id. The “Clifford plaintiffs” are a group of retired state and municipal
employees not associated with the other retiree associations involved in this
appeal. Id. at 678 n.3.
9. Id. at 680.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 681. The Cranston police and firefighters were the one group of
plaintiffs not willing to settle. Id.
12. Id. “The parties also sought initial approval of the settlement terms
and approval of notice procedures of the settlement to all members of the class
action.” Id.
13. Id. The trial justice also certified several plaintiff subclasses. Id. at
680.
14. Id. at 682. “The trial justice found that the class settlement
agreement warranted ‘an initial presumption of fairness,’ and concluded that
it was ‘within the range of reasonableness.’” Id.
15. Id. Under the proposed method, class members would be notified “by
mail, newspaper publication, and posting the settlement information on the
[Employees’ Retirement System of Rhode Island] website.” Id.
16. Id. The “Clifford plaintiffs” objected to the settlement on the basis
that “the state failed to explicitly define the amount of compensation retirees
would lose under the settlement.” Id.
17. Id. at 683–84.
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hearing spanned five days, and the trial justice heard testimony
from counsel for both parties and six witnesses. 18
On June 9, 2015, the trial justice issued a written decision in
which she reaffirmed her certification of the class, determined that
the members of the class had received adequate notice, and
concluded that the settlement was substantively and procedurally
fair. 19 Following this decision, the legislature amended RIRSA to
reflect the terms of the settlement agreement. 20
On appeal, Plaintiffs challenged “whether the trial justice’s
certification of the class was appropriate” and “whether the
settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the trial justice’s decision to approve the class
action settlement, the Rhode Island Supreme Court sought to
determine whether the trial justice abused her discretion. 22 The
court explained that the trial justice holds ample discretion in
framing the issues and defining the facts and legal arguments that
are most important to the requirements of Rule 23 of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure.23 Further, the court articulated
that it will give deference to a trial justice’s decision to certify a
class ‘“unless the trial court misconceived material evidence,
substantially abused its discretion or was otherwise clearly
wrong.’” 24
The court began its analysis by reviewing the trial justice’s
application of Rule 23(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure.25 Presuming that the numerosity requirement was
satisfied, 26 the court moved to the second prerequisite: that the
class share a common question of law or fact.27 Given that all
Plaintiffs’ claims raised the question of whether the enactment of
18. Id. at 682.
19. Id. at 684.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting DeCesare v. Lincoln Benefit Life Co., 852 A.2d 474, 487–
88 (R.I. 2004)).
25. Id. at 685.
26. Id. at 688. The proposed class contained more than 60,000 individuals
and defendants included 113 municipal entities. Id. at 686.
27. Id. at 688.
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RIRSA violated their rights under the Rhode Island Constitution,
the court found that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in
determining that the entire class shared common questions of law
and fact. 28 Further, the court explained that variations in
Plaintiffs’ claims for damages did not undermine the
appropriateness of class action certification where common
questions of law or fact predominate.29
Next, the court reviewed the trial justice’s assessment of the
third prerequisite: that the class representatives’ claims be typical
of the entire class. 30 The court found that the same conduct affected
the named class representatives and the entire class; therefore, the
requirement of typicality was satisfied.31 Further, the court
explained the trial justice had appointed representatives to each
subclass, which assured that all Plaintiffs were represented by an
individual with a similar claim.32
Turning to the fourth and final prerequisite of Rule 23(a), the
court found that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion in
concluding that “[t]he representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” 33 As the court
explained, adequate representation requires that plaintiffs’
attorneys are experienced and qualified to conduct the proposed
litigation, and that the interests of plaintiffs do not conflict with the
interests of the class. 34 First, the court considered that the trial
justice had engaged in an extensive inquiry into the attorneys’
ability to represent the class and properly determined that
Plaintiffs were adequately represented.35 Second, the court
emphasized that all class members and class representatives
shared the common goal of preserving their pension plans and,
therefore, the trial justice properly determined that the selected
class representatives presented no conflict of interest. 36
Ultimately, the court concluded that the trial justice did not
abuse her discretion in finding all prerequisites of Rule 23(a)

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 685, 688.
Id. at 688–89.
Id. at 689.
Id.
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In response to Plaintiffs’ contention that their
satisfied. 37
dissatisfaction with the settlement was evidence that they were not
adequately represented, the court explained that adequate
representation does not require that all plaintiffs be completely
satisfied with the settlement, as such a standard would result in
decertification of a class each time an objection is raised. 38
Additionally, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that they
should not have been included in the class because they did not
participate in the underlying litigation, explaining that Rule 23
does not require that all class members participate in the litigation
and, by their nature, class action lawsuits contemplate absent
plaintiffs.39
Next, the court sought to determine whether the trial justice
abused her discretion in approving the settlement. 40 The court
began this inquiry by considering the procedural fairness of the
settlement and determined that the trial justice had not abused her
discretion.41 The court determined that the trial justice had
properly presumed that the settlement was fair given that the
parties had engaged in sufficient discovery and the settlement was
a result of earlier negotiations. 42 Additionally, the court considered
that the trial justice had conducted a five-day fairness hearing
where class members were given adequate opportunity to be
heard. 43
The court then turned to the substantive fairness of the
settlement and determined that the trial justice did not abuse her
discretion in determining that the settlement was substantively
fair. 44 The court agreed with the trial justice’s finding that the
duration of the controversy, the complexity of the consolidated
cases, and the substantial costs of litigation weighed in favor of
settlement. 45 Additionally, the court found that the trial justice did
not abuse her discretion when she determined that the settlement
was fair despite the fact that settlement objectors presented
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id. at 692.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 692–95.
Id. at 692–93.
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arguments that had some merit. 46 Given that discovery had
produced an enormous number of documents, the court agreed with
the trial justice’s conclusion that the extent of discovery weighed in
favor of a reasonable settlement. 47 Further, the court found that
the trial justice properly considered that Plaintiffs would have to
overcome numerous dispositive motions before reaching trial and
would have to surmount a high burden of proof to succeed on their
claims, weighing both factors in favor of settlement. 48
Finally, the court analyzed the trial justice’s evaluation of the
reasonableness of the settlement. 49 The court explained that
Plaintiffs faced a higher burden at trial because they were required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that RIRSA violated their rights
under the Rhode Island Constitution, while Defendants merely had
to demonstrate that RIRSA was ‘reasonable and necessary to carry
out a legitimate public purpose.” 50 Acknowledging the uncertainty
involved in predicting the likely outcome of the trial, the court
concluded that the settlement offered Plaintiffs immediate benefits
that weighed in favor of a determination that the settlement was
reasonable and fair.51
For the forgoing reasons, the court held that the trial justice
did not abuse her discretion in approving the class action
settlement. 52
Accordingly, the court denied and dismissed
Plaintiffs’ appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial justice.53
COMMENTARY

The court clearly acknowledged that a trial justice can exercise
considerable discretion in allowing or denying a class action
settlement. 54 The court explained that the trial justice is well
positioned to identify the facts and legal arguments that are most
important to the requirements of Rule 23 of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure. 55
46. Id. at 693. There were only 400 settlement objectors out of 60,000
individuals included in the class. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 694.
50. Id. (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 638 (R.I. 1987)).
51. Id. at 695.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 684.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Here, the court properly affirmed the trial justice’s approval of
the class settlement because the trial justice engaged in a thorough
analysis in order to determine that all requirements of Rule 23(a)
were satisfied,56 and she properly determined that the settlement
was fair, reasonable, and adequate. 57 The trial justice addressed
each requirement of Rule 23(a) individually and did not abuse her
discretion in determining that all requirements for class
certification were satisfied. 58 Following the established framework
for class certification, the trial justice properly certified the class
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) based on Plaintiffs’ prayer for equitable
relief. 59 Further, the trial justice properly considered the factors
necessary to determine whether the settlement was fair and
engaged in the required balancing of the benefits and
disadvantages of the settlement. 60
Additionally, the court recognized that it is within the trial
justice’s discretion to divide a class into subclasses under Rule
24(c)(4)(b). 61 Here, the trial justice recognized that retirees had
different interests than active employees and divided the groups
into subclasses that would each have their own representatives.62
The court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their status as retirees
differentiated them from other Plaintiffs because the trial justice
properly considered this fact when she established subclasses. 63
Further, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that their
dissatisfaction with the settlement was evidence that class counsel
did not adequately represent their subclass.64 The court posited
that an objection to a settlement is not sufficient to demonstrate
that counsel did not provide adequate representation because such
a standard would result in a finding of inadequate representation
every time an objection is raised by a class. 65 Therefore, even when
plaintiffs are dissatisfied with a class action settlement agreement,
the requirement of adequate representation will be satisfied as long

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 687–88.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 688–90.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 691–95.
Id. at 680–82, 688.
Id. at 688.
Id. at 689–90.
Id. at 689.
See id.
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as the plaintiffs’ attorneys are “qualified, experienced, and
generally able to conduct the proposed litigation” and the plaintiffs
do “not have interests antagonistic to those of the class.” 66
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the trial justice did
not abuse her discretion in determining that the class action
settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate. The trial justice
gave appropriate consideration to the objections to the settlement,
properly weighed the benefits and disadvantages of the settlement,
and reviewed all factors necessary to determine that the settlement
was fair, reasonable, and adequate.
Caitlyn Horbert

66.

See id. at 688.

Civil Procedure. Nugent v. State Public Defender’s Office, 184
A.3d 703 (R.I. 2018). A determination on the matter of standing in
an appeal of an arbitrator’s decision does not constitute a final
judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In July 2013, Dolores Nugent, an employee of the Rhode Island
Public Defender’s Office (PD’s Office), attended the arraignment of
an individual accused of murdering Nugent’s nephew. 1 Nugent’s
employer, the PD’s Office, represented the accused individual and,
following the arraignment, Nugent asked a coworker to see
documentation relating to the case.2 Shortly after this request was
denied, the coworker observed Nugent on the phone, assuring an
unknown third party that she would be able to gain access to the
denied documentation by the following day. 3
On August 29, 2013, the PD’s Office terminated Nugent by
letter, and the Rhode Island Laborers’ District Council, on behalf of
Local Union 800 LIUNA (LIUNA), responded by filing a grievance
on Nugent’s behalf, alleging termination without just cause.4 After
hearing the testimony of several employees and Nugent, an
arbitrator determined that the PD’s Office had just cause to
terminate Nugent’s employment based on the “egregiousness of
[Nugent’s] misconduct . . . and considering as well her prior record
of discipline.” 5
On June 27, 2014, Nugent filed dual actions: the first (Nugent
I) in Rhode Island Superior Court, appealing the arbitration
decision, and the second (Nugent II) with the Rhode Island
Commission
for
Human
Rights,
alleging
employment
6
discrimination.
In Nugent I, Nugent sought reversal of the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Nugent v. State Pub. Defender’s Office, 184 A.3d 703, 705 (R.I. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 705–06.
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arbitration decision and reinstatement to her position, alleging that
the arbitrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious given the
facts presented, thereby constituting a clear error of law based on
the evidence.7 The PD’s Office moved for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure, successfully arguing that Nugent lacked standing
to seek judicial review because she had not proved LIUNA breached
its duty of representation. 8 The court issued a bench decision
agreeing with the PD’s Office on December 9, 2014. 9
Simultaneous to Nugent I’s proceedings ending, Nugent II
advanced. On December 2, 2014, the Rhode Island Commission for
Human Rights issued Nugent a “right-to-sue” letter and, on March
2, 2015, Nugent filed a new complaint in Superior Court, advancing
Nugent II. 10 In her complaint, Nugent sought multiple forms of
relief and compensatory damages—including reinstatement to her
former position—for alleged unlawful employment discrimination
and retaliation. 11 Notably, reinstatement would have constituted
a reversal of Nugent’s termination as upheld by the arbitrator in
her original action and the court in Nugent I.12
On March 3, 2016, the PD’s Office argued that Nugent II was
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel on the basis that both
the claims and parties to the action were the same as those heard
and decided by the court in Nugent I. 13 On June 17, 2016, the court
7. Id. at 705. The Court noted that Nugent alleged “the [a]rbitrator[ ]
was arbitrary and capricious, based on facts, constituting clear error of law,
against a greater weight of evidence presented, and the intent of the mandates
and guidelines, protecting the confidentiality of Public Defender records, and
conflicts of interest.” Id.
8. Id. at 705–06. The PD’s Office based its argument on the court’s
holding in DiGuilio v. Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, 819
A.2d 1271, 1273 (R.I. 2003), that under the terms of the collective bargaining
agreements, unless there is evidence that the union breached its duty of fair
representation, only the parties to the agreement can appeal, in this case the
PD’s Office and LIUNA. Nugent, 184 A.3d at 706.
9. Id. at 706.
10. Id.
11. Id. Nugent sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief,
reinstatement to her former position, back pay, and compensatory damages,
alleging “unlawful employment discrimination based on race and disability,
and retaliation based on her prior complaints of race discrimination, disability
discrimination, religious discrimination, and sexual harassment.” Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. This argument was made before the same judge that had heard
Nugent I. Id.
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granted the PD’s Office’s motion for judgment on the pleadings,
entering final judgment in favor of the PD’s Office based on its res
judicata argument. 14
On July 7, 2015, Nugent appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, contending that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar her
discrimination claims in Nugent II because they were different from
the claims in her Nugent I action, which simply sought to vacate
the arbitrator’s decision.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In its review of the lower court’s application of res judicata, the
Supreme Court considered whether the lower court’s judgement
based on standing in Nugent I constituted an actual adjudication
on the matters raised in Nugent II.16 This determination hinged on
whether the hearing justice’s Rule 12(c) judgment on the pleadings
in Nugent I constituted a final judgment on the merits, thereby
appropriately forming the prior determination necessary for the
Superior Court’s application of res judicata in Nugent II.17 The
Supreme Court found that the determination of standing in Nugent
I fell short of being a judgment on the merits, despite being an
appropriate final decision. 18 The Supreme Court explained that in
order for a decision to be “on the merits,” a party must have been
provided the opportunity “to be heard.” 19
The Supreme Court found that the lower court’s determination
of standing in Nugent I did not form a final judgment on the merits
for the purposes of res judicata because it did not allow Nugent to
be heard on the merits of her case. 20 Grounding its decision in the
importance of protecting an individual’s right to due process, the
Supreme Court held that the lower court should not have barred
Nugent from seeking redress for her claims raised in Nugent II
14. Id. The PD’s Office argued that the underlying accusations raised and
dismissed in Nugent I were substantively the same as those Nugent alleged in
Nugent II. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 707.
17. Id. The Supreme Court used a Rule 12(b)(6) standard of “beyond a
reasonable doubt that a party would not be entitled to relief under any set of
conceivable facts that could be proven in support of the claim.” Id.
18. Id. at 708 (finding that the Superior Court correctly ruled on the
matter of standing in Nugent I).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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purely based on the standing determination in Nugent I. 21
COMMENTARY

The Supreme Court’s decision in Nugent II provides unionized
employees with a clear path for dual litigation tracks following
termination—the arbitration process and a separate action on the
underlying employment allegations—by removing the bar of res
judicata posed by an arbitration appeal dismissed for lack of
standing. 22 This alternative avenue reclaims union employees’
right of redress curtailed by the Supreme Court in DiGuilio v.
Rhode Island Brotherhood of Correctional Officers, which requires
a litigant to prove that her union breached its duty to represent her
in order to establish the requisite standing needed to appeal an
arbitration ruling in Superior Court. 23
The dissent does not take issue with whether a decision based
on standing is a ruling on the merits, but instead focuses on the fact
that the majority stopped short in its application of res judicata. 24
As the dissent notes, the Supreme Court’s previous interpretation
of the doctrine of res judicata consistently limited the relitigation of
issues that “were tried or might have been tried in an earlier
action.” 25 To this end, there was no procedural prohibition
preventing Nugent from including her allegation of discrimination
raised in Nugent II as part of her Nugent I appeal of the arbitration
decision.26 Instead, the majority looked simply to issues that “were
tried,” ignoring the “or might have been tried” plain-language
analysis mandated under its prior applications of res judicata. 27 By
not requiring Nugent to comprehensively plead her entire case in
one action, the Supreme Court effectively allowed her to try her
case “on an installment plan,” thereby getting more than “one bite

21. Id.
22. See id. at 709 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
23. DiGuilio v. R.I. Bhd. of Corr. Officers, 819 A.2d 1271, 1273 (R.I. 2003).
24. See Nugent, 184 A.3d at 709–10 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (citing Huntley v. State, 63 A.3d 526, 531 (R.I. 2013)) (emphasis in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bossian v. Anderson, 991
A.2d 1025, 1027 (R.I. 2010) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Carrozza v. Voccola, 962 A.2d 73, 78 (R.I. 2009) (emphasis in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Ouimette v. State, 785 A.2d 1132, 1138
(R.I. 2001).
26. Nugent, 184 A.3d at 709 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
27. Id. This is the dissent’s most compelling argument.
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at the apple.” 28
Given this absent analysis, the majority’s decision reads as a
statement of the Supreme Court’s resolve to protect the due process
rights of individual union litigants. 29
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court held that a final judgment denying an
appeal of an arbitration award, when rendered on the basis of
standing, does not constitute a final judgment on the merits for the
purposes of res judicata. 30 The Supreme Court determined that the
opportunity to be heard is a key determinant of whether res
judicata should apply. 31
Xaykham Khamsyvoravong

28. Id. at 711 (citing U.S. v. Cal. & Or. Land Co., 192 U.S. 355, 358 (1904);
Perez v. Pawtucket Redevelopment Agency, 302 A.2d 785, 791 (1973)).
29. Id. at 709, 711.
30. Id. at 708.
31. Id.

Civil Procedure. Hawes v. Reilly, 184 A.3d 661 (R.I. 2018).
Pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
an order by a Utah state court finding a “prima facie showing of
sufficient facts to establish . . . personal jurisdiction” 1 does not
require full faith and credit in Rhode Island when the issue of
personal jurisdiction has not been either fully and fairly litigated or
decided with finality.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

InnerLight Holdings, Inc. is a company with its principal place
of business in Utah.2 InnerLight hired William Reilly 3 to be its
corporate counsel while it worked to get authorization from the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to trade
the company’s shares publicly.4 InnerLight filed a complaint in
Utah District Court, stating it agreed to pay William 650,000
shares for his services, with William holding 600,000 more shares
to be transferred to him once the company went public.5 InnerLight
claimed William transferred, without permission, 700,000
InnerLight shares through various corporate entities: Ashworth
Development, LLC; Doylestown Partners, Inc.; Shamrock Equities,
Inc.; and Beachview Associates, Inc. 6 Defendant Daniel P. Reilly,
William’s son, was a minority shareholder and officer in
Doylestown, Shamrock, and Beachview. 7 Plaintiff George T.
Hawes purchased InnerLight warrants and stock that William
purportedly transferred into the aforementioned corporate
entities.8 InnerLight eventually rescinded the stock offerings, and
1. Hawes v. Reilly, 184 A.3d 661, 666 (R.I. 2018).
2. Id. at 663.
3. William Reilly, Daniel Reilly, and Shannon Reilly will be referred to
by their first names, as the court did in its Opinion, to avoid confusion.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 663–64.
7. Id.
8. Id. A warrant is “[a]n option to buy a stock at a specified price from
an issuing company.” Warrant, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1953 (5th ed. 2011).
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Hawes never received a refund. 9
On March 16, 2010, InnerLight filed its previous federal
complaint in a Utah state court against William, Daniel, Shannon
Reilly (Daniel’s sister), the corporate entities, Hawes, and other
purchasers of InnerLight stock. 10 Hawes answered the complaint
and filed a cross-claim against William, Daniel, Shannon, and
others. 11 On June 29, 2010, Daniel, Shannon, and the corporate
entities filed a motion to dismiss InnerLight’s complaint in Utah
state court on grounds that Utah did not have personal jurisdiction
over them. 12 At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, neither
Daniel nor his counsel were present. 13 The state proceeding was
removed to federal court, where the Utah District Court denied the
motion to dismiss in an order which stated, in its entirety,
“InnerLight made a prima facie showing by pleading sufficient facts
to establish that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
each of the non-resident Defendants.” 14 On May 11, 2012, the Utah
state court entered a default judgment on Hawes’ cross-claim
against Daniel, William, Shannon, and the corporate entities. 15
On April 21, 2014, Hawes filed a “Petition to Enforce a Foreign
Judgment” in Rhode Island Superior Court, requesting
enforcement of the default judgment entered against Daniel in
Utah state court.16 On June 20, 2014, the Superior Court issued an
execution in the amount of $971,351.78.17 On October 30, 2014,
Daniel filed a motion to quash the execution and dismiss Hawes’s
petition for lack of personal jurisdiction in the Utah state court
action. 18
On April 27, 2015, after considering the briefs and hearing
arguments from both parties, the hearing justice issued a written
decision on Daniel’s motions.19 In that decision, the hearing justice
9. Hawes, 184 A.3d at 664.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. This case focuses on the events in Utah state court as they relate
to Daniel and Hawes. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The default judgment was for $775,000, plus “reasonable
expenses, including attorney’s fees.” Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 665.
19. Id.
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addressed whether he needed to give full faith and credit to the
Utah state court’s order denying Daniel’s motion to dismiss. 20 The
hearing justice determined he did not need to give full faith and
credit to the Utah state court’s order because the order was “vague,”
it did not include any “underlying reasoning,” and it appeared that
a “final determination of personal jurisdiction had [not been]
reached.” 21 Instead, he noted, “the order only states a prima facie
showing of personal jurisdiction had been made.” 22 The hearing
justice then reviewed Daniel’s contacts with Utah and the
applicable Utah law and concluded Utah did not have personal
jurisdiction over Daniel. 23 Accordingly, he dismissed Hawes’
petition and quashed the execution. 24 Hawes timely appealed to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 25
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The court initially sought to determine whether the Utah state
court’s order finding a prima facie showing that the Utah state
court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Daniel should be
granted full faith and credit.26 In doing so, the court applied de
novo review because the appeal dealt with a question of law that
implicated a constitutional right.27 The court noted that if Daniel
had submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Utah for the limited
purpose of challenging jurisdiction, he would have been agreeing to
abide by that court’s determination on the issue of jurisdiction. 28
Accordingly, the court said that determination would have been
binding on any further proceedings related to the question of
jurisdiction.29 Here, the court found that Daniel had submitted
himself to the limited jurisdiction of Utah for the purpose of
determining personal jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss for

20. Id. “Full faith and credit” refers to the duty states have to respect the
“public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state[,]” pursuant
to the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
21. Hawes, 184 A.3d at 665.
22. Id. (emphasis in original).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 666.
29. Id.
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lack of personal jurisdiction. 30 In order to grant the order full faith
and credit, however, the court had to decide whether the issue had
been “fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court
which rendered the original judgment.” 31 The court found that the
issue was not fully and fairly litigated because (1) neither Daniel
nor his counsel was present at oral arguments in Utah when the
motion was decided, and (2) the Utah state court’s order did not
include any insight into the arguments of the parties or the court’s
reasoning. 32 The court also highlighted that, prior to the entry of
default judgment, the Utah state court’s order had found only a
prima facie showing of sufficient facts to establish the Utah court’s
personal jurisdiction over Daniel, which is not a “final decision” on
the issue.33 As a result, the court found that the Utah court’s order
against Daniel was not entitled to full faith and credit in Rhode
Island. 34
The court then sought to determine whether, under Utah law,
Utah had personal jurisdiction over Daniel.35 The court, following
Utah law, began a two-pronged inquiry to determine (1) whether
the requirements of Utah’s long-arm statute were satisfied, and (2)
whether the assertion of jurisdiction violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36 The court began its
analysis by deciding whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction
violated due process and deciding whether the Utah state court was
asserting specific or general jurisdiction over Daniel. 37 The court
found that the assertion must have been specific jurisdiction given
that the factual basis for the case was based upon Daniel’s
involvement as a minority shareholder in various corporate
entities, with none of those corporate entities (nor Daniel)
conducting substantial and continuous activity in Utah.38 The
court then found that Daniel had no clear contacts with Utah other
than being a shareholder and officer in the corporate entities being
30. Id.
31. Id. at 667 (quoting Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111 (1963))
(emphasis in original).
32. Id. at 668–69.
33. Id. at 668.
34. Id. at 669.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Pohl, Inc. of America v. Webelhuth, 201 P.3d 944, 950 (Utah
2008)).
37. Id. at 669–70.
38. Id. at 671.
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sued by Hawes—entities which, according to an affidavit filed with
the Rhode Island Superior Court by Daniel, were incorporated in,
and had their principal place of business in, Florida. 39 The affidavit
also stated Daniel was a resident of Rhode Island, that he had only
been physically present in Utah once (on a 2007 ski trip), and that
Daniel did not participate in William’s work for InnerLight.40
Accordingly, the court concluded that Daniel did not have the
sufficient “minimum contacts” envisioned by the United States
Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington.41
Thus, the court found that Utah did not have specific personal
jurisdiction over Daniel.42
Lastly, the court considered whether Daniel forfeited the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction under the court’s precedent
in Pullar v. Cappelli. 43 The court found that neither filing a motion
to dismiss on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, nor
attempting to remove the case to federal court, gave Hawes a
reasonable expectation that the suit would be defended on the
merits.44 Accordingly, the court found Daniel had not forfeited the
defense of lack of personal jurisdiction as the defendant had in
Pullar. 45
COMMENTARY

The court found that Daniel and his counsel not being present
at the Utah state court’s hearing on Daniel’s motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction was evidence that the issue was not
“fairly and fully litigated.” 46 In doing so, however, the court seemed
to directly contradict its argument against Daniel forfeiting his
ability to contest Utah’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over him
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
42. Id. at 672.
43. Id. (citing Pullar v. Cappelli, 148 A.3d 551, 553 (R.I. 2016)).
[A] defense of lack of personal jurisdiction [can] be forfeited when the
defendant, through delay or conduct, give[s] a plaintiff a reasonable
expectation that it will defend the suit on the merits or cause[s] the
court to go to some effort that would be wasted if personal jurisdiction
is later found lacking.
Id. (citing Pullar, 148 A.3d at 558) (internal quotations omitted).
44. Id. at 673.
45. Id. (citing Pullar, 148 A.3d at 553).
46. Id. at 668.
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under the rule laid out in Pullar.47 The court, in deciding Daniel
had not forfeited his ability to contest Utah’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over him, distinguished the facts in the instant case
from those in Pullar. 48 Here, Daniel had not given Hawes a
reasonable expectation that he would defend the suit on the merits,
as the defendant had in Pullar, but Daniel had given the Utah state
court a reasonable expectation that he would defend his motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 49 In not defending his
motion, Daniel never appeared in Utah again, forcing the Utah
court to issue a default judgment against him.50 Despite this,
Daniel benefited by not appearing to defend his motion.51 This
benefit stands in stark contrast to the principle of a defendant not
being allowed to “pull[ ] personal jurisdiction out of the hat like a
rabbit in the face of an inhospitable sea,” which is how the court
decided that the defendant in Pullar had forfeited his defense of
lack of personal jurisdiction because he had wasted the court’s
time. 52 Here, despite Daniel wasting the Utah state court’s time by
not defending his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
and never showing up for trial, Daniel benefited from his absence
when he then pulled the lack of personal jurisdiction argument out
again in the face of Hawes’ attempt to enforce a default judgment
against him in Rhode Island. 53
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, pursuant to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an order by a
Utah state court finding a prima facie showing of sufficient facts to
establish personal jurisdiction did not require full faith and credit
in Rhode Island, as the issue of personal jurisdiction had not been
fully and fairly litigated or decided with finality, and the Defendant
did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Utah.
Luis A. Vargas

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Pullar, 148 A.3d at 558.
See Hawes, 184 A.3d at 673.
See id. at 664.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 672.
Id.

Criminal Law. State v. Marizan, 185 A.3d 510 (R.I. 2018). A
prosecutor’s comment to a jury does not violate a defendant’s Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, so long as a jury would not
“naturally and necessarily construe” the comment as going to the
defendant’s failure to testify. In such an event, a cautionary
instruction must be immediately provided to inform the jury that
the defendant has a constitutional right to be free from compulsion
of any kind to testify in his own defense. Further, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court will not overturn a trial justice’s evidentiary ruling
allowing a “mug shot” into trial absent a clear showing that he or
she abused her discretion, which resulted in prejudicial error.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On February 14, 2014, a grand jury indicted Andre Marizan on
two counts of first-degree sexual assault. 1 The events that led to
Marizan’s indictment were recalled through testimony by multiple
witnesses at trial.2 On August 17, 2012, the complaining witness,
Alicia, and her sister, Lauren, spent a few hours at a South County
beach. 3 Alicia and Lauren were both drinking Hennessy liquor and
when the beach closed, they drove to Lauren’s ex-boyfriend’s house
(the Providence residence) and continued to drink alcohol with
Lauren’s friends. 4 The “party” eventually moved from the living
room to the bedroom where, after smoking marijuana and drinking
alcohol, Alicia vomited and later “passed out” on a bed. 5 Alicia
recalled waking up around 7:00 a.m., not wearing pants or
underwear, and feeling a wet substance on her leg. 6 Alicia then
noticed Marizan at the corner of the bed and began “flipping out”

1. State v. Marizan, 185 A.3d 510, 513 (R.I. 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id. The court used pseudonyms when referencing the complaining
witness and her sister. Id. at 513 n.2.
4. Id. One of Lauren’s friends was the defendant, Andre Marizan. Id.
5. Id. Sometime after 11:00 p.m., but before 3:00 a.m., the group left the
house to purchase alcohol. Id.
6. Id.

449

450 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:449
on him. 7 Alicia testified that Marizan told her she was “bugging,”
that “nothing happened,” and that the wet substance she felt was
urine. 8 Marizan told her that she removed her clothing because she
urinated on herself.9
During that same night, Lauren recalled playing a prank on
Alicia and Marizan around 3:00 a.m. while they were asleep. 10
After the prank, Lauren and her friends returned to the living room
and approximately fifteen minutes later, one of Lauren’s friends
attempted to open the bedroom door but it was locked. 11 When one
of Lauren’s friends finally unlocked the door, Lauren remembered
seeing Alicia asleep without her pants and Marizan wearing only
boxer shorts.12 Lauren also recalled that, after waking Alicia,
Alicia began to attack Marizan.13 After Marizan left the scene,
Lauren drove Alicia to the hospital.14
At the hospital, the emergency room nurse performed a routine
sexual-assault examination on Alicia and notified the police when
the exam was complete. 15 The police responded to the Providence
residence and conducted an investigation into the alleged sexual
assault. 16 The police showed Alicia a “mug shot,” and she positivity
identified Marizan as her assailant. 17 The police later obtained
Marizan’s consent to take a buccal swab of his mouth and after
further investigation, the police obtained an arrest warrant for
Marizan.18
7. Id. at 513–14.
8. Id. at 514.
9. Id.
10. Id. The prank was recorded on Lauren’s phone and presented to the
jury. Id. at 513 n.5.
11. Id. at 514.
12. Id. Lauren stated that, even though she was concerned, she returned
to the living room and, around 6:00 a.m., left to get breakfast and woke Alicia
when she returned thirty minutes to an hour later. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Lauren drove Alicia to Women & Infants’ Hospital in Providence.
Id.
15. Id. The nurse, Amy Corrado, testified at trial that Alicia told her she
had showered prior to the examination, but was wearing the same clothes from
when the incident occurred. Id.
16. Id. Detective Joseph Villella testified that he collected the bedding
from the scene for testing at the Rhode Island Department of Health, and
Detective William Corrigan testified that he took formal statements from both
Alicia and Lauren. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 514–15. Detective Corrigan testified that he did not take
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Cara Lupino, the supervisor for the Rhode Island Department
of Health Forensic DNA Laboratory, performed the testing on
Alicia’s sexual-assault examination. 19 She explained that Alicia’s
sexual-assault examination tested positive for seminal fluid but did
not contain sperm cells. 20 Ms. Lupino explained that she used a
standard DNA test on both Marizan’s buccal swab and Alicia’s
vaginal swab and could not determine whether the small amount of
seminal fluid on the vaginal swab was consistent with Marizan’s
DNA profile.21 At that time, however, the laboratory acquired the
ability to perform Y–STR testing, which showed that Alicia’s
vaginal swab and Marizan’s buccal swab were consistent with
Marizan’s Y–STR DNA profile.22 Ms. Lupino considered Y–STR
testing effective in this case given the lack of sperm in the seminal
fluid and overwhelming amount of female cells on the vaginal
swab.23
At trial, after the prosecutor’s closing argument, Marizan
moved for a mistrial, arguing “that one of the prosecutor’s
comments violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify.” 24 The
trial justice reserved his decision on this motion. 25 The trial justice
gave the jury its instructions, and, after deliberation, it returned a
guilty verdict.26 The trial justice immediately denied Marizan’s
motion for a mistrial.27 Marizan then moved for a new trial, which
witness statements from the other men at the Providence residence because
Alicia warned him that the men were Marizan’s friends and they would not
cooperate. Id. at 515.
19. Id. at 515. Cara Lupino testified for the State. Id.
20. Id. Ms. Lupino further testified that the test performed on the
bedding contained a bloodstain that came from a male donor. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Y–STRs are found only in the male’s Y chromosome and, thus, Y–
STR testing ignores the female DNA that often overwhelms the male DNA, as
it did here. Id. at 515 n.7. However, Y–STR testing does not identify a
particular individual because “a male inherits the DNA type from his father
and shares that type with siblings, uncles, and cousins.” Id.
24. Id. at 515.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. When the court rules on a motion for a mistrial, it affords the trial
justice’s decision “great weight” and only reverses “if it was clearly wrong.” Id.
at 516 (quoting State v. Fry, 130 A.3d 812, 828 (R.I. 2016)). When the trial
justice rules on a motion for mistrial, he or she “must determine whether the
evidence would cause the jurors to be so inflamed as to make them unable to
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented.” Id. (quoting State v.
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the trial justice also denied before sentencing him to forty years at
the Adult Correctional Institution with twenty-five years to serve
and fifteen years suspended with probation. 28 Marizan filed a
timely appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 29
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A. Marizan’s Constitutional Right to Remain Silent
The first issue on appeal was whether the prosecutor’s
comment during her closing argument violated Marizan’s Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent. 30 Because this allegation
concerned Marizan’s constitutional rights, the court conducted a de
novo review. 31 In determining whether a prosecutor’s statement
violates a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right, the court looks to
whether “the language used in the [prosecutor’s] comment was
manifestly intended or was of such a character that a jury would
naturally and necessarily construe it to amount to a comment on
the failure of the accused to testify.” 32 In its assessment, the court
reviewed the context of the statement and in light of the
circumstances, to determine how a “jury composed of ordinary,
intelligent lay persons would have understood it during closing
arguments.” 33 The court noted that in the event that such a
comment violated this standard, a cautionary instruction must
immediately be given to cure the error and prevent undue
prejudice.34
Enos, 21 A.3d 326, 332 (R.I. 2011)).
28. Id. at 515. Marizan also must register as a sex offender and obtain
counseling. Id.
29. Id. A motion for a new trial was also discussed in the Opinion but will
not be of focus in this survey.
30. Id. at 516. The prosecutor began her closing argument with the
following: “Lets clear up one thing. There’s not a shred of evidence in this case,
not a shred before you, to suggest that this was consensual sex. Not from
[Alicia]. Certainly not from [Lauren]. And certainly not from him.” Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 517 (quoting State v. Fontaine, 323 A.2d 571, 574 (R.I. 1974)).
The United States Supreme Court has held that “the Fifth Amendment forbids
either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by
the court that such silence is evidence of guilt.” Id. at 516 (citing Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)).
33. Id. at 517 (quoting State v. Andrews, 390 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I. 1978)).
34. Id.
“[T]he cautionary instruction must be . . . in language
understandable by the ordinary, reasonable man that the defendant has a
constitutional right to be free from compulsion of any kind, physical or mental

2019]

SURVEY SECTION

453

When Marizan moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s
comment, the State argued that the prosecutor was not referencing
Marizan’s decision not to testify; rather, the State was responding
to his contention that the sex was consensual.35 Although Marizan
agreed that a prosecutor is permitted to rebut a consent argument,
he contended that the statement crossed the line. 36 As noted, the
court examined this remark in the context in which it was made,
highlighting the fact that the prosecutor did not directly comment
on Marizan’s failure to take the stand, but commented on the lack
of evidence before the jury showing the sex was consensual,
including from Marizan himself. 37
The court gives “[a]
prosecutor . . . considerable latitude in closing argument, as long as
the statements pertain only to the evidence presented and
represent reasonable inferences from the record.” 38
Ultimately, the court found that the prosecutor’s comment did
not violate Marizan’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 39
Further, the fact that the trial justice provided a general
instruction immediately after the prosecutor completed her closing
argument comforted the court, which presumes that such
instructions are followed by the jury.40 Accordingly, the court found
the prosecutor’s statement was not “of such a character that a jury
would . . . construe it to amount to a comment on the failure of the
accused to testify,” 41 and therefore the trial justice did not clearly
err in denying Marizan’s motion for a mistrial. 42

to testify in his own defense.” Id. (quoting State v. Sherman, 317 A.2d 445,
448 (R.I. 1974)); see State v. Simpson, 606 A.2d 677, 679 (R.I. 1992) (holding
that in a trial with three defendants, where one elected not to testify, the trial
justice’s failure to instruct the jury at the close of evidence as to the defendant’s
right not to testify was prejudicial error); but see State v. Enos, 21 A.3d 326,
333 (R.I. 2011) (holding that the trial justice’s curative instruction to the jury
sufficed to extinguish “any prejudice that may have arisen”).
35. Id. at 518. A hearing on Marizan’s motion for a mistrial took place in
the absence of the jury. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 518–19.
38. Id. at 519 (citing State v. Cavanaugh, 158 A.3d 268, 278 (R.I. 2017)).
39. Id.
40. Id. The instruction pertained to the defendant’s right not to testify
and that he had every right to remain silent, and that right could not be held
against him. Id.
41. Id. at 520 (citing Fontaine, 323 A.2d at 574).
42. Id.
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B. Admissibility of Marizan’s “Mug Shot”
The second issue on appeal was whether the trial justice
properly admitted Marizan’s “mug shot” into evidence.43 In Rhode
Island, to determine whether a “mug shot” should be admitted into
evidence, courts employ a three-prong test known as “the Lemon
test”:
(1) the prosecution must have a demonstrable need to
introduce the photographs; (2) the photographs must not
imply that the defendant had a prior criminal record; and
(3) the manner of introduction at trial must be such that it
does not draw particular attention to the source of
implications of the photographs.44
Here, the court found that the first two prongs of the Lemon
test were not satisfied. 45 The court explained that the State failed
to satisfy the first prong because the prosecutor acknowledged
Marizan’s identity was not at issue, and his photograph was used
solely for the police to get an identification from Alicia. 46 Moreover,
the court found that the State did not satisfy the second prong of
the Lemon test because the State did not separate Marizan’s
double-shot photograph, suggesting to the jury that he had a
criminal record.47
After finding that the State failed to meet the Lemon test, the
court then had to determine if the introduction of the “mug shot”

43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting State v. Long, 488 A.2d 427, 431 (R.I. 1985)). The test was
first outlined in State v. Lemon, 456 A.2d 261 (R.I. 1983). Id. The court did
not analyze the third prong in its opinion and, thus, it will not be addressed in
this survey.
45. Id. at 521.
46. Id.; see Long, 488 A.2d at 432–33 (listing reasons why the introduction
of a “mug shot” at trial is necessary, such as hesitation or doubt with the incourt identification, or a defendant looks physically different from the time of
arrest).
47. Marizan, 185 A.3d 510 at 521; see State v. Dinnagen, 639 A.2d 1353,
1357 (R.I. 1994) (holding that the State failed to satisfy the Lemon test when
they cut out the middle of a photograph that contained the identification
plaque the defendant was holding but left two stamps of the police department
visible on the back of the photograph). But see State v. Delarosa, 59 A.3d 1185,
1189 (R.I. 2013) (deeming the Lemon test irrelevant even though the
photograph was taken when the defendant was incarcerated but contained no
suggestion that he was in prison at the time).
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constituted reversible error. 48 The court acknowledged that if the
State provides “competent evidence from which the jury could
convict the defendant aside from the improperly admitted
photograph, the introduction of such a picture ‘is not prejudicial.’” 49
Moreover, if it is not reasonably possible for the objectionable
evidence to “influence an average jury on the ultimate issue of guilt
or innocence,” then the inclusion of such evidence may be
harmless. 50
Here, the court found that the admission of the photograph was
not reversible error.51 It noted that the trial justice gave a
cautionary instruction immediately prior to the prosecutor’s
introduction of the photograph. 52 Furthermore, the DNA evidence
demonstrated the presence of Marizan’s seminal fluid in the
vaginal swab samples taken from Alicia, and two witnesses for the
State corroborated each other’s testimony.53 Therefore, the court
held that, because the trial justice gave a timely cautionary
instruction regarding Marizan’s photograph and provided other
evidence of guilt, admission of the photograph was not reversible
error. 54
COMMENTARY

In this case, the majority opinion focused much of its analysis
on whether the prosecutor’s comment violated Marizan’s Fifth
Amendment right not to testify. 55 The court determined that, when
looking at the statement in context, the prosecutor’s comment did
not violate Marizan’s constitutional right because the prosecutor
provided the trial justice with a detailed explanation as to how the
48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Dinnagen, 639 A.2d at 1357).
50. Id. (quoting Dinnagen, 639 A.2d at 1357). The court in Dinnagen held
that the admission of the defendant’s picture was not reversible error because
the jury heard evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal record. Id.
51. Id. at 522.
52. Id. at 521. In summation, the cautionary instruction to the jury
provided that the relevance of the evidence was simply a picture shown to
Alicia to identify the defendant and no other conclusions should be drawn from
the photograph. Id.
53. Id. at 521–22. The testimony was also supported by video footage
evidence showing Alicia unconscious. Id. at 522.
54. Id.
55. The dissent focused its analysis on whether Marizan’s Fifth
Amendment right was violated and, thus, that issue will be the sole focus of
this Commentary.

456 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:449
comment related to Marizan’s statement to Alicia that she urinated
on herself. 56 Additionally, the majority acknowledged that the trial
justice provided the jury with a general instruction immediately
after the prosecutor completed her closing argument. 57 The
instruction informed the jury that Marizan has a right to remain
silent and that his choice to invoke that right could not be held
against him. 58 Thus, the majority was satisfied with the ruling of
the trial justice.59
However, Justice Robinson, in his dissenting opinion,
conducted the same analysis and found that the prosecutor’s
argument did in fact violate Marizan’s Fifth Amendment right.60
The dissent’s analysis provided a more generalized view of the
context of the prosecutor’s statement, analyzing how a reasonable
jury might have perceived the comment in light of all the testimony
at trial rather than just the prosecutor’s closing argument. 61 The
dissent noted that both Alicia and Lauren testified at length during
the trial, whereas Marizan did not testify at all.62 In the dissent’s
more expansive view of the statement’s context, it found that a jury
composed of ordinarily intelligent lay persons could reasonably
understand the prosecutor’s comment to be “a comment on the
failure of the accused to testify.” 63
Furthermore, the dissent noted that the jury never heard the
prosecutor’s explanation as to why her comment did not violate
Marizan’s Fifth Amendment right.64 The dissent reasoned that
because the prosecutor had to explain the intended meaning of the
statement to the court, that indicates that the comment was
ambiguous and needed a curative instruction. 65 In the dissent’s
view, because no curative instruction was immediately given to the
jury, the trial justice’s later given general instruction regarding
Marizan’s right not to testify was insufficient to cure the potential
56. Id. at 518–19. The trial justice explained that when he heard the
prosecutor’s explanation, he said, “it certainly made sense to me, and I believe
it was fair comment because that was testimony in the case.” Id. at 519.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 524 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
61. See id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 513 n.1 (majority opinion).
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prejudice. 66 The record revealed that the prosecutor’s comment
was separated from the trial justice’s general instruction by thirtytwo transcript pages, and though it is difficult to determine how
much time actually elapsed, certainly a substantial amount of time
passed between the comment and the jury instruction. 67 Thus,
under the dissent’s more generalized view of context, it is more
likely that a reasonable juror would have found the prosecutor’s
comment to be about Marizan’s constitutional right not to testify. 68
The dissent’s argument is persuasive because it illustrates that
reasonable minds could form different conclusions when looking at
something in context. Here, the majority and dissenting opinions
looked at the prosecutor’s statement in different contexts. When
determining if the prosecutor’s statement violated Marizan’s Fifth
Amendment right, the majority examined the comment only in the
context of the prosecutor’s closing argument. This examination
limits the scope of a juror’s perception of the statement to that one
aspect of the trial. Using the dissent’s broader view of context, the
trial justice should have considered not only how a juror might have
perceived the statement during the prosecutor’s closing arguments,
but also how a juror would perceive the comment in light of all the
testimony or lack thereof. By using the broad context of a
statement, a trial justice would be more apt to provide an
immediate cautionary instruction to a jury out of fear that it would
be tainted by undue prejudice. The dissent’s argument provides a
new lens for judges to examine whether a comment made during
trial violates a defendant’s constitutional right. Using the dissent’s
approach, a court should analyze the statement itself, how it could
be viewed given the statements surrounding the comment, and how
the comment could be viewed given all the testimony presented at
trial.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the prosecutor’s
closing argument did not impermissibly comment on Marizan’s
constitutional right not to testify. The court also determined that
66. Id. at 525 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
67. Id. “[A] cautionary instruction [must] be given immediately in order
that the seed planted by the remark will not be given time to germinate.” Id.
at 517 (citing State v. Andrews, 390 A.2d 926, 929 (R.I. 1978)).
68. Id.

458 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:449
the trial court erred in admitting the “mug shot” into evidence
because the State failed to establish a demonstrable need for the
photograph’s introduction and failed to separate the “mug shot” so
the jury would not know of Marizan’s criminal record. However,
the erroneous admission of Marizan’s “mug shot” did not constitute
reversible error on appeal.
Shane Gallant

Criminal Law. State v. Minior, 175 A.3d 1202 (R.I. 2018). A final
judgment for a defendant on a civil violation heard in the Traffic
Tribunal does not preclude the State from bringing criminal
charges for the same transaction or occurrence against the same
defendant.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In February 2014, the Town of Bristol (the Town) Police
Department cited Defendant Benjamin Minior with a “civil
violation of reasonable and prudent speeds” following a vehicle
collision with a telephone pole and tree.1 Two people were in the
vehicle at the time of the collision, though who was driving the
vehicle remains an unresolved question. 2 Both Minior and the
other person in the vehicle were taken to Rhode Island Hospital
with injuries. 3 Because the police suspected Minior was under the
influence, Minior was administered a blood test which revealed a
blood-alcohol content of 0.153 mg/dl. 4 Subsequently, Minior was
issued a summons to appear at an arraignment for driving under
the influence (DUI), serious bodily injury resulting. 5
In April 2014, Minior appeared in front of the Traffic Tribunal
(Tribunal) to contest the civil citation.6 When the Tribunal
magistrate saw that Minior was also being charged criminally with
a DUI by the State of Rhode Island, she advised the Town to alert
the State of the civil violation proceedings, which the Town did.7
Two Bristol police officers testified at the Tribunal as to what
they saw when they arrived on the scene of the accident, but the
Town presented no evidence as to what occurred just before or
during the accident. 8 Accordingly, the Tribunal magistrate held
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

State v. Minior, 175 A.3d 1202, 1204 (R.I. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1209 n.3.
Id. at 1204–05.

459

460 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:459
that the Town offered insufficient evidence to show Minior was the
person operating the vehicle, and thus she could not sustain a
violation for reasonable and prudent speeds. 9 The civil charges
were dismissed. 10
In December 2014, the State filed a criminal information in
Rhode Island Superior Court charging Minior with DUI, serious
bodily injury resulting, and reckless driving. 11 Minior filed a
motion to dismiss the criminal charges based on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.12 Pursuant to his motion, Minior argued that
the Tribunal had already issued a final judgment determining that
there was insufficient evidence to show that Minior had been
driving the vehicle or was exceeding the speed limit. Given this
finding, Minior asserted that the criminal charges were collaterally
estopped from proceeding. 13
The Superior Court magistrate granted Minior’s motion to
dismiss.14 The State appealed the magistrate’s ruling to a Superior
Court justice; the justice reversed the magistrate’s decision,
reinstating the criminal charges against Minior.15 Minior appealed
to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, where the Court reviewed
the issue of collateral estoppel de novo. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The court held that the State was not estopped from bringing
DUI and reckless driving criminal charges against Minior, despite
the Tribunal ruling that the Town did not present sufficient
evidence to show that Minior was the driver. 17 The court reasoned
that the Tribunal was bound by different rules and regulations than
9. Id. at 1205.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is applicable when there is
“(1) an identity of issues, (2) the previous proceeding must have resulted in a
final judgment on the merits, and (3) the party against whom collateral
estoppel is asserted must be the same or in privity with a party in the previous
proceeding.” Id. at 1206.
13. See id. at 1205.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 1209. The court noted the issue “left hanging” in State v.
Pacheco—whether a decision in a Tribunal hearing could estop criminal
charges on the same occurrence—could now be resolved given the nature of
Minior’s case. 161 A.3d 1166 (R.I. 2017); Minior, 175 A.3d at 1207.
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the criminal court. 18 Namely, in the Tribunal there was no right to
counsel, less “latitude” in discovery, a lower burden of proof, and
less formal hearings. 19 The court determined that precluding the
criminal charges would yield inequitable results for the State, and
thus it should not be estopped from bringing those criminal charges
based on the Tribunal’s decision. 20 Accordingly, the court classified
Tribunal decisions on traffic violations as final and valid, but in this
case, “only a small part of a larger, ongoing criminal
investigation.” 21
In explaining its decision, the court focused on what it viewed
to be the major differences between the Tribunal and the criminal
court, specifically discovery expectations, burdens of proof, and
inequitable results.22 First, a defendant in the Tribunal “is not
guaranteed the right to counsel,” as he would be in criminal court. 23
Second, in the Tribunal, the town or state must show by clear and
convincing evidence that a defendant committed the infraction at
issue, whereas in a criminal proceeding, the town or state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
charged crime. 24 Third, due to the different burdens of proof, the
Tribunal and the criminal court have different discovery
expectations.25 At the Tribunal, the state or the town are not
“statutorily or constitutionally obligated to put forward all its
evidence,” as they would be in a criminal case. 26 Finally, the court
posited that if the State was estopped from bringing criminal
charges emanating from traffic citations following a negative
Tribunal decision, it would “hinder [the State’s] ability to carefully
strategize the prosecution of criminal suspects” because the State
would be compelled to present its case at a much earlier period in

18. Minior, 175 A.3d at 1207.
19. Id. at 1207–08.
20. Id. at 1207. Additionally, the court suggested that estopping the State
from bringing criminal charges based on a Tribunal decision was a risk to
public safety and would “be an inequity to the community.” Id. at 1208.
21. Id. at 1209.
22. See id. at 1208.
23. Id.
24. Id. The burden of proof required in a Tribunal hearing—clear and
convincing evidence—is contrasted with that of the burden of proof in a
criminal proceed—beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. (quoting State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347 (R.I. 2005)) (comparing
Tribunals to probation-revocation hearings).
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the investigation process. 27 Because of these concerns, the court
held that collateral estoppel is not applicable to criminal charges
brought from traffic violations already heard and decided in the
Tribunal.28 Justice Flaherty dissented, arguing that all the
elements of collateral estoppel were met, and thus collateral
estoppel should apply to the case at issue. 29
COMMENTARY

The court noted that it was closing an issue “left hanging” in
State v. Pacheco,30 offering a clear determination that collateral
estoppel does not apply when the State files criminal charges
emanating from a traffic citation that was heard and decided in the
Tribunal in favor of a defendant.31 However, the rationale offered
by the court, as Justice Flaherty argued in his dissent, seemed to
gloss over the elements of collateral estoppel in an effort to close
that “hanging” issue. 32 The dissenting opinion convincingly
argued that the purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent the
inequity of a defendant having to defend himself twice for the same,
or nearly the same, conduct. 33
In his dissent, Justice Flaherty argued that the majority
opinion misplaced the concern of inequitable results, and instead
should be concerned that the “balance of equities tilt[ed] decidedly
in the defendant’s favor.” 34 Here, the State had notice of the
Tribunal hearing for Minior’s case and could have intervened to
present evidence demonstrating that Minior was, in fact, the driver
of the vehicle.35 Because the State had adequate notice and chose
not to engage on the issue, the dissent concluded that he could
“reach no other conclusion than . . . that the defendant was not

27. Id. Here, the court made a brief observation that the application of
collateral estoppel would create a higher burden of proof and then force
defendants to have to more zealously defend themselves without the benefit of
a jury trial or an appointed attorney. Id.
28. Id. at 1208–09.
29. Id. at 1209 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
30. See id. at 1207 (majority opinion); see also supra note 17.
31. Id. at 1209.
32. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting). Collateral estoppel is defined supra note
12.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1209–10.
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driving” at the time of the incident. 36 The dissent posited that the
burden should sit with the Town and the State, not with the
defendant.37
To prove collateral estoppel, the defendant had to show that
there was: “(1) an identity of issues, (2) the previous proceeding
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the
party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must be the
same or in privity with a party in the previous proceeding.” 38 In
front of the Tribunal, the Town had to show by clear and convincing
evidence that Minior was driving the vehicle at the time of the
accident—the key element in each of the three criminal charges
brought against Minior by the State—and the Town was unable to
produce such evidence. 39 The State had notice of Minior’s hearing
in front of the Tribunal and did not provide any supporting
evidence. 40 The Tribunal then rendered a valid and final judgment,
stating that there was insufficient evidence to show that Minior had
been driving the vehicle at the time of the infraction.41 Finally, as
Justice Flaherty noted, the State and Town had a “sufficient
mutuality of interest” to create privity because “the town
prosecuted [the] defendant for exceeding reasonable and prudent
speeds, a violation of a state statute.” 42 In consideration of each of
these facts, and as held in the dissenting opinion, all of the elements
of collateral estoppel are met. 43
In precluding the application of collateral estoppel in this case,
the court is arguably providing the State with two bites at the
apple, causing the defendant to defend himself twice for the same
conduct.44 When read literally, the elements of collateral estoppel
require that a “valid and final judgment” be rendered.45 The
dissent concluded that given all the points above, collateral estoppel
should apply to criminal charges brought from traffic violations
that have been adjudged in the Traffic Tribunal. The decision not

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 1210.
See id.
Id. at 1206 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1209 n.3 (Flaherty, J. dissenting).
Id. at 1210.
Id. at 1209 n.1.
Id. at 1209.
Id.
Id.
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to apply collateral estoppel to these facts was not inequitable to the
state, but rather to the defendant when “the balance of equities
[should] tilt[ ] in the defendant’s favor.” 46
CONCLUSION

The court held that the Tribunal’s judgment in favor of Minior
did not collaterally estop the State from bringing criminal charges
against Minior for the same incident due to the fundamental
differences between Tribunal and criminal proceedings.
Amy Greer

46.

Id.

Criminal Law. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540 (R.I. 2018). The
Registration Act repealed and replaced the prior statute and now
governs a convicted sex offender’s duty to register as a sex offender
in the town or city in which he or she resides, and the duration of
that duty. The duty to register is a civil, nonpunitive regulatory
scheme, such that legislative changes to the duration of a sex
offender’s obligation to register as a sex offender do not violate the
ex post facto clauses of the United States and Rhode Island
Constitutions.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 1992, the Rhode Island General Assembly enacted Rhode
Island General Law section 11-37-16 (1992 Statute), requiring
convicted sex offenders to register with the town or city in which
they reside. 1 However, the 1992 Statute did not specify the
duration of a sex offender’s duty to register, and the charge for
failing to register was only a misdemeanor. 2
The Registration Act of 1996 (Registration Act) repealed and
replaced the 1992 Statute, but expressly preserved a sex offender’s
duty to register. 3 Under the Registration Act, a sex offender’s duty
to register lasted “for a period of ten (10) years subsequent to the
date of conviction,” and the failure to register became a felony. 4
Two subsequent amendments to the Registration Act changed
the duration of an offender’s duty to register. 5 First, in 1997, the
duration changed from “ten (10) years subsequent to the date of

1. State v. Gibson, 182 A.3d 540, 544 & n.4 (R.I. 2018).
2. Id. at 551. Under the 1992 Statute, failure to register was a
misdemeanor and those convicted were “sentenced to serve a term of ninety
(90) days in jail and thereafter service one (1) year probation.” Id. (citing 11
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16 (1992) (repealed 1996)).
3. Id.
4. Id. (citing 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-4(a) (1996)). Under the 1996
Act, failure to register became a felony and conviction imposed punishment of
jail time for “not more than two (2) years or fines not more than two thousand
($2,000) or both.” Id. (citing § 11-37.1-10(a)).
5. See id. at 551–52.
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conviction” to “ten (10) years subsequent to the date of release from
confinement or placement on parole, supervised release or
probation.” 6 Then in 2003, the General Assembly amended the
duration to “ten (10) years from the expiration of sentence for the
offense.” 7 The 2003 Amendment also increased the punishment for
failing to register to “imprison[ment] not more than ten (10) years,
or fines not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.” 8
In November 1994, Frederick Gibson was convicted of seconddegree child molestation sexual assault and sentenced to fifteen
years, with four and a half years to serve and the remaining time
suspended with probation. 9 At the time of his conviction, Gibson’s
duty to register as a sex offender was governed by the 1992
Statute. 10
Gibson was convicted on three separate occasions, in 2007,
2009, and 2010, for failing to register in violation of the Registration
Act. 11 In 2012, Gibson was charged with failure to notify for the
fourth time. 12 Gibson moved to dismiss the charge, claiming that
his duty to register expired in 2004. 13 The Rhode Island Superior
Court magistrate denied Gibson’s motion, finding that Gibson had
a “lifetime duty to register.” 14
Subsequently, Gibson filed a petition for writ of certiorari,
seeking review of the magistrate’s decision, and later filed for post-

6. Id. (citing the 1997 Amendment to § 11-37.1-4(a)).
7. Id. (citing the 2003 Amendment to § 11-37.1-4(a)). This was the latest
version of the statute at the time of the decision. Id.
8. Id. at 552.
9. Id. at 544. Gibson was convicted under § 11-37-8.3. Id. at 544 n.3
(citing § 11-37-8.3) (“[A] person is guilty of a second degree child molestation
sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with another person
fourteen (14) years of age or under.”).
10. See id.
11. Id. at 545. Gibson pled nolo contendere to each of these three failureto-register charges. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Gibson made this claim under the duration requirement as set
forth in the 1996 Act. Id.
14. Id. at 546. The magistrate found that Gibson’s duty to register was
governed by the statute and “registration requirements in effect at the time he
was charged.” Id. (quoting State v. Flores, 714 A.2d 581 (R.I. 1998)). Relying
on the language of the 1992 Statute, which was silent on the duration of a sex
offender’s duty to register, the magistrate interpreted the absence of a time
constraint in the statute to mean that Gibson had a lifetime duty. Id. at 546–
47.
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conviction relief for his three prior failure-to-register convictions. 15
In his application for post-conviction relief, Gibson argued that the
duration of his duty to register was limited to ten years because his
convictions occurred after the passage of the 1996 version of the
Registration Act. 16 Gibson also argued that the 1997 and 2003
Amendments to the Registration Act violated the ex post facto
clauses of the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions,
because those amendments extend the duration of his duty to
register as a sex offender and increase the punishment for failing
to comply with the duty to register from a misdemeanor to a
felony.17
In response to Gibson’s application for post-conviction relief
from the three failure-to-register convictions, the hearing justice
found that Gibson had a lifetime duty to register, and, since Gibson
had a lifetime duty, the amendments did not extend his duty. 18 The
hearing justice also addressed whether the amendments to the
Registration Act unlawfully increased Gibson’s punishment, and
found that because Gibson committed the failure-to-notify offenses
after the Registration Act and subsequent amendments were
passed, there were no ex post facto violations.19 Gibson appealed,
and the Rhode Island Supreme Court consolidated the appeal and
writ of certiorari.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the court addressed three primary issues: (1)
whether Gibson’s obligation to register as a sex offender was
governed by the 1992 Statute or the Registration Act; if the latter,
then whether Gibson’s three failure-to-notify convictions were in
15. Id. at 545.
16. Id.
17. Id. The ex post facto clause prohibits the enactment of laws that
“retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for
criminal acts.” Id. at 553 (citing Cal. Dep’t of Corr. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499,
504 (1995)). “[T]here are four categories of laws that the ex post facto clause
prohibits”; the category at issue in this case is a “law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed.” Id. at 553 n.17.
18. Id. at 545, 550. The hearing justice found Gibson’s duty was governed
by the 1992 Statute, which did not specify a duration. See id. at 545.
19. Id. at 550. The “penalty . . . did not change after [Gibson] was
charged,” which would have violated the ex post facto clause. Id.
20. Id. at 543 n.1, 545.
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violation of the ex post facto clause by (2) extending Gibson’s duty
to register and (3) changing the charge for failure to notify from a
misdemeanor to a felony with the possibility of a longer sentence.21
The court held that the Registration Act governed Gibson’s duty to
register as a sex offender and that the three failure-to-notify
convictions did not violate the ex post facto clause. 22 The court
reviewed all the issues de novo. 23
To determine whether the 1992 Statute or the Registration Act
governed Gibson’s duty to register, and thus whether he had a
lifetime duty or a ten-year duty, the court turned to statutory
interpretation. 24 By analyzing the language of the Registration
Act, the court determined that Gibson’s duty to register under the
1992 Statute was preserved by the Registration Act. 25 The
Registration Act did not, however, preserve the lifetime duration
requirement in the 1992 Statute. 26 According to the Registration
Act, Gibson had a “duty to register in accordance with” the
Registration Act alone, including the 2003 durational
Amendment. 27
21. See id. at 546. The 1996 Amendment obligated a sex offender to
register for ten years after conviction, meaning Gibson’s obligation to register
would end in 2004. See id. at 547. The 2003 Amendment obligates a sex
offender to register until ten years after the expiration of a sentence, meaning
Gibson’s obligation to register would end in 2019. See id. As a collateral
matter, the court addressed the State’s argument that Gibson was not entitled
to collaterally attack his convictions by seeking post-conviction relief because
he waived his right to challenge his conviction when he pled nolo contendere;
however, the court found that an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute
is one of the exceptions to this rule. Id. at 552–53.
22. Id. at 544.
23. Id. at 547, 553.
24. See id. at 547. The court found the language clear and unambiguous
and therefore “g[a]ve the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meanings.” Id. (quoting Accent Store Designs, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc.,
674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I. 1996)).
25. Id. at 548 (“Any person who . . . had a duty to register under [the 1992
Statute] . . . shall have the duty to register in accordance with the provisions
of [the Registration Act].”) (quoting 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37.1-18 (1996)).
26. Id. To further support its statutory interpretation, the court pointed
to the “savings clause” in the Registration Act that reads, “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to abrogate any duty to register which exists or
existed under the provisions of former § 11-37-16.” Id. (emphasis in original)
(citing § 11-37.1-18). The court emphasized that this provision clearly
preserved the duty to register alone and did not include the duration of the
duty to register, which was clearly specified in a duration provision of the
Registration Act in § 11-37.1-4(a). See id. at 548–49.
27. Id. at 548 (quoting § 11-37.1-18). The court noted that the magistrate
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Next, to determine whether the amendments to the
Registration Act “unconstitutionally extended [Gibson’s] duty to
register” in violation of the ex post facto clause, the court turned to
case law, applying the judicially created “intent-effects” test. 28 The
ex post facto clauses in the United States and Rhode Island
Constitutions prohibit “every law that changes the punishment,
and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the
crime, when committed.” 29 However, the court determined that the
duty to register as a sex offender is a “civil, nonpunitive regulatory
measure,” as distinguished from the criminal offense for failing to
register. 30
The court then applied the “intent-effects” test to determine
whether the extension of the registration requirement under the
Registration Act “implicates the ex post facto clause,” even though
the duty to register is a “civil, nonpunitive regulatory measure.” 31
The court found that the intent of the General Assembly in enacting
the registration requirement was to enact a regulatory scheme that
is civil and nonpunitive.32 Rather than to impose punishment on
the offender, the intent was to establish a regulatory scheme “to
protect[ ] the safety and general welfare of the public.” 33
The court then decided that the effect or purpose of this
regulatory scheme was not punitive so “as to negate the intention
to deem it civil.” 34 The court reviewed seven factors in concluding
that the extension of the duty to register was “not excessive” when
weighed against the legislative purpose of protecting the public. 35

was correct to deny the motion to dismiss, but not correct to conclude that
Gibson had a lifetime duty to register since the Registration Act “preserved
[the 1992 Statute’s] duty to register, not its duration.” Id. at 549.
28. Id. at 555.
29. Id. at 553, 553 n.17 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; R.I. CONST. art. I,
§ 12). Gibson argued that the extension in his duty to register beyond the ten
years provided by the 1996 Act violated this clause because the 2003
Amendment extended his duty to 2019. See id. at 554.
30. Id. at 555 (citing State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 593 (R.I. 2009)).
The “conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory
consequences,” that are not in violation of ex post facto. See id. (quoting Smith
v. Doe I, 538 U.S. 84, 103–04 (2003)).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 556.
33. Id. (quoting Germane, 971 A.2d at 593).
34. Id. (citing Doe I, 538 U.S at 92) (stating that there was no punitive
effect and the amendments were not in furtherance of a punitive purpose).
35. Id. at 557 (citing Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077, 1100 (N.H. 2015)) (“[W]e
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Finally, the court determined that the change in classification
for failure to register from a misdemeanor, under the 1992 Statute,
to a felony, under the Registration Act, was not in violation of the
ex post facto clause. 36 When Gibson was initially convicted of
sexual molestation child abuse in 1994, the 1992 Statute governed
that violation and conviction.37 However, when Gibson committed
his three failure-to-notify charges in 2007, 2009, and 2010, the
Registration Act, including the 2003 Amendment, governed
Gibson’s violations of law. 38 Therefore, there was no retroactive
punishment for Gibson’s failure-to-register convictions. 39 Failure
to register was its own offense under the 2003 Amendment to the
Registration Act, which was “already in full force and effect” when
Gibson committed the offenses. 40
COMMENTARY

Through Gibson, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
straightened out some blatant issues in statutory construction that
led to confusion among Rhode Island trial courts and sex offenders
statewide. If courts were unsure which statute governed whose
conduct and convictions, undoubtedly a reasonable person could
also be confused.
The 1992 Statute clearly defined a duty to register, but placed
no duration or time constraint on that duty to register. 41 Thus,
because there was no duration or time restraint, it was reasonable
for the lower courts in this case to rule that there was no time

do not believe that the extension of Gibson’s duty to register is excessive in
relation to the nonpunitive purpose underlying the 1997 and 2003
Amendments.”). The court looked to seven factors to balance the punitive effect
against the intent of the registration requirement:
whether the law (1) “has been regarded in our history and traditions
as a punishment”; (2) “imposes an affirmative disability or restraint’;
(3) ‘promotes the traditional aims of punishment”; (4) “has a rational
connection to a nonpunitive purpose”; (5) “is excessive with respect to
the purpose”; (6) “comes into play on a finding of scienter”; (7)
“whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime[.]”
Id. at 556 (quoting Doe I, 538 U.S. at 92)).
36. Id. at 558.
37. Id. at 544.
38. Id. at 558.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 551.
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limitation on a sex offender’s duty to register. 42 The General
Assembly seemed to recognize this confusion and the need for a
definite durational provision when it enacted the Registration Act
in 1996, which placed a definitive limitation on a sex offender’s duty
to register.43 The subsequent 1997 and 2003 Amendments also
seemed to reflect the legislature’s battle to find a fair balance
between public safety and the incentive for an offender to register
and rehabilitate. 44
First, the Registration Act of 1996 made the duration of the
duty to register ten years from conviction. 45 Under that version of
the Act, Gibson’s duty to register would end in 2004, which was five
years prior to the end of his sentence. 46 The 1997 Amendment
made the duration ten years subsequent to the “date of release from
confinement or placement on parole, supervised release, or
probation.” 47 Under that version of the Act, Gibson’s duty to
register would end around in 2009. 48 Finally, the 2003 Amendment
made the duration “ten years from the date of expiration of the
sentence” for the offense. 49 Under this version of the Act, Gibson’s
duty to register will expire in 2019.50
The court was correct to hold that the extension of a sex
offender’s duty to register was civil and nonpunitive such that it
was not a violation of the ex post facto clause. 51 The purpose behind
instituting sex offender registration is not to publicly shame the sex
offender, but rather to ensure public safety and welfare.52 The
court also distinguished this case from a New Hampshire case,

42. See id. at 545.
43. See id. at 548.
44. See id. at 551–52 (explaining the history of the Registration Act).
45. Id. at 551.
46. See id. Gibson was convicted in 1994 to a fifteen-year sentence so that,
under the 1996 version of the Registration Act, his obligation to register would
end ten years after conviction, which was in 2004. See id. at 544, 551.
47. Id. at 551.
48. See id. Gibson served four and half years of his sentence, which means
he was released around 1998–1999; his duty would end ten years after his
release under the 1997 Amendment, which would be 2008–2009. See id. at
544, 551.
49. Id. at 551–52.
50. See id. at 552. Gibson’s sentence, if he served a full fifteen-year
sentence, would have ended in 2009 and his obligation to register as a sex
offender under the 2003 Amendment would end in 2019. See id. at 544, 551.
51. See id. at 544.
52. See id. at 556.

472 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:465
where the registration requirement was found to be punitive in
effect and purpose, because the statute imposed a lifetime duty to
register and a requirement to register in person four times per
year. 53
After four legislative enactments within nearly a decade, to
fine-tune the duration of a sex offender’s duty to register, the 2003
Amendment struck a reasonable balance between public safety and
incentive for an offender to rehabilitate. 54 Foremost, under the
Registration Act, the public remains informed for ten years after
the expiration of a sex offender’s sentence.55 This serves to protect
the safety and general welfare of the public.56 Also, a sex offender
has incentive to rehabilitate because their duty to register will
expire if they do not reoffend; however, the sentence associated with
a failure-to-register conviction is harsh enough to deter sex
offenders from failing in their duty to register.57 Finally, the court
has discretion to sentence an offender who fails to register to “not
more than ten (10) years in jail,” or to no jail time at all, which
allows the court to balance the equities under the circumstances.58
CONCLUSION

The Registration Act now governs a sex offender’s obligation to
register with the town or city in which he or she resides for a period
of ten years after the expiration of their sentence. The duty to
register is merely a regulatory obligation imposed on a sex offender,
as opposed to a punishment. As a civil, regulatory obligation, the

53. See id. at 557 (distinguishing Doe v. State, 111 A.3d 1077 (N.H. 2015)).
54. See id. at 551–52.
55. See id. at 552.
56. See id. at 555.
57. See id. The court has discretion under the statute to sentence an
offender who fails to register to “up to ten years in jail.” Id.
58. See id. at 552 (emphasis added). The 1992 Statute spelled out the
sentencing requirements so that the court did not have discretion in
sentencing. See id. at 551 (citing 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-16(g) (1992)
(repealed 1996)) (“Any person . . . shall be sentenced to serve a term of ninety
(90) days in jail and thereafter serve one (1) year probation.”). On the other
hand, the Registration Act and the subsequent amendments presented
maximum sentencing guidelines, sentencing requirements, which granted the
court discretion in sentencing. See id. at 552 (citing the 2003 Amendment to
§ 11-37.1-4(a)) (“Any person who is required to register or verify his or her
address, who knowingly fails to do so, shall be guilty of a felony and upon
conviction be imprisoned not more than ten (10) years, or fined not more than
ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both.”) (emphasis added).
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registration requirements may change as long as the public safety
and welfare purpose outweighs the punitive effect.
Mary Poirier

Criminal Law. State v. Maxie, 187 A.3d 330 (R.I. 2018). The
authority to add criminalizing language to a criminal statute that
lacks a connection between the stated conduct and the penalty is
properly vested in the legislature, not the courts.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Emily, 1 at the age of sixteen, was the victim of sexual assault
and sex trafficking. 2 Emily’s childhood was unstable, full of abuse
and neglect, and as a result, she would often run away from home.3
In April 2014, Emily ran away from home and, with nowhere else
to go, she went to her friend’s mother’s home in Providence. 4 There,
her friend’s twenty-two-year-old brother, Marquis Melia, convinced
her to go “smoke with [a] friend.” 5 That friend turned out to be
Curtis Maxie, the Defendant. 6 The Defendant was approximately
sixty years old, and Melia referred to him as “Pimp.” 7 Once the
Defendant learned about Emily, Melia and the Defendant conspired
to put Emily to work having sex with men for money. 8
The Defendant pressured Melia to bring Emily over to the
Defendant’s home, which Melia did. 9 When Emily and Melia
arrived, the Defendant sent Melia out on an errand.10 Once he had
her alone, the Defendant sexually assaulted Emily by penetrating
her orally and vaginally without her consent. 11 Afterward, the
Defendant took pictures of Emily posing in high heels and other
intimate apparel, uploaded the pictures onto his computer, and
1. The complaining witness in this case was a minor and, thus, is
referred to by a pseudonym, as the Supreme Court did in its Opinion.
2. State v. Maxie, 187 A.3d 330, 333–34 (R.I. 2018).
3. Id. at 332.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 332–33.
10. Id. at 333.
11. Id. These acts formed the basis for two counts of first-degree sexual
assault against the Defendant. Id. at 333 nn.3–4.
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posted them in an advertisement on a website called “Backpage.” 12
Minutes after the Defendant posted the advertisement, he received
responses from “men looking for sex,” and the Defendant had Emily
speak to them using a script that detailed what she would do to
them. 13 When these men came to the Defendant’s apartment,
Emily was forced to perform sexual acts on them in exchange for
money.14 The Defendant sexually assaulted Emily repeatedly and
continued to make her work for his “pimp operation.” 15
Additionally, he prevented her from leaving his home, and it was
not until Emily met Jeremy, a nineteen-year-old first-time
customer, that she was able to escape from the Defendant’s home. 16
Jeremy, however, did not help her, but instead forced her to do the
same things as the Defendant because “he wanted [her] to make
him some money.” 17 Because Emily refused to work for Jeremy, he
drove her back to the Defendant’s apartment where things picked
up right where they left off. 18
On April 24, 2014, much to Emily’s surprise, the police arrived
at the Defendant’s home and took her into custody based on an
outstanding Family Court bench warrant. 19 At the police station,
a detective interviewed Emily, and she identified a photograph of
the Defendant as the man who sexually assaulted her and forced
her to prostitute herself.20 After the interview, the police returned
to the Defendant’s apartment and arrested him. 21 On June 18,
2014, a grand jury indicted the Defendant for first-degree sexual
assault, sex trafficking of a minor, and conspiracy to commit the
crime of sex trafficking of a minor.22
The Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the sex trafficking of a
minor and conspiracy charges, arguing that the statute under

12. Id. “Backpage” is a website where people can post advertisements
anonymously concerning illicit activity. See id.
13. Id. at 333–34.
14. Id. at 334. All the acts beginning with the text accompanying footnote
twelve contributed to the sex trafficking of a minor count, although this count
was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 341.
15. See id. at 334, 343.
16. Id. at 334.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 335.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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which he was charged failed to state a crime.23 The trial justice
denied the Defendant’s motion, and the case proceeded to trial.24
At trial, Melia testified that Defendant “ran a prostitution sting
right out of this apartment” and that the Defendant had a “long
history” with prostitution. 25 The Defendant moved for a mistrial
and, in the alternative, to strike Melia’s statements. 26 The trial
court denied the Defendant’s motion for a mistrial, but granted the
motion to strike and issued a cautionary instruction.27 Moreover,
the prosecution introduced evidence showing that the Defendant
continued
his
illegal
money-making
endeavors
while
incarcerated.28 The Defendant made several telephone calls while
at the Adult Correctional Institutions, asking “how the newest
‘fresh catch’ was standing up,” and boasted that if he was not
incarcerated, he would “be moving b****es like crazy.” 29 The
Defendant objected to the admission of this evidence, but the
objection was overruled.30
At the conclusion of the trial, the Defendant was convicted on
all counts and sentenced to prison.31 The Defendant then appealed
to the Rhode Island Supreme Court on three grounds: (1) the trial
judge erred in denying his motion to dismiss count four, sex
trafficking of a minor, and count six, conspiracy to commit the crime
of sex trafficking of a minor, based on the statute’s failure to state
a crime, and that count four was duplicitous 32 and denied him
adequate notice of the criminal act he committed; (2) the trial
justice erred in denying the motion to pass after Melia made
remarks relating the Defendant to prostitution; and (3) the trial
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 342.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 336.
29. Id. at 335–36.
30. Id. at 343.
31. Id. at 336. The Defendant was sentenced to forty-five years on each
of the three counts of first-degree sexual assault, all to run concurrently; the
maximum forty years’ imprisonment on the sex trafficking of a minor count, to
run consecutive to the sentences for the sexual-assault counts; ten years in
prison for the conspiracy count, concurrent to the sentence for sex trafficking
of a minor; and an additional fifteen-year sentence as a habitual offender,
consecutive to the sentences imposed on all counts. Id.
32. “The term ‘duplicity’ refers to the joining of two or more offenses . . . in
a single count.” Id. at 336 n.7 (quoting State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1253
(R.I. 1998)).
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judge erred in admitting evidence of the telephone call records
while he was confined. 33
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial justice’s
ruling in part, but vacated the judgment of conviction for sex
trafficking of a minor and conspiracy. 34
The court reviewed the first issue on appeal: whether the trial
justice erred in denying the Defendant’s motion to dismiss de
novo. 35 The Defendant argued that the statute failed to state a
crime and provide fair notice of prohibited conduct, and that the
count was of a duplicitous nature. 36 According to the Court, the
statute, Rhode Island General Laws section 11-67-6—which was
repealed after the Defendant was indicted—contained a gap that
failed to describe the conduct described in subsection (b) as a
crime.37 After subsection (b), which described the conduct that the
Defendant was charged with, subsection (c) jumped to establishing
a penalty. 38 Ultimately, the court looked to whether it could
interpret the statute using canons of statutory construction, or
whether additional language was necessary in order for the statute
to state a crime. 39
The court disagreed with the trial justice’s determination that,
notwithstanding the lack of explicit language, the statute was valid
because the legislature clearly intended to criminalize sex
trafficking of a minor. 40 The court reasoned that the statute was
not ambiguous—it was not “susceptible of more than one
reasonable meaning”—but was missing language making the
conduct a crime, and therefore needed to be repaired.41 The court
33. Id. at 336.
34. Id. at 344.
35. Whether a statute encompasses a crime is a question of law because
it requires statutory interpretation. See id. at 338 (citing State ex rel. Town of
Tiverton v. Pelletier, 174 A.3d 713, 718 (R.I. 2017)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 339.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 337–41.
41. Id. at 339 (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood
Health Plan of R.I., 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011)). The Supreme Court
compared this statute to section 11-67-3 (repealed in 2017), which generally
criminalized sex trafficking of all persons, and determined that the statute did
not contain a gap because there was language criminalizing the conduct (“is
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also showed deference to the legislature, determining that it did not
have authority to remedy the legislature’s drafting error regardless
of its clear legislative intent. 42 The court explained that the
legislature must define the acts it intends to punish as crimes
because the courts do not have the authority to “supplement or
amend statutes enacted by the General Assembly.” 43 Since the
statute at issue here was missing an essential component to an
effective criminal statute––language stating that the described
conduct actually amounts to the crime of sex trafficking a minor––
it did not state a crime or provide fair notice of prohibited conduct. 44
As a result, the court concluded that the Defendant could not be
indicted under the statute for sex trafficking of a minor, or for
conspiracy to do so, because it could not exist without the crime
itself. 45
Justice Robinson disagreed with the majority on this issue. 46
In his dissent, Justice Robinson argued that the missing language
identified by the majority was not necessary for the purpose of
giving fair notice of prohibited conduct under the statute, and that
guilty of a felony”). Id. at 337 n.8. Section 11-67-3 provided that:
Whoever knowingly:
(a) Recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains by any
means, or attempts to recruit, entice, harbor, transport[,] provide, or
obtain by any means, another person, intending or knowing that the
person will be subjected to forced labor in order to commit a
commercial sexual activity; or
(b) Benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from
knowing participation in a venture which has engaged in an act
described in violation of § 11-67-2, or 11-67-3, is guilty of a felony and
subject to not more than twenty (20) years imprisonment or a fine of
not more than twenty thousand dollars ($20,000), or both; provided,
however, that this subsection shall not apply to a “victim” as defined
in this chapter.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-67-3 (2014) (repealed 2017) (emphasis added).
42. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 339–40 (citing Creditors’ Serv. Corp. v. Cummings,
190 A.2d 10 (1937)).
43. Id. at 341 (quoting State v. Carter, 827 A.2d 636, 644 (R.I. 2003)).
44. Id. at 347. “A crime is made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a
prescribed penalty.” Id. at 340 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(d) 18 (3d ed. 2018)). The language the Defendant
suggested to eliminate the gap was “shall be guilty of the felony of sex
trafficking of a minor.” Id. at 339.
45. Id. at 341.
46. See id. at 344 (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Robinson only dissents on this portion of the analysis and concurs with
the rest of the majority opinion.
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the statute did not fail to set forth a crime. 47 According to the
dissent, although the drafting of the statute was incomplete, the
legislature’s negligence did not undermine the statute’s
enforcement against sex trafficking of a minor.48 Justice Robinson
supported his opinion by citing to precedent on statutory
interpretation. 49 In his view, by looking at the context of the
statute, it was an “unavoidable inference,” when read in its
entirety, that the described conduct was legislatively deemed to be
criminal, considering that it was part of a criminal code, it described
a number of prohibited acts, and provided a range of punishment
for one who committed one of those acts.50 The dissent also noted
that the statute’s title––“[s]ex trafficking of a minor”––clearly
denoted its focus, and that subsection (b) stated the prohibited
conduct, and subsection (c) set forth a penalty for engaging in such
conduct.51 Therefore, the statute clearly provided fair notice of
prohibited conduct and the penalties for that conduct.52
Regarding the Defendant’s motion to pass based on Melia’s
statement at the trial that the Defendant had a “long history” with
prostitution, the court applied a “clearly erroneous” standard of
review. 53 The trial justice explained that the evidence was
admissible to show the Defendant’s state of mind.54 The court
reasoned that because a trial justice’s ruling on a motion to pass the
case “will be disturbed only [ ] if the judge was clearly wrong”55 and
the trial court is entitled to “great weight,” 56 there was no error and
the trial court’s ruling should be affirmed. 57
Moving to the Defendant’s final issue on appeal, the court held
47. Id. at 344.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 344–45; Dunne Leases Cars & Trucks, Inc. v. Kenworth Truck
Co., 466 A.2d 1153, 1156 (R.I. 1983) (stating that the Supreme Court’s duty in
construing a statute is to “ascertain the intent behind its enactment”).
50. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 345–46 (Robinson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
51. Id. at 346.
52. Id. at 346–47. Justice Robinson quotes former United States Supreme
Court Justice Holmes to support his common-sense guideline: “[w]e agree to
all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but
there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying
what they obviously mean.” Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929).
53. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 342 (majority opinion).
54. See id.
55. Id. (quoting State v. Grant, 946 A.2d 818, 827 (R.I. 2008)).
56. Id. (quoting State v. Rosario, 14 A.3d 206, 214 (R.I. 2011)).
57. See id. at 342–43.
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that the Defendant waived the admissibility of the Defendant’s
telephone conversations while incarcerated. 58 The court followed
Rhode Island’s long-standing “raise-or-waive” rule, 59 and sought to
determine whether the Defendant’s objection to this evidence at
trial was “sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice’s
attention to the basis for said objection.” 60 The Supreme Court
determined that the Defendant did not present an objection specific
enough to meet the requisite standard. 61 The court supported its
holding by citing to Rule 103(a)(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of
Evidence, which indicates “that a specific ground for an objection
must be stated unless the reason for the objection is clear from the
context in which it was made.” 62 In the Defendant’s first objection,
he argued that the evidence was irrelevant, unless the street
language that the Defendant used in the phone conversations could
be interpreted.63 The Defendant also objected based on Rule 404(b)
of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, but nothing was concretely
noted other than “I’m running into [Rule] 404(b) walls.” 64 The
Defendant objected one more time on the same grounds––without
the requisite specificity––and the trial justice overruled the
objection again. 65 The court, therefore, concluded that because of
the general nature of the objections, the content was insufficient to
properly preserve the matter for appellate review.66
In short, the Rhode Island Supreme Court dismissed the counts
for sex trafficking of a minor and for conspiracy to commit sex
trafficking of a minor based on the insufficient statute that failed
to make such conduct a criminal offense. As to the Defendant’s
second and third arguments, the court affirmed the trial court
decision, ruling that the trial justice did not err in denying the
motion to pass, and that Defendant did not properly preserve the
58. Id. at 344.
59. Id. at 343 (citing State v. Figuereo, 31 A.3d 1283, 1289 (R.I. 2011)).
The “raise-or-waive” rule requires a specific enough objection to alert the trial
justice as to the nature of the error. Barros, 148 A.3d at 174 (quoting Figuereo,
31 A.3d at 1289).
60. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 343 (quoting State v. Diefenderfer, 970 A.2d 12, 30
(R.I. 2009)).
61. See id.
62. Id. (citing R.I. R. Ev. 103(a)(1)).
63. Id. The Defendant used language such as, “how the ‘fresh catch’ was
‘standing up.’” Id. at 336.
64. Id. at 343; R.I. R. Ev. 404(b).
65. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 343–44.
66. See id. at 344.
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issue of admissibility of the phone calls for appeal. 67
COMMENTARY

On the first issue addressed by the Supreme Court, the
majority opinion sought to establish a boundary between the role of
the judiciary and that of the legislature.68 The court maintained
that the language of a statute must explicitly state a crime, and
where there is missing language to bridge the two essential
components of a criminal statute, the court lacks the authority to
implement such language on its own.69 On the other hand, Justice
Robinson, in his dissenting opinion, argued that the application of
common sense should be considered in this case. 70 The dissent
seems to make a more persuasive argument by citing to both Rhode
Island and United States Supreme Court precedent on the issue of
statutory construction. 71 Justice Robinson opined that adding
language into the statute that the conduct described amounted to
the crime of sex trafficking of a minor was not necessary.72 Looking
at the title of the statute and the different portions of it, it was clear
that the legislature intended to prohibit sex trafficking of a minor
and to punish such crime under the penalties set forth in subsection
(c). 73 The statute was not ambiguous, it simply required additional
language, which was not necessary to give fair notice of the
prohibited conduct described in the statute. However, the majority
opinion made a compelling comparison to Rhode Island General
Laws section 11-67-3, which punishes sex trafficking of all persons,
to the statute in question, where section 11-67-3 included language
that linked the prohibited conduct and the penalty, describing the
conduct as a crime. 74
67. Id. at 341–44.
68. See id. at 339–41.
69. “A crime is made up of two parts, forbidden conduct and a prescribed
penalty.” Id. at 340 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
LAW § 1.2(d) 18 (3d ed. 2018)).
70. Id. at 346–47 (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
71. Id. at 347. Similarly, as Justice Robinson stated in another case, “our
primary task in construing a statute is to attribute to the enactment the
meaning most consistent with its policies and with the obvious purposes of the
Legislature . . . .” Matter of Falstaff Brewing Corp. Re: Narragansett Brewery
Fire, 637 A.2d 1047, 1050 (R.I. 1994).
72. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 344. (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
73. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-67-6.
74. The court explained that, unlike in section 11-67-6, in section 11-67-3
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Although the dissent’s opinion was persuasive, the majority
opinion was cautious not to overstep its boundaries by drafting a
statute. Rather, it recognized that its role is solely to interpret
statutes. 75 Separation of powers is fundamental in the American
justice system because it allows for the branches of government to
check each other. Furthermore, the court’s approach to enacting
clear and explicit statutes reinforces the role of the legislature in
effecting social order and safety.
On the second matter presented on appeal, the court properly
upheld that the trial justice’s ruling that Melia’s remarks on the
stand were admissible. 76 The trial justice granted the Defendant’s
motion to strike for some of her testimony, and allowed other
testimony into evidence with a cautionary instruction to ensure
that the jury only considered the testimony as evidence of Melia’s
state of mind.77 The court’s decision was guided by the well-settled
deferential standard, which affords “great weight” to a trial justice’s
ruling on a motion to pass and under these circumstances, there did
not appear to be any error at the trial court level. 78 Appellate
courts generally give deference to findings of fact at the trial court
level because trial judges observe and evaluate the facts and
evidence of the case, and the court properly applied such deference
in this case.
On the last issue, the court properly concluded that the
Defendant did not properly preserve his challenge to the
admissibility of the telephone conversation records through a clear
and specific objection at trial.79 Although the defense objected for
a Rule 404(b) violation, the court concluded that the objection was
not stated with enough specificity. 80 While the Defendant could
have explained the grounds for his objection in a more concrete and
specific manner, it is generally known that an objection based on
Rule 404(b) grounds means that there is character evidence at play
that is highly prejudicial to a defendant. Nonetheless, the court
properly invoked the “raise-or-waive” rule because the objection
there is a link between the prohibited conduct and the penalties for such
conduct, making it clear that sex trafficking is a crime. Id.; Maxie, 187 A.3d at
347 n.8. (Robinson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
75. Maxie, 187 A.3d at 341.
76. Id. at 342.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting State v. Grant, 946 A.2d 818, 826–27 (R.I. 2008)).
79. Id. at 344.
80. Id.
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simply stated, “I’m running into 404(b) walls,” without explicitly
stating on what basis it was highly prejudicial to the Defendant or
irrelevant to the case. 81
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court properly held that a trial court should
dismiss a criminal count based on a statute that fails to state a
crime and cannot be repaired without the addition of language
criminalizing such conduct.
When such a statute requires
additional language to bridge a gap between a conduct and a
penalty, it is the responsibility of the legislature, and not the courts,
to draft it in a clear and explicit manner. Furthermore, the court
applied a deferential “clearly erroneous” standard to the trial
justice’s ruling on the admissibility of witness testimony and will
not overturn a trial justice’s ruling absent clear error. Lastly, the
court correctly decided that pursuant to the “raise or waive” rule, a
party’s objection to the admissibility of evidence is deemed waived
if it fails to specifically state the grounds for his objection.
Nathalie M. Vega Crespo

81.

Id.

Employment Law. Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482 (R.I. 2018).
An individual receiving an accidental disability pension pursuant
to section 45-21.2-10 of the Rhode Island General Laws is required
to undergo an annual independent medical examination, and his or
her pension is subject to adjustment based on income, as set forth
in sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 of the Rhode Island General
Laws.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On June 18, 2000, John Grasso, a member of the Cranston
police force, suffered a “debilitating injury” while on the job.1
Because the injury rendered him unable to return to work, Mr.
Grasso applied for, and was granted, an accidental disability
pension pursuant to section 45-21.2-10 of the Rhode Island General
Laws on September 12, 2002. 2 Ten years later, Mr. Grasso received
a letter from the Retirement Board, which oversees the Employees’
Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI), notifying him that his
pension would be suspended on September 30, 2012, because it had
been “overpaid.” 3 The Retirement Board also requested that Mr.
Grasso provide copies of his tax returns and medical progress notes
from his treating physician.4 In addition, the Retirement Board
informed him that he might be required to submit to an
independent medical examination (IME) pursuant to section 45-2123(a). 5 Per the Retirement Board’s request, Mr. Grasso submitted
“certain medical documentation” and was subsequently notified
that he was to contact a particular physician to schedule an IME. 6
On May 9, 2013, Mr. Grasso’s counsel met with the Retirement
1. Grasso v. Raimondo, 177 A.3d 482, 484 (R.I. 2018).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 484–85. R.I. Gen. Laws section 45-21-23(a) provides that an
individual receiving an accidental disability retirement allowance may be
required to undergo a medical examination performed by a physician or
physicians engaged by the retirement board. Id. at 488.
6. Id. at 485.

484
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Board’s counsel to convey Mr. Grasso’s belief that his pension was
governed by neither section 45-21-23 nor section 45-21-24, which
requires the Retirement Board to adjust the amount of a disability
annuitant’s pension if the beneficiary is engaged in a “gainful
occupation.” 7
Following that meeting, Mr. Grasso filed suit in Providence
County Superior Court against Defendants Gina Raimondo, Frank
Karpinski, the ERSRI, and the State of Rhode Island, seeking a
declaratory judgement that he was not obligated to comply with the
provisions of sections 45-21-23 or 45-21-24 in order to continue
receiving his pension. 8 He contended that those provisions do not
apply to accidental disability pensions paid to former police officers
and firefighters.9 Also following that May 9, 2013 meeting, the
Executive Director of the ERSRI rendered an administrative
decision rejecting Mr. Grasso’s argument that the ERSRI could not
compel him to undergo an IME or reduce the amount of his pension
benefit. 10 Mr. Grasso requested a hearing before the Retirement
Board and, on August 1, 2014, the hearing officer also rejected Mr.
Grasso’s argument. 11 On September 25, 2014, the Retirement
Board upheld the hearing officer’s decision. 12
Mr. Grasso
subsequently appealed the ERSRI’s decision to the Superior
Court. 13
The Superior Court consolidated Mr. Grasso’s two cases on
December 1, 2014. 14 Mr. Grasso moved for summary judgement in
the declaratory judgement action, arguing that a 1980 amendment
to section 45-21.2-10, which governs accidental disability pensions
paid to police officers and firefighters, rendered the statutory
provisions concerning IMEs and income reporting requirements
7. Id. Mr. Grasso began working as an attorney during the period that
he was collecting an accidental disability pension. Id.
8. Id. The defendants named in the complaint are as follows: Rhode
Island Governor Gina Raimondo, individually and in her capacity as
chairperson of the ERSRI; Frank Karpinski, individually and in his capacity
as Executive Director of the ERSRI; the ERSRI; and the State of Rhode Island.
Id. at 484 n.1. The Superior Court dismissed the individual claims against
Governor Raimondo and Mr. Karpinski and, as such, they remained
defendants to the suit in their representative capacities only. Id.
9. Id. at 485.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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inapplicable.15 The Defendants later filed a corresponding crossmotion for summary judgement. 16 The trial justice rendered a
bench decision in Mr. Grasso’s favor in the consolidated cases on
November 5, 2015, holding that his pension was not subject to
sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24. 17 Further, the trial justice found
that the language of section 45-21.2-10 was “clear and
unambiguous,” and that it addressed “only the amount of the
[disability pension] benefit,” without reference to sections 45-21-23
and 45-21-24. 18
The Defendants subsequently appealed the trial justice’s
decision in the declaratory judgement action. 19 They also filed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari concerning the appeal
of the ERSRI’s administrative decision, which the Rhode Island
Supreme Court granted.20 On appeal, the Defendants argued, inter
alia, that the trial justice misinterpreted the meaning of section 4521.2-10, thus reaching an “absurd result.” 21 Specifically, the
Defendants contended that it would be unreasonable to conclude
that a former police officer or firefighter collecting an accidental
disability pension may continue to do so at the full benefit rate,
regardless of his ability to secure gainful employment. 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

On appeal, the court conducted a de novo review to determine
whether, under the post-1980 version of section 45-21.2-10, the
ERSRI can require a police officer or firefighter receiving an
accidental disability pension to submit to an annual IME pursuant
to section 45-21-23, and whether the ERSRI can consider an
individual’s other earnings in determining the amount of his
pension, pursuant to section 45-21-24.23 Prior to 1980, section 4521.2-10 stated that “any member retiring and receiving a disability
allowance shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 45-21-23 and 45-

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 485, 488.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 485, 488.
Id. at 488.
Id. at 485.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 485–86, 489.
Id. at 487–88.
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21-24.” 24 However, the 1980 revision omitted the reference to
sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24. 25 The current version of the
statute sets forth that “the amount of retirement allowance for
accidental disability is that as prescribed in § 45-21-22.” 26 The trial
justice opined that the General Assembly amended section 45-21.210 precisely to remove the IME and pension reduction obligations
that existed prior to 1980. 27 The trial justice concluded that it is
not absurd to find that the General Assembly intended to provide
police officers and firefighters, who face a variety of very dangerous
workplace risks, with a more attractive retirement plan “in the
event that those risks materialize into actual harms.” 28
Upon detailed review of the relevant statutory sections, the
court disagreed with the trial justice’s assertion that section 4521.2-10 was “clear and unambiguous.” 29 When a statute is
ambiguous, the court applies the rules of statutory construction and
examines the statute in its entirety to determine the intent and
purpose of the Rhode Island Legislature. 30 Upon examination of
chapter 21.2, the court pointed to several factors which rendered
section 45-21.2-10 “substantially ambiguous.” 31 First, the 1980
revision replaced the references to sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24
with a cross-reference to section 45-21-22, which simply provides
that individuals receiving an accidental disability pension are
entitled to receive sixty-six and two-thirds percent of their
compensation at the date of retirement.32 The court found that it
was unclear whether that reference to section 45-21-22 was meant
to also include other sections of chapter 21, as those sections would
apply to any pension governed by section 45-21-22. 33 Second,
sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 explicitly provide that they apply to

24. Id.
25. Id. at 487.
26. Id. Section 45-21-22 provides that an individual receiving an
accidental disability pension “receives a retirement allowance equal to sixtysix and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the rate of the member’s compensation
at the date of the member’s retirement . . . .” Id. at 487 n.4.
27. Id. at 489.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 489–90.
30. Id. at 489 (quoting State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546, 548 (R.I. 2014)).
31. Id. at 490.
32. Id. at 487 n.4, 490.
33. Id. at 490.
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any disability annuity.34 Finally, section 45-21.2-4 states that the
optional retirement system provided for in chapter 21.2 is to be
“administered in the same manner provided in chapter 21,” but
does not clarify the meaning of the term “administered.” 35
Upon finding that section 45-21.2-10 was “substantially
ambiguous,” the court next attempted to determine the meaning of
the statute as intended by the Legislature in light of the entire
statutory scheme. 36 The court noted that its ultimate goal in
matters of statutory interpretation “is to give effect to the purpose
of the act as intended by the Legislature.” 37 The purpose of chapter
21.2, titled “Optional Retirement for Members of Police Force and
Fire Fighters,” is to provide an accidental disability pension for
police officers and firefighters who were injured on the job and can
no longer work due to disability resulting from that injury.38 In
light of that purpose, the court concluded that the most “reasonable,
fair, and harmonious” interpretation of the statutory scheme is that
the “General Assembly intended for an accidental disability pension
under § 45-21.2-10 to be subject to the IME and income reporting
requirements of §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24.” 39
Any other
interpretation would lead to the unlikely result that the Legislature
intended to provide accidental disability benefits to police officers
and firefighters for life, regardless of whether or not an individual
is still disabled or is able to earn income from another source that
is equal to, or greater than, the income he would have earned as a
police officer or firefighter. 40 To illustrate its point, the court posed
a hypothetical in which a police officer, after retiring for accidental
disability, has a full recovery and becomes a major league baseball
pitcher with a multimillion-dollar annual contract. 41 Should he be
able to continue collecting an accidental disability pension? 42
Although the Legislature has the power to provide for that result,
the court explained that statutory silence is not enough; the
Legislature must explicitly convey its intent if “it should wish to do
34.
35.
36.
37.
2012)).
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Alessi v. Bowen Court Condo., 44 A.3d 736, 740 (R.I.
Id. at 487, 491.
Id. at 491.
Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
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something so extraordinary in such an important context.” 43 As
such, the court held that Mr. Grasso was subject to sections 45-2123 and 45-21-24 and, therefore, he may be required to undergo
periodic IMEs at the request of the Retirement Board and to submit
financial information as requested. 44
Chief Justice Suttell dissented, arguing that the language of
section 45-21.2-10 is clear and unambiguous because it plainly
prescribes the amount of accidental disability for police officers and
firefighters and nothing more. 45 He stated that he “might agree”
with the majority that such accidental disability pensions, as a
matter of policy, should be subject to the IME and income reporting
requirements set forth in sections 45-21-23 and 45-21-24. 46 He also
acknowledged that the case at bar and the multimillion-dollar
baseball pitcher scenario “approach the absurd.” 47 Nevertheless,
he stated that such policy decisions are best left to the
Legislature.48 Chief Justice Suttell concluded that the court should
not attempt to determine the legislative intent behind section 4521.2-10 “when [the General Assembly] [speaks] in such clear and
comprehensible language.” 49
Justice Flaherty filed a separate dissenting opinion, also
arguing that the language of section 45-21.2-10 is clear,
unambiguous, and not susceptible to more than one reasonable
meaning.50 In his dissent, he contended that a common-sense
reading of the statute’s plain language, coupled with the fact that
the General Assembly deleted all references to sections 45-21-23
and 45-21-24 from the statute in 1980, can only lead to the
conclusion that the General Assembly purposefully opted to exempt
pensioners governed by chapter 21.2 from IME and income
reporting requirements. 51
He concluded that “[i]t may be
unpalatable that plaintiff is not subject to a yearly IME or to
income-reporting requirements, but that is for the General

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 493 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 493–94 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
Id. at 493–96.
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Assembly to determine, not this Court.” 52
COMMENTARY

The court clearly recognized that when a statutory section is
clear and unambiguous, the plain and ordinary meaning of a
statute should be applied and no further interpretation is
necessary. 53 Upon review of the relevant statutory sections, the
court found that section 45-21.2-10 is “substantially ambiguous”
and, thus, applied the rules of statutory construction to determine
the intent and purpose of the General Assembly.54 However, both
Chief Justice Suttell and Justice Flaherty presented cogent
arguments that section 45-21.2-10, which simply sets forth that
“the amount of retirement allowance for accidental disability is that
as prescribed in § 45-21-22,” is clear on its face.55 Justice Flaherty
explained that ambiguity exists “only when a word or phrase in a
statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable meaning.” 56 The
plain language of section 45-21.2-10, however, is not susceptible to
other reasonable, common-sense interpretation.57 The statute does
not mention sections 45-21-23 or 45-21-24 and, as such, the IME
and income reporting requirements under those statutes should not
be attached to the terms of section 45-21.2-10 simply because they
had been in the past. 58
Furthermore, the court acknowledged that it is within the
purview of the Legislature to treat retired police officers and
firefighters differently than other pensioners by providing them
with an accidental disability pension that is free from the burden of
periodic IMEs and income-reporting requirements. 59 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that while such a provision would not
necessarily be absurd or unreasonable, it would be so extraordinary
that statutory silence is simply insufficient to determine that this

52. Id. at 496.
53. Id. at 489 (majority opinion) (citing State v. Diamante, 83 A.3d 546,
548 (R.I. 2014)).
54. Id. at 490.
55. See id. at 493–94 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 494 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (quoting Drs. Pass & Betherman,
Inc. v. Neighborhood Health Plan of R.I., 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011)).
57. See id. (quoting In re Proposed Town of New Sherman, 10 A.3d 456,
464 (R.I. 2011)).
58. See id.
59. Id. at 492 (majority opinion).
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was the General Assembly’s desired result. 60 In doing so, the
majority veered from the long-held presumption “that the General
Assembly knows the state of existing relevant law when it enacts
or amends a statute.” 61 Following this presumption, it appears that
the General Assembly, in its legislative wisdom, intended that
accidental disability pensions governed by section 45-21.2-10
should not be subject to the requirements of sections 45-21-23 and
45-21-24, as exemplified by the deliberate removal of any and all
reference to these provisions when the statute was amended in
1980.62 As such, the dissenters, once again, make a compelling
argument that this matter involves a question of policy that is best
left to the Legislature. 63
CONCLUSION

The court held that an individual receiving an accidental
disability pension pursuant to section 45-21.2-10 of the Rhode
Island General Laws is subject to a requirement that he undergo
an annual IME, and his pension is subject to adjustment based on
his occupation. The court determined this interpretation to be the
intent of the Legislature, gleaned from the statutory language
governing such pensions and the statute’s primary purpose of
providing for an accidental disability pension for a police officer or
firefighter who is injured on the job and cannot work due to his or
her disability.
Sarah D. Boucher

60. Id. at 489.
61. See id. at 494 (Flaherty, J., dissenting) (citing Power Test Realty Co.
Ltd. P’ship v. Coit, 134 A.3d 1213, 1222 (R.I. 2016)) (quoting Ret. Bd. of Emp.
Ret. Sys. of R.I. v. DiPrete, 845 A.2d 270, 287 (R.I. 2004)).
62. See id. at 494–95.
63. See id. at 493, 496 (Suttell, C.J., dissenting) (Flaherty, J., dissenting).

Employment Law. State v. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d 1090
(R.I. 2018). The Attorney General is vested with the authority to
determine whether a state employee is entitled to legal
representation when sued in his or her individual capacity, due to
an act that occurred outside of the scope of employment. The
Attorney General’s determination of whether to provide defense to
a state employee is not an arbitrable issue.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In February 2014, two members of the Rhode Island State
Police, Trooper James Donnelly Taylor and Trooper Gregory
Palmer, stopped a vehicle that they observed speeding in
Pawtucket, Rhode Island. 1 The vehicle was operated by Lionel
Monsanto. 2 Because Monsanto was driving on an expired license,
he was “arrested and transported to the State Police Lincoln
Barracks for processing.” 3 At the conclusion of Monsanto’s
processing and booking, he was escorted to a cellblock where Taylor
allegedly “physically assaulted Monsanto multiple times.” 4 Taylor
was indicted on an assault charge, to which he pled nolo contendere,
knowingly waived his constitutional rights, and admitted to the
underlying facts of the indictment.5 A Sixth Division District Court
judge accepted the plea, directed the case to be filed in accordance
with section 12-10-12 of the Rhode Island General Laws, and
ordered Taylor to perform twenty-five hours of community service
work. 6 Taylor’s criminal disposition was later expunged and, thus,
no criminal record resulted. 7
On March 24, 2016, Monsanto filed suit against Taylor and
several other defendants in the United States District Court for the

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d 1090, 1093 (R.I. 2018).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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District of Rhode Island.8 On April 8, 2016, the Attorney General
received a written request from Taylor for legal representation and
indemnification with regard to Monsanto’s civil action.9 Taylor
stated that his request was “in accordance with the RIGL, to include
but not limited to, 42-28-20, and the Rhode Island State Police
Troopers Association Collective Bargaining Agreement [(CBA)],
section 29.17.” 10 On May 15, 2016, the Department of the Attorney
General responded that the State would not represent Taylor for
any cause of action filed against him in his individual capacity. 11
The State based this determination on section 9-31-9, 12 Taylor’s
plea of nolo contendere, and the allegations of the intentional torts
of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. 13 Because Taylor’s actions fell “outside of the scope of his
employment” and amounted to willful misconduct in accordance
with the Governmental Tort Liability Act, the Attorney General
refused to provide a defense to Taylor in his individual capacity.14
Following the Attorney General’s decision, the Rhode Island
Trooper’s Association (RITA) filed a grievance with the State Police
on behalf of Taylor, alleging a violation of the CBA, specifically
Article 29.17, 15 and asserting that the State must provide Taylor
8. Id. Monsanto named as defendants in his suit the State of Rhode
Island; Trooper Taylor, individually and in his official capacity; the Rhode
Island State Police; and Colonel Steven G. O’Donnell, individually and in his
official capacity. Id.
Mr. Monsanto alleged federal civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §
1983; conspiracy to violate plaintiff’s civil rights; assault and battery;
malicious prosecution; false imprisonment and false arrest;
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and violations of G.L. 1956
§ 9-1-35 and G.L. 1956 § 31-21.2-3, causes of action based on alleged
racial harassment by racial profiling.
Id. Monsanto also sought punitive damages. Id.
9. Id. at 1094–95.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1095.
12. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-9 (2012). In pertinent part, the statute
provides that the Attorney General may refuse to defend an action against a
state employee where “[t]he [employee’s] act or omission was not within the
scope of employment” or “[t]he act or the failure to act was because of actual
fraud, willful misconduct, or actual malice.” Id. §§ 9-31-9(1)–(2) (emphasis
added).
13. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d at 1095.
14. Id.
15. According to Article 29.17 of the CBA,
The State shall provide legal counsel for any legal action arising out
of conduct of State Troopers acting within the scope of their
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with “full legal defense of all claims asserted in Monsanto v. State
of Rhode Island et al., and . . . full indemnification for all liabilities,
expenses and damages of any nature resulting from that legal
action.” 16 The State subsequently denied RITA’s grievance.17 On
June 30, 2016, RITA filed a “Demand for Arbitration” again,
seeking that the State provide Taylor with a full legal defense and
full indemnification for all liabilities in accordance with the State’s
obligations contained in Article 29.17. 18
On February 27, 2017, the State filed a “Verified Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” in Providence Superior Court.19
On July 6, 2017, the Superior Court trial justice “issued a
judgement with eight declarations that generally mirror[ed] the
state’s request.” 20 Most importantly, the judgement declared that
RITA’s grievance was not an arbitrable issue and that the Attorney
General’s constitutional and common law authority includes the
power to refuse to provide a state-paid defense and indemnification
to state employees acting outside of the scope of employment. 21
RITA appealed to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, where
the court reviewed the trial justice’s decision to grant declaratory
relief with great deference to her factual findings and “with an eye
to whether the court abused its discretion, misinterpreted the
applicable law, overlooked material facts, or otherwise exceeded its
authority.” 22
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

As a preliminary matter, the court narrowed the issues raised
on appeal to the following two questions:

employment. The State shall also provide full indemnification for any
liability, expenses or damages of any nature incurred by State
Troopers resulting from any legal action arising out of conduct
performed within the scope of employment. With respect to the
provision of legal counsel in criminal matters, any legal action
includes alleged criminal conduct arising out of conduct of the State
Troopers acting within the scope of their employment.
Id. at 1095 n.5.
16. Id. at 1095–96.
17. Id. at 1096.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1097.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1098 (quoting Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 751 (R.I. 1997)).
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(1) whether the Attorney General’s authority to refuse to
provide a defense to a state employee is an arbitrable issue
under a collective bargaining agreement; and (2) whether,
in accordance with the Governmental Tort Liability Act,
the Attorney General is vested with the statutory
authority to determine whether a state employee is
entitled to legal representation when sued in his or her
individual capacity “on account of an act or omission that
occurred within the scope of his or her employment with
the state”; and whether that authority is delegable or
transferable.23
On the first issue, the court held that RITA’s challenge to the
Attorney General’s authority to determine when to provide a state
employee with legal representation was not an arbitrable issue. 24
The court reasoned that the Attorney General’s authority to refuse
to defend an action was statutorily proscribed. 25 Particularly,
section 9-31-9 states that “[t]he attorney general may refuse to
defend an action . . . if he or she determines that . . . [t]he act or
omission was not within the scope of the employment.”26
Accordingly, this question was not capable of resolution through
arbitration given that “labor disputes and grievances that seek to
modify applicable state law are not subject to arbitration because
the arbitrator has no power to do so.” 27 Therefore, the court upheld
the trial justice’s decision to permanently enjoin the arbitration
proceedings. 28
On the second issue, the court held that the Attorney General
was vested with the statutory authority, pursuant to section 9-319, to refuse to defend a state employee where the employee’s
conduct was not within the scope of employment or the employee
was engaged in willful misconduct or actual malice. 29 First, the
court recognized the “broad discretion” 30 afforded to the Attorney

23. Id. at 1098–99.
24. Id. at 1101.
25. Id.
26. 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-31-9(1) (2012).
27. R.I. Troopers Ass’n, 187 A.3d at 1101 (discussing State v. R.I. All. of
Soc. Servs. Emps., Local 580 SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 469 (R.I. 2000)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1103.
30. Id. at 1102 (discussing State v. Lead Paint Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d
428, 471, 473 (R.I. 2008)).
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General in exercising his or her authority, and how “[i]t is not the
province of this Court . . . to dictate how the Attorney General elects
to carry out the statutory functions of his office.” 31 The court then
noted that the express language of the Governmental Tort Liability
Act directly imparts the authority to the Attorney General to
determine when to provide a defense for a state employee. 32
Finally, the court acknowledged that the Attorney General’s refusal
to defend Taylor was appropriately supported by the fact that
Taylor was indicted by a grand jury, pled nolo contendere to
misdemeanor assault upon Monsanto, and that video footage
existed that had captured the assault. 33 Accordingly, Taylor’s
conduct fell beyond the scope of his employment as a Rhode Island
State Trooper, and the Attorney General’s refusal to provide Taylor
with representation was appropriate pursuant to section 9-31-9. 34
Finally, the court addressed several ancillary arguments made
by RITA. 35 First, RITA contended that, according to section 9-3112(b), the judiciary, rather than the Attorney General, makes the
final determination on whether a state will indemnify a state
employee.36 The court determined that this argument was
misplaced as section 9-31-12(b) does not apply to cases where the
Attorney General has declined to provide legal representation and
indemnification based on one of the “disqualifying factors” under
section 9-31-9.37 Next, RITA argued that, according to section 931-11, the Attorney General does not have the authority to dictate
the financial obligations of the State, only to determine
indemnification to his or her own office.38 The court found that
section 9-31-11 did not apply: that section applies only where the
Attorney General has a conflict of interest, and here, the decision
not to represent Taylor was due to the determination that he was
disqualified from representation, not because there was a conflict
of interest in representing Taylor. 39

31. Id. at 1103 (quoting Mottola v. Cirello, 789 A.2d 421, 425 (R.I. 2002))
(alteration in original).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1103–04.
34. Id. at 1104.
35. Id. at 1104–05.
36. Id. at 1104.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1105.
39. Id.
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The court appropriately determined that whether Taylor was
entitled to a legal defense and indemnification by the State was not
an arbitrable issue under the RITA CBA.40 The court relied on the
well-reasoned decision of State v. Rhode Island Alliance of Social
Services, Local 580, SEIU, where the court determined that “an
arbitrator cannot resolve a labor dispute by issuing a ruling that
would conflict with or compromise the statutory authority or legal
obligations of a department of state government.” 41
Here,
arbitration would have conflicted with the Attorney General’s
vested statutory authority to decline representation in accordance
with the “disqualifying factors” enumerated in section 9-31-9. 42
Accordingly, given that arbitration of the Attorney General’s
decision would usurp the “Attorney General’s powers and
obligations,” 43 particularly the exclusive authority granted under
section 9-31-9 to determine when to provide a state employee with
a legal defense, the court appropriately determined that arbitration
was inappropriate. 44
The second question at issue—whether the Governmental Tort
Liability Act gave the Attorney General sole legal authority to
determine when the State should provide a defense to a state
employee in his individual capacity—was appropriately decided by
the court.45 The court noted that it has “consistently recognized
and affirmed the Attorney General’s assertion of common law and
constitutionally derived authority to carry out the important
functions of the office on behalf of the people of this state.” 46
Understanding the “broad discretion” that has historically been
afforded to the Attorney General and recognizing that, in addition
to the Attorney General’s inherent powers, the resolution of the
issue was also controlled by the language of section 9-31-9, the court
correctly held that the decision to decline representation of Taylor
was appropriate.47 Under section 9-31-9, the Attorney General is
40. Id. at 1101.
41. Id. at 1099 (quoting State v. R.I. All. of Soc. Servs. Emps., Local 580,
SEIU, 747 A.2d 465, 468 (R.I. 2000)).
42. Id. at 1101.
43. Id. at 1100.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 1102.
47. Id. at 1101–04.

2019]

SURVEY SECTION

499

permitted to decline to defend a state employee where his or her
actions fall outside of the scope of employment or are the result of
willful misconduct or actual malice. 48 Given that the Attorney
General based his decision on evidence 49 that wholly supported the
determination that Taylor acted intentionally with actual malice in
assaulting Monsanto and, therefore, acted beyond the scope of his
employment, the court appropriately determined that the Attorney
General’s decision a proper exercise of his authority. 50
Finally, the court properly determined that section 9-31-11,
which requires the State to pay for the state employee’s reasonable
attorney’s fees when the State determines that there is a conflict of
interest in undertaking the state employee’s defense, did not apply
to Taylor’s federal tort action. 51 Because the Attorney General
based his decision to decline representation on Taylor’s
disqualification from a state-provided legal defense for acting
outside of the scope of his employment, and not because there was
a conflict of interest preventing the representation, section 9-31-11
did not apply. 52 Accordingly, the court correctly concluded that this
provision of the Governmental Tort Liability Act was inapplicable
to Taylor. 53
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Attorney
General has the authority to determine whether a state employee
is entitled to legal representation when sued in his or her individual
capacity due to an act that occurred outside of the scope of
employment. The court also determined that the Attorney General’s
determination of whether to provide a defense to a state employee
is not an arbitrable issue.
Crystal Peralta

48. Id. at 1103.
49. Id. at 1103–04. The evidence the Attorney General relied upon
included that “Taylor was indicted by a grand jury and pled nolo contendere to
misdemeanor assault upon Monsanto” and that “the record include[d] a video
recording that captured Trooper Taylor’s assault upon Monsanto.” Id.
50. Id. at 1103.
51. Id. at 1105.
52. Id.
53. Id.

Evidence. State v. Perry, 182 A.3d 558 (R.I. 2018). The trial court
has discretion to allow witness testimony of prior sexual misconduct
so long as it does not violate Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence. In ruling on a defendant’s motion to
dismiss, a trial justice does not violate Rule 29(b) of the Superior
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure by granting the motion in part
and denying the motion in part.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In May 2012, the Bristol Police Department was investigating
a possible child molestation that occurred between the years 1977
and 1980. 1 Through police investigation, Sergeant Steven St.
Pierre was contacted by Brian, who directed Sergeant St. Pierre to
Adam, the complaining witness and Brian’s childhood friend. 2 As
a result of Adam’s disclosures to the police, the Defendant, Jesse S.
Perry, was arrested on January 4, 2013.3 On April 12, 2013, the
Defendant was charged with nine counts: three counts of firstdegree child molestation sexual assault, two counts of seconddegree child molestation sexual assault, two counts of first-degree
sexual assault, and two counts of second-degree sexual assault. 4
On May 15, 2013, the State filed a motion in limine seeking to
admit testimony from multiple witnesses about alleged incidents of
sexual misconduct by the Defendant that occurred between 1977
and 1980. 5 The State maintained that nearly all the witnesses
were involved in youth sports in Bristol, had a difficult home life,
and were offered a sports massage prior to the sexual abuse. 6
Therefore, the State asserted that the Defendant’s prior sexual
misconduct was “‘probative of [his] modus operandi of preying on

1. State v. Perry, 1982 A.3d. 558, 561 (R.I. 2018).
2. Id. The court used fictitious names in its Opinion to protect the privacy
of the complaining witness and the other witnesses. Id. at 561 n.1.
3. Id. at 562.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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vulnerable young boys[,]’ and tended to prove defendant’s motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, an
absence of mistake or accident.” 7 The Defendant opposed the
State’s motion in limine and argued that the testimony was
inadmissible under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Rhode Island
Rules of Evidence. 8 The trial justice granted the State’s motion in
limine, allowing the State to present testimony from witnesses
about prior sexual misconduct by the Defendant. 9
A bench trial began on November 18, 2014 in Rhode Island
Superior Court.10 At the trial, the complaining witness, Adam,
testified, as well as three other witnesses: Colin, David, and
Brian.11 Adam, who was thirty-three years old at trial, testified
that he first met the Defendant when he was eight years old and
that the Defendant was his youth football coach. 12 Adam explained
to the court how their relationship developed and how he moved in
with the Defendant when he was twelve years old. 13 Adam further
testified about the Defendant’s sexual abuse, including incidents of
fellatio. 14 Colin, who was forty-seven years old at trial, testified
next. 15 He testified about an incident that occurred when he was
twelve years old and went to the Defendant’s home for a sports
massage following an injury during football practice; the Defendant
removed Colin’s underwear and moved, but did not injure, Colin’s
penis.16 David, who was forty-six years old at trial, was the third
witness to testify. 17 He testified about two incidents: the first
involved the Defendant fondling his genitals after David told the
Defendant he intended to play football and would need a jockstrap
and cup; the second occurred when the Defendant told David he was

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 563. In rendering her decision, the trial justice was mindful of
the time span between the alleged prior sexual misconduct and the charged
acts. The trial justice considered the similarities between the relationship of
the parties and the nature and location of the alleged assault when deciding
on the remoteness of the evidence. Id.
10. Id. The Defendant waived his right to a trial by jury. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 563–64.
15. Id. at 564.
16. Id.
17. Id.

2019]

SURVEY SECTION

503

falling in love with him.18 Lastly, Brian, who was forty-five years
old at the trial, testified that he used to live on the same street as
the Defendant. 19 Brian also testified about an incident that
occurred at the Defendant’s home where the Defendant invited him
over to show him nunchucks and, while Brian sat on the bed, the
Defendant touched Brian’s penis for between five and ten
minutes.20 The State then rested its case against the Defendant
and dismissed one of the counts of first-degree child molestation
sexual assault.21
The Defendant then moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 29(b)
of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,
challenging the legal sufficiency of the State’s trial evidence;
specifically, he argued that the counts were duplicitous. 22 On
December 16, 2014 the trial justice issued a decision where she first
noted that one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault
and one count of second-degree sexual assault had already been
dismissed.23 The trial justice found Adam to be a credible witness
and accepted the testimony of the other witnesses as satisfying the
requirements for admissible character evidence pursuant to Rule
404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. 24 The trial justice
therefore denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss with respect to
two counts of first-degree child molestation sexual assault and one
count of second-degree child molestation sexual assault, and
granted the motion with respect to one count of second-degree child
molestation sexual assault, two counts of first-degree sexual
assault, and one count second-degree sexual assault. 25
In
summation, the remaining charges after the disposition of the
motion to dismiss were two counts of first-degree child molestation
sexual assault and one count of second-degree child molestation
sexual assault.26
The Defendant then testified. 27 He denied any sexual contact

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 564–65.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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with Colin, David, or Brian.28 The Defendant called Colin’s and
David’s allegations “a one upmanship kind of thing.” 29 The
Defendant also denied having a sexual relationship with Adam or
ever touching him in a sexual manner, and accused Adam of lying
in his testimony about the Defendant. 30 On January 5, 2015, the
trial justice rendered her decision and, after considering all the
evidence, found the Defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree
child molestation sexual assault and one count of second-degree
child molestation sexual assault. 31 On May 8, 2015, the trial justice
sentenced the Defendant to serve concurrent life sentences at the
Adult Correctional Institutions for the two counts of first-degree
child molestation sexual assault, and thirty years, to run
concurrently with the life sentences, for the one count of seconddegree child molestation sexual assault. 32 The Defendant appealed
the trial justice’s decision. 33
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Defendant brought this appeal on three separate grounds.
First, the Defendant argued that the trial justice erred in granting
the State’s motion in limine and admitting the testimony of Brian,
Colin, and David because this evidence violated Rhode Island Rule
of Evidence 404(b).34 Second, the Defendant argued that the
allegations of prior sexual misconduct should not have been
admitted because the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed the
evidence’s probative value pursuant to Rhode Island Rule of
Evidence 403. 35 Lastly, the Defendant argued that the trial justice
exceeded the dictates of Rule 29(b) of the Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure when deciding his motion to dismiss.36
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the Defendant’s
first point of appeal under an “abuse of discretion” standard, stating
that “th[e] Court is disinclined to perceive an abuse of discretion so
long as the record contains some grounds for supporting the trial

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567–68.
Id. at 568.
Id.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
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justice’s decision.” 37 In general, evidence offered to prove the
character of a person and that the person acted in conformity with
past crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible under Rule 404(b). 38
Rule 404(b) contains an exception for the admission of such
evidence “for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake
or accident, or to prove that defendant feared imminent bodily harm
and that the fear was reasonable.” 39 To present evidence of prior
sexual misconduct with someone other than the complainant under
Rule 404(b), the sexual offenses have to be “nonremote” and
“similar.” 40 Sexual offenses are nonremote and similar “if they are
closely related in time, place, age, family relationship of the victims,
and the form of the sexual acts.” 41 The evidence must also be
relevant to the crime charged and reasonably necessary. 42
The court first analyzed whether the trial justice balanced the
relevance of the evidence against its remoteness and potential for
improper prejudicial impact. 43 The court concluded that the trial
justice remained cognizant of the time between the prior sexual
misconduct and the charged acts, and ultimately determined that
the similarities were so strong that any remoteness was
outweighed. 44 The court held that the trial justice did not abuse
her discretion in finding that the prior acts of sexual misconduct
were similar to the charged acts because the victims were of similar
age, were all local boys that participated in the youth sports league,
and all the incidents occurred at the Defendant’s residence.45 The
nature of the abuse was also similar. 46
The court then conducted a relevancy analysis under Rule 401,
which defines relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency

37. Id. at 568.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting State v. Mohapatra, 880 A.2d 802, 806 (R.I. 2005)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting State v. Coningford, 901 A.2d 623, 628–29 (R.I. 2006)).
43. Id. at 569.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 570.
46. Id. The victims were between nine and twelve years old. Id. at 569–
70. They were all local boys who participated in youth sports leagues. Id. at
570. The incidents of sexual misconduct all occurred at the Defendant’s
residence and involved the Defendant touching the victims’ genitals under the
guise of various situations. Id.
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to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.” 47 The court held that because the
Defendant was charged with second-degree child molestation
sexual assault, evidence that the Defendant engaged in similar acts
was relevant to demonstrate the Defendant’s intent to selfIn determining whether the evidence about the
gratify. 48
Defendant’s prior sexual misconduct was reasonably necessary, the
court considered the significant lapse of time between the sexual
assaults and the prosecution, as well as the “credibility contest”
between the Defendant and Adam, concluding that the testimony
was reasonably necessary. 49 The court held that the trial justice
did not abuse her discretion in admitting evidence of the
Defendant’s prior sexual misconduct under Rule 404(b). 50
Moving to the Defendant’s second issue on appeal, the court
again applied an abuse of discretion standard. 51 Rule 403 states
that relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” 52 The Defendant argued that the record did
not reflect a Rule 403 analysis; however, the court disagreed.53 The
court explained that a trial justice can disregard prejudicial
material if and when he or she determines that material to be
inadmissible.54 Here, the trial justice would have disregarded the
evidence if it were prejudicial and, therefore, the court rejected the
Defendant’s argument that the prior sexual misconduct biased the
trial justice and impaired her impartiality.55 Ultimately, the court
held that the trial justice properly admitted the testimony
regarding the Defendant’s prior sexual misconduct. 56
In addressing the Defendant’s final argument on appeal, the
court applied a deferential standard of review, stating that it will
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 570–71.
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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uphold the findings of a trial justice “unless it can be shown that
she overlooked or misconceived relevant and material evidence or
was otherwise clearly wrong.” 57 Rule 29(b) states that “in a case
tried without a jury, a motion to dismiss may be filed at the close of
the [s]tate’s case to challenge the legal sufficiency of the [s]tate’s
trial evidence.” 58 The court found that the Defendant’s argument
was without merit; it reasoned that the trial justice did not exceed
the dictates of Rule 29(b) because she analyzed all of the witnesses’
credibility and acknowledged that her findings were based on the
record at the time of the motion to dismiss. 59 Therefore, based on
the trial justice’s evaluation of the evidence and her credibility
determinations, the court found no error in the trial justice’s
analysis because she adhered to the requirements of Rule 29(b). 60
COMMENTARY

In this appeal, the Defendant challenged the analysis of several
rules of evidence that ultimately allowed evidence of prior sexual
misconduct to be admitted during the trial. From the outset, the
Defendant challenged the State’s motion in limine, arguing that the
testimony of prior sexual misconduct should not be admitted
pursuant to Rule 404(b).61 The State relied on the exception carved
out in Rule 404(b) and maintained the position that the witness
testimony proved the Defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or
accident. 62 The court resolved this issue by applying a “nonremote”
and “similar” test which allows admission of evidence of a
defendant’s sexual offenses against a person other than the
complaining witness if the evidence is “nonremote” and “similar.” 63
As the dissent discussed, the standard requires that the
evidence be both nonremote and similar to the charged conduct.64
The dissent persuasively suggested that the majority improperly
used similar factors to assess both the nonremote requirement and
the similar requirement, essentially blending the two requirements
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 573–74.
Id. at 574.
Id. at 562.
Id.
Id. at 563.
Id. at 574 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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into one and blurring the line between admissible and inadmissible
evidence. 65 As the dissent pointed out, the fact that the prior abuse
occurred between ten and twenty-two years prior to the charged
conduct was relevant to the analysis. 66 The dissent suggested that
the majority, by combining the “nonremote” and “similar” factors,
did not necessarily address that fact. 67 The dissent ultimately
opined that the evidence was too remote and, therefore, did not
satisfy the test for admissibility. 68
Another persuasive issue that the dissent presented was the
overall trend of Rhode Island Rule 404(b) cases. 69 The dissent
expressed concern about the resurrection of the “scatter-shot”
approach: “[T]he trial court should not take a scatter-shot approach
and list all of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Rather, it
shall designate with particularity the specific exceptions to which
the ‘other crimes’ evidence is relevant and delete from its charge
the remaining exceptions.” 70 As the majority indicated, the trial
justice mentioned the exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of
evidence of past crimes, but the trial justice did not pinpoint the
exception that applied. 71 The dissent suggested that a solution
would be to require the trial justice to state the express purpose for
which the evidence is offered, rather than a “blanket assertion.” 72
This procedure would provide the court with clearer guidance as to
why a trial justice admitted certain evidence, which would result in
a more efficient system.73
CONCLUSION

The court concluded that that the trial justice properly allowed
in the witnesses’ testimony of prior sexual misconduct. In doing so,
the trial justice did not violate Rule 404(b) or Rule 403.
Additionally, the trial justice did not rule in error on the
Defendant’s motion to dismiss following Rule 29(b). Accordingly,
the court affirmed the decision of the Superior Court on all issues.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 575.
See id.
Id.
See id.
Id. (quoting State v. Jalette, 382 A.2d. 526, 533 (R.I. 1978)).
See id. at 567 (majority opinion).
Id. at 576 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
Id.
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Brianna Arnold

Family Law. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 186 A.3d 1074 (R.I. 2018).
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the Family Court’s
decision to deny a motion to relocate children who were under joint
custody. The court declined to disturb the Family Court’s ruling
that relocating was not in the best interests of the children, as the
new location would make visitation with the non-relocating parent
impracticable given the circumstances.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The Plaintiff, Lauren Daley Ainsworth, and the Defendant,
John Ainsworth, were married in Australia on October 2, 1999. 1
During their marriage, the couple lived in the United States and
Lauren gave birth to four children, who all have dual citizenship.2
On March 23, 2011, Lauren filed for divorce,3 and while the divorce
proceedings were still pending, Lauren filed a motion to relocate the
children to Australia.4 About one month later, a Rhode Island
Family Court justice “issued a decision pending entry of final
judgment,” awarding joint custody of the children to the parties,
with Lauren being granted “physical possession” of the children and
John having “all reasonable rights of visitation.” 5 More than a year
later, after conducting a hearing, a different justice of the Family
1. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 186 A.3d 1074, 1077 (R.I. 2018). The Plaintiff
and the Defendant will be referenced by their first names, as the Rhode Island
Supreme Court did in its Opinion, in order to avoid confusion. Lauren is an
Australian citizen with permanent residency status in the United States, while
John is a citizen of the United States. Id.
2. Id. The children’s names are Hope, Sydney, Jenny, and Jack, and they
were born in 2001, 2003, 2007, and 2009, respectively. Id. at 1077 n.2.
3. Id. at 1077. Lauren filed for divorce due to “irreconcilable differences
between the parties [that] had led to the irremediable breakdown of the
marriage.” Id.
4. Id. Lauren filed the motion to relocate on October 31, 2012. Id.
Lauren explained that her purpose for relocating was because she would have
significantly better economic prospects in Australia, which would provide a
better quality of life for her and the children, and also because her father, who
lives in Australia, had been diagnosed with a terminal illness shortly before
Lauren filed the motion to relocate. Id. at 1077–78.
5. Id. at 1077.
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Court issued a bench decision denying Lauren’s motion to relocate.6
The hearing justice stated that “the ‘seminal question’ in this case
was ‘the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating parent and [the] children through suitable visiting
arrangements considering th[e] logistics and financial
circumstances of the parties.’” 7 Of considerable importance to this
issue, according to the hearing justice, was the practicability of
Lauren’s proposed visitation schedule and the indication that
“[Lauren] would not endeavor to actively foster a close and
continuous relationship between the children and their father.” 8
Lauren timely appealed the final order to the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.9
On appeal, Lauren asserted three arguments. First, she
contended that “the hearing justice clearly erred in assessing the
evidence” by giving “too much weight to John’s present appearance
before the court” and according “too little weight to his past
misdeeds, while also failing to give adequate consideration to the
economic benefits [of relocating].” 10 Additionally, she contended
that “the hearing justice overlooked material evidence by failing to
properly [consider] the fact that the parties’ ‘utter loathing’ for each
other resulted in a ‘significant detriment’ to the children.” 11
Second, she contended that “the hearing justice overlooked or
misconceived material evidence” by failing to “acknowledge or
address the testimony of the school nurse, Christine McGrane.” 12
Third, she contended that “the hearing justice failed to properly
apply the criteria set forth in the Dupré and Pettinato cases because
there was no testimony about the children’s reasonable preferences
with respect to the proposed relocation.” 13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In reviewing the issues on appeal, the court noted that “[i]t is
a firmly established principle in family law that the paramount
6. Id. The final order was entered on July 22, 2015. Id.
7. Id. at 1081 (quoting Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 258 (R.I. 2004)
(alterations in original)).
8. Id. (alteration in original).
9. Id. at 1076.
10. Id. at 1083.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing Dupré v. Dupré, 857 A.2d 242, 256 (R.I. 2004); Pettinato v.
Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913 (R.I. 1990)).
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consideration in relocation cases is the best interests of the child or
children.” 14 The court explained that a “best interests of the child”
determination is within the sound discretion of the trial justice. 15
Additionally, “[o]n review, th[e] Court will not disturb the findings
of fact made by a justice of the Family Court with respect to the
issue of custody and the best interests of the child[ren] unless the
hearing justice abused his or her discretion in making such
findings.” 16 The court has “set forth several factors that the
hearing justice must consider in determining the best interests of
the child when confronted with a motion to relocate.” 17 First, “the
hearing justice must address the eight factors articulated in [the]
Court’s opinion in Dupré,” keeping in mind that “[n]o single [Dupré]
factor is dispositive.” 18 Second, “the hearing justice must address
such of the eight factors articulated in Pettinato [that] are relevant
to the relocation issue.” 19 Finally, the court “will affirm the Family
14. Id. at 1081 (quoting DePrete v. DePrete, 44 A.3d 1260, 1271 (R.I.
2012)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
15. Id. (quoting Dupré, 857 A.2d at 256).
16. Id. (quoting DePrete, 44 A.3d at 1270).
17. Id. at 1081–82.
18. Id. at 1082 (quoting Valkown v. Frizzle, 973 A.2d 566, 577 (R.I. 2009))
(alterations in original).
In our opinion in Dupré, we identified the following factors that are to
be considered “whenever a parent seeks to move with his or her
children:” (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement, and duration
of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate and
with the non-relocating parent. (2) The reasonable likelihood that the
relocation will enhance the general quality of life for both the child
and the parent seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to,
economic and emotional benefits, and educational opportunities. (3)
The probable impact that the relocation will have on the child’s
physical, educational, and emotional development. Any special needs
of the child should also be taken into account in considering this
factor. (4) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
non-relocating parent and child through suitable visitation
arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances
of the parties. (5) The existence of extended family or other support
systems available to the child in both locations. (6) Each parent’s
reasons for seeking or opposing the relocation. (7) In cases of
international relocation, the question of whether the country to which
the child is to be relocated is a signatory to the Hague Convention on
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction will be an
important consideration. (8) To the extent that they may be relevant
to a relocation inquiry, the Pettinato factors also will be significant.
Id. at 1082 (quoting Dupré, 857 A.2d at 257–59 (R.I. 2004)).
19. Id. at 1082.
Our earlier decision in Pettinato had set forth the following factors
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Court’s ruling ‘unless the trial justice’s factual findings overlooked
or misconceived material evidence or were clearly wrong.’” 20
Regarding Lauren’s first argument, that the hearing justice
accorded too much weight to John’s present appearance while
according too little weight to his previous misdeeds, the court held
that “[i]n [its] view, the hearing justice appropriately weighed the
Dupré factors and the relevant Pettinato factors and then proceeded
to render a well-reasoned decision, which properly took into account
all of the material evidence presented at the hearing.” 21 Looking
at the first Dupré factor, 22 the hearing justice found that John’s
alcohol abuse caused the breakup of the marriage, but at the time
of the hearing, John was a member of Alcoholics Anonymous and
had been sober since November 2011.23 The hearing justice also
found that “John ha[d] done everything that the [Family Court had]
required to re-establish his relationship with the children after the
separation,” and that “both parents were engaged in meaningful
relationships with the children.” 24 Similarly, the court was not
persuaded by Lauren’s argument that the hearing justice
improperly weighed the evidence or her argument regarding the
potential economic benefits of relocation. 25 The trial justice,
analyzing the second and third Dupré factors, found that there was
that are to be weighed in the best interests of the child analysis when
relevant: (1) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents regarding the
child’s custody. (2) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court
deems the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and
experience to express a preference.
(3) The interaction and
interrelationship of the child with the child’s parent or parents, the
child’s siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
child’s best interest. (4) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home,
school, and community. (5) The mental and physical health of all
individuals involved.
(6) The stability of the child’s home
environment. (7) The moral fitness of the child’s parents. (8) The
willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate a close and
continuous parent-child relationship between the child and the other
parent.
Id. at 1082–83 (quoting Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 913–14 (R.I. 1990)).
20. Id. at 1081 (quoting McDonough v. McDonough, 962 A.2d 47, 52 (R.I.
2009)).
21. Id. at 1083.
22. The first Dupré factor is “the nature, quality, extent of involvement,
and duration of the child’s relationship with the parent proposing to relocate
and with the non-relocating parent.” Dupré, 857 A.2d at 257.
23. Ainsworth, 186 A.3d at 1084.
24. Id. at 1083–84 (alterations in original).
25. Id.
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“no doubt that relocation would . . . serve to enhance the economic
standing and well-being of the mother,” which would also positively
impact her children.26 However, the hearing justice also noted that
the children were “bonded to Rhode Island” because they had spent
their entire lives in Rhode Island, attended school there, and were
involved in the community. 27 Thus, the court found that the trial
justice properly weighed the evidence concerning the economic
benefits of relocation.28
Additionally, the court ruled that the hearing justice properly
considered the impact of the parties’ “utter loathing” for each other
on the children and found that relocating, although economically
beneficial to Lauren and the children, would go against the best
interests of the children because it was questionable whether the
parties were actually capable of arranging international visitation
on a regular basis.29 When considering all of the aforementioned
factors, the hearing justice found that “the petition for relocation to
Australia should be denied,” and because “[the Court] shall not
substitute [its] view of the evidence for [that of the trial justice]
even though a contrary conclusion could have been reached,” the
court perceived no reversible error in the conclusions reached by
the hearing justice.30
Regarding Lauren’s second argument, that the hearing justice
overlooked or misconceived material evidence by failing to consider
the testimony of the school nurse and by failing to consider the
parties’ relationship with each other, the court stated that “[i]t is
well established that a hearing justice ‘need not engage in an
exhaustive review and analysis of all of the evidence and testimony
presented at trial’ so long as he or she ‘make[s] reference to such
facts disclosed by the testimony as have motivated his or her
conclusion.’” 31 Although the hearing justice did not mention the
school nurse by name, “his decision did refer to the only salient
26. Id. at 1084.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The hearing justice did not think Lauren’s proposed visitation
plan would be feasible because of the complexity inherent in such visitation,
the high costs involved, the lack of wealth among the parties, the fact that
Lauren and John only spoke via email, and the fact that Lauren did not want
anything to do with John. Id.
30. Id. at 1084–85.
31. Id. at 1085 (quoting Bitgood v. Greene, 108 A.3d 1023, 1028 (R.I.
2015)).
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aspect of her brief testimony,” which was that “Lauren ha[d]
historically suffered from financial hardships.” 32 The record
reflected that the hearing justice properly considered this factor
when determining whether relocation would be in the best interests
of the children. 33 Accordingly, the court found no reversible error
in the hearing justice’s ruling. 34
Finally, regarding Lauren’s third argument, that the hearing
justice abused his discretion by failing to hear testimony about the
children’s reasonable preferences regarding the proposed
relocation, the court, again, found no error.35 Although the second
Pettinato factor provides that the hearing justice must consider the
reasonable preference of the child if the child is competent to claim
a preference, neither party submitted evidence of the children’s
preferences and the guardian ad litem was unable to adequately
represent the children’s interests.36 The failure to submit evidence
of the children’s preference did not impose an obligation on the
hearing justice to act sua sponte to seek additional evidence, such
as the children’s testimony, and it was the hearing justice’s “duty
to decide Lauren’s motion to relocate even in the absence of
evidence of the children’s preferences, and he proceeded to do just
that.” 37 Accordingly, the court found no error in the hearing
justice’s assessment of the evidence with respect to the proposed
relocation. 38
COMMENTARY

The court correctly affirmed the hearing justice’s decision to
deny Lauren’s motion to relocate after carefully analyzing and
weighing the Dupré and Pettinato factors against the evidence.
After considering all of the factors, the hearing justice found that
Lauren’s proposed way to preserve the relationship between John
and their children was just not feasible when considering the
logistics of visiting arrangements and the financial circumstances
32. Id. “Specifically, he found that, at the time of the relocation hearing,
Lauren was unemployed, ‘surviving on food stamps and the generosity of
friends and church members,’ and that she was ‘in the process of having her
home foreclosed.’” Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1085–86.
37. Id. at 1086.
38. Id.
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of the parties.39 The factors indicated that Lauren would not
attempt to actively foster a close and continuous relationship
between the children and their father.40
Because the
determination of what is in the best interests of the children is
appropriately placed in the sound discretion of the trial justice, and
because the court will affirm the Family Court’s ruling unless the
trial justice’s factual findings overlooked material evidence or was
clearly wrong, which in this case it was not, the court affirmed the
order of the Family Court, denying Lauren’s motion to relocate her
children to Australia.
The court affords a deferential standard of review to a trial
justice’s determination of what is in the best interests of the
children, stating that the decision is “appropriately placed in the
sound discretion of the trial justice.” 41 Although Lauren provided
some compelling reasons for why relocation would be beneficial,
such as the economic benefits to Lauren and her children, the
benefits were clearly outweighed by the harm that would have
resulted from relocation, including the possibility that the children
would not see their father again if they left Rhode Island. 42
Lauren might have been able to persuade the hearing justice
to grant her motion to relocate if she had showed that her
relationship with John would have remained intact after relocation.
However, Lauren did not show any consideration for the effect that
relocation would have had on John, or how he would reasonably be
able to visit his children, other than the proposed visitation
schedule, which provided that John would see his children for ten
weeks out of the year and that he was “welcome to visit the children
in Australia whenever he liked.” 43 Because she failed to show that
relocation would not impose a substantial burden on John and his
relationship with the children, the only reasonable conclusion was
that relocation was not in the best interests of the children and,
thus, the court correctly affirmed the trial justice’s denial of
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1081.
42. Id. at 1081, 1084.
43. Id. at 1078–79. Although welcoming John to come to Australia to visit
the children “whenever he liked” seems like it would help John’s relationship
with the children remain intact, the fact that both Lauren and John are not
wealthy and instead have relied on receiving various forms of assistance from
the community over the course of several years makes it highly unlikely that
a visit to Australia would ever actually happen. Id. at 1081.
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Lauren’s motion to relocate.
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined
that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in denying
Lauren’s motion to relocate her children to Australia. The court
noted that, generally, it will not reverse the Family Court’s findings
of fact unless the trial justice overlooked material evidence or was
clearly wrong. The court determined that the trial justice did not
overlook material evidence and was not clearly wrong. Therefore,
the Family Court’s judgment was affirmed.
Connor Criswell

Family Law. Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711 (R.I. 2018). The
Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that assets that either party
gains during a marriage are marital property and, therefore, are
subject to equitable distribution in the event of a divorce.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

The Plaintiff, Simeng Wu-Carter, and the Defendant, Thomas
Carter, met through an online dating service. 1 After several
months of dating, Simeng and Thomas decided to get married on
October 20, 2012 on Cape Cod. 2 Unbeknownst to Simeng, Thomas
had not yet finalized his divorce from his third wife. 3 This was
problematic for two reasons: first, Simeng’s visa was to expire in
February 2013 (which threatened her legal status in the United
States) and, second, Simeng had already “made travel
arrangements for her parents to travel from China for the
[wedding].” 4 As a result, Simeng and Thomas decided to have the
planned wedding ceremony, although their marriage would not be
legal.5
Simeng and Thomas were officially married on October 7, 2013
and, by the time she submitted her green card application that
December, Simeng and Thomas were legally married.6 In order for
Simeng to obtain a green card, it was required that she be legally
married to an American citizen. 7 However, a second requirement
stood in the way of Simeng’s ability to obtain her green card:
Thomas’s income was not “125 percent above the poverty line . . . to
show that he could support [Simeng] financially.” 8 Because
1. Wu-Carter v. Carter, 179 A.3d 711, 713 (R.I. 2018). The parties are
referred to by their first names, as the court did in its Opinion, to avoid
confusion.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 714.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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Thomas was unable to prove that he could financially support his
new wife, Simeng asked her parents to help by “wire-transfer[ring]
$100,000 to her so that she could effectuate Thomas’s qualifying as
her sponsor.” 9 After adding Simeng’s name to his Bank of America
account, the funds were transferred, and Thomas could now
demonstrate, via a bank statement, that he had legally sufficient
funds to sponsor Simeng. 10
Upon approval of her green card application in April 2014,
Simeng “began working and immediately opened checking and
savings accounts with Bank of America in her own name, into which
she deposited her paychecks.” 11 She transferred $38,000 of the
original $100,000 wire-transferred funds into her personal checking
and savings accounts and then, with Thomas’s knowledge, “wired
the remaining $62,000 back to her parents’ Bank of China
account.” 12
In spring of 2014, the couple’s relationship began to decline. 13
Simeng and Thomas lived in separate parts of Thomas’s house, and
they kept their finances completely separate, except for times when
“[Simeng] would give Thomas money if he had run out of funds,
because he did not have a stable job.” 14
In December 2015, Simeng ultimately filed for divorce in Rhode
Island Family Court “citing irreconcilable differences . . . that had
caused the irremediable breakdown of their marriage.” 15 Thomas
counterclaimed for the same reasons. 16 Thomas testified that
Simeng would “have violent outbursts . . . and alleged that Simeng
demanded he choose between her and his children.” 17 Simeng, on
the other hand, testified that Thomas physically assaulted her and
that he was an angry and jealous man. 18
In issuing her bench decision, the trial justice first determined
the relevant dates, including the legal marriage date, October 7,
2013, and the date Simeng and Thomas separated, November

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2015.19 The trial justice wanted to clarify these relevant dates to
“determine the marital estate.” 20 “The ‘most significant’ asset in
dispute was the $100,000 that Simeng’s parents had wiretransferred into Thomas’s and her joint Bank of America account
during the marriage.” 21 The trial justice traced the money from the
wire-transfer to the couple, to when the couple transferred it into a
money-market account, to when Simeng transferred $38,000 of it
into her own accounts, and finally to when she wire-transferred the
remaining $62,000 back to her parents. 22 The trial justice
determined that the money was a loan to Simeng from her parents
and not a wedding gift, as Thomas had asserted. 23 “[T]he trial
justice concluded that ‘at all times . . . the $100,000 gift to [Simeng]
[for immigration purposes] during the marriage [was] never
intended to be [a] joint gift . . . nor at any point during the marriage
did [Simeng] transmute these assets to become marital.’” 24 The
trial justice awarded Simeng her personal bank accounts and
awarded Thomas the joint bank accounts that remained.25 Finally,
the trial justice found that two boats, valued at $3,000, were the
only marital assets subject to equitable distribution and ultimately
awarded them to Thomas because Simeng made no claim to the
boats.26
Thomas appealed the trial justice’s decision, arguing that she
misinterpreted the marital assets, did not use the factors of
equitable distribution under Rhode Island General Laws section 155-16.1, and did not consider his claim to be entitled to an award of
counsel fees.27
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviews divorce actions with
deference, however, “[n]otwithstanding such deference, when th[e]
Court reviews questions of law in an appeal from Family Court, [it]

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 716–17.
Id. at 718.
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must apply a de novo review.” 28 Additionally, when the equitable
distribution of assets is contested, the “[C]ourt will not disturb the
trial justice’s findings where he or she has scrupulously considered
all of the elements set forth in [Rhode Island General Laws section
15-5-16.1],” entitled “Assignment of property.” 29 The court noted
that “equitable distribution is a three-step process”30 and that it
would defer to the trial justice’s findings regarding the equitable
distribution of Simeng and Thomas’s marital assets unless “the
trial justice overlook[ed] salient uncontradicted evidence in
determining the amount of assets to be distributed.” 31
Here, the court found that Simeng and Thomas had previously
agreed to a fifty percent division of marital assets 32 and, because of
this stipulation, held that the trial justice properly awarded
Thomas the two boats valued at $3,000, which she found to be the
only marital assets between Simeng and Thomas. 33 The court
made this determination after reviewing other assets, including the
2008 BMW Simeng purchased with money gifted from her parents,
which she subsequently registered under her name before she
married Thomas. 34 The court found this was “not marital property
subject to equitable distribution upon divorce.” 35 The court then
used the doctrine of transmutation 36 to discuss the parties’ intent
28. Id. at 717.
29. Id. (alteration in original). See 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(a) (1956).
This statute contains ten factors that determine the assignment of property
upon divorce in the state of Rhode Island. Id. Several relevant factors include:
“[t]he length of marriage”; “[t]he conduct of the parties during the marriage”;
“[t]he amount of sources of income of each of the parties”; and “[t]he occupation
and employability of each of the parties.” Id.
30. Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 718. The three-step process requires the trial
justice to determine the marital and nonmarital property, consider the factors
listed within section 15-5-16.1(a), and then distribute the marital property. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Rhode Island General Laws section 15-5-16.1(b) describes three
categories of property exempt from marital asset classification: (1) “property
held by the party prior to marriage”; (2) “property or an interest in property
which has been transferred to one of the parties by inheritance before, during,
or after the marriage”; and (3) “property or an interest in property which has
been transferred to one of the parties by gift from a third party before, during,
or after the marriage.” § 15-5-16.1(b).
34. Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 719.
35. Id.
36. See Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d 1138, 1142–43 (R.I. 2002).
The doctrine of transmutation dictates that “property can be converted from
nonmarital property into marital property if changed in form and put into joint
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regarding the $100,000 gift from Simeng’s parents and whether it
was to be considered marital property because it was deposited into
a Bank of America account in both Simeng’s and Thomas’s names. 37
The court held that the trial justice correctly found, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the doctrine of transmutation did not
apply to the $100,000 because “there was no intent for [the money]
to be a marital asset.” 38
The court found that the trial justice erred in determining the
classification of the remaining funds from Simeng’s income totaling
$19,500. 39
The court noted that, “in accordance with the
partnership theory of marriage, assets that one spouse acquires
while married are subject to equitable distribution upon divorce”
unless specifically excluded by section 15-5-6.1. 40 Thus, the court
found the $19,500 in Simeng’s individual bank account to be a
marital asset that should have been distributed according to the
parties’ agreed upon fifty percent division of the marital assets. 41
This fifty percent stipulation applied to the money within the joint
bank accounts, as well.42
Finally, the court deferred to the trial justice’s decision that
Thomas was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees.43 It held
that the trial justice correctly applied the factors in section 15-516.1 and also noted that Thomas incurred avoidable legal expenses
by “unnecessar[ily] delay[ing] the case for nearly a year,” plus he
had no expenses because he lived in his mother’s house, rent-free. 44
COMMENTARY

The court relied upon section 15-5-16.1 when it held that the
remaining funds ($19,500) in Simeng’s individual bank accounts
were part of the marital estate.45 Moreover, the court relied on its
holding in D’Agostino v. D’Agostino when applying section 15-5-16.1
names.” Id. (quoting Cloutier v. Cloutier, 567 A.2d 1131, 1132 (R.I. 1989)).
37. Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 721.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 722.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 723. Thomas’s claim pursuant to section 15-5-16(b) indicated
“the Family Court has the authority to order one spouse to pay the counsel fees
of the other spouse.” Id.
44. Id. at 723 n.10.
45. See id. at 722.
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to show that assets acquired during marriage are subject to
equitable distribution upon divorce unless those assets are
specifically excluded by section 15-5-16.1(b). 46 In this case, Simeng
and Thomas agreed to an equal split of the marital assets, but that
is not the case in all divorce actions.47
The court’s opinion seems to suggest that, regardless of a
party’s intent with respect to his or her acquired assets throughout
the marriage, unless the asset is excluded by section 15-5-16.1, the
asset will be subject to equitable distribution in the event of a
divorce. 48 This conclusion stems mainly from the doctrine of
transmutation in that property can change from a nonmarital
classification to a marital classification when the parties show an
“actual intention objectively manifested.” 49 This decision turned
away from the trial justice’s conclusion that the bank accounts
“were technically marital assets, [and] the money held in those
accounts was meant to remain nonmarital property.” 50 The trial
justice made this conclusion because Simeng and Thomas kept
their finances separate by maintaining separate bank accounts and
paying bills separately, thus “evincing a clear intent to keep the
accounts separate and distinguished.” 51 The court clarified its
application of the doctrine of transmutation here by explaining that
the intent of the parties can change the classification from
nonmarital to marital, but the parties’ intent to keep property
separate, which was acquired during the marriage, has no bearing
on its ultimate classification.52 To put it simply, a party’s intent
cannot change the property’s classification from marital to

46. Id.
It is true that property that one spouse alone receives from a third
party via gift or inheritance during the marriage, unless somehow
transmuted, is properly classified as nonmarital property under § 155-16.1(b). Otherwise, in accordance with the partnership theory of
marriage, assets that one spouse acquires while married are subject
to equitable distribution upon divorce.
Id. (quoting D’Agostino v. D’Agostino, 463 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1983)).
47. Id. at 722; see Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 A.2d at 1138, 1143 (R.I.
2002) (holding that marital assets are to be divided equitably, though not
necessarily equally).
48. See Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d at 722.
49. Id. at 721.
50. Id. at 722 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 721.
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nonmarital.53
The court primarily focused on the $19,500 in Simeng’s bank
account because of the fifty percent stipulation of marital assets the
couple had previously agreed upon. 54 It is unclear whether Thomas
would be entitled to any of Simeng’s earnings had they not already
stipulated to an even split of marital assets. This particular divorce
proceeding seemed to be a unique and delicate situation because
the couple knew each other only for several months before getting
married and, as a result of the marriage, Simeng was able to receive
her green card for citizenship. 55 Based upon these unusual facts,
it would make sense for the court to defer to the trial justice’s
conclusion that Simeng was entitled to the full amount because the
marriage did not last long enough for Simeng and Thomas to hold
themselves out as a married couple. 56 Perhaps the trial justice felt
some sympathy for Simeng (as she was a non-citizen and the fourth
wife of Thomas) but, ultimately, the court determined that the trial
justice misapplied the law.
Finally, it seems inconsistent that the court accounted for the
parties’ intent to never make the $100,000 wire-transfer marital
property while, at the same time, the court found that Simeng’s
personal bank accounts into which she deposited her paychecks was
marital property, although she never intended it to be. 57 The court
determined that intent was only material to a marital property case
when determining if property had transmuted into marital
property by operation of law. 58 The distinguishing component here
was that the $100,000 was a gift to Simeng alone, albeit during the
marriage, whereas the money Simeng earned during the marriage
was classified as marital property “in accordance with the
partnership theory of marriage” and not excluded specifically by
section 15-5-16.1(b).59
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme court held that assets acquired
during marriage, and not excluded by section 15-5-16.1(b), are
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See id.
See id. at 718.
See id. at 713–14.
See id. at 716.
See id. at 720–21.
Id. at 721.
See id. at 722; see also 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1(b).
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subject to equitable distribution in the event of a divorce. 60 Here,
the court mainly focused on the trial justice’s finding that the
income was “technically [a] marital asset” but was not part of the
marital property because the couple intended to keep their finances
separate. 61 The court found the trial justice’s holding erroneous
and reiterated that a party’s intent does not have any effect on an
asset’s classification.
Rebecca Rochelle

60.
61.

See Wu-Carter, 179 A.3d. at 721–22.
Id. at 722.

Family Law. Luis v. Gaugler, 185 A.3d 497 (R.I. 2018). The Rhode
Island Supreme Court reviews questions of law that are presented
in an appeal from the Family Court de novo. 1 The required
showings for a common law marriage are “that (1) the parties had
the capacity to marry; (2) the parties seriously intended to enter
into a mutual husband-wife relationship; and (3) the parties’
conduct was of such a character as to lead to a belief in the
community that they were married.” 2 Further, to establish a
common-law marriage, the clear and convincing standard of proof
is applied.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In May of 2013, the relationship between Angela Luis, the
Plaintiff, and Kevin Gaugler, the Defendant, “imploded.” 4 Prior to
this incident, the two had lived together with the Plaintiff’s son,
Zach, since they began dating in 1990. 5 After seeing the Defendant
kiss another woman, the Plaintiff kicked him out of their home and,
on July 9, 2013, she filed a complaint for divorce.6 In her complaint,
the Plaintiff asserted that she and the Defendant were married at
common law since September 6, 1995. 7 A month after she filed the
complaint, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, “asserting that he and [the Plaintiff]
were never married.” 8 The trial justice reserved her ruling on the
Defendant’s motion, and “the trial began on January 29, 2014.” 9
The trial lasted eleven days, “during which numerous witnesses

1.
2.
1982)).
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Luis v. Gaugler, 185 A.3d 497, 502 (R.I. 2018).
Id. at 503 (citing Zharkova v. Gaudreau 45 A.3d 1282, 1290–91 (R.I.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Id. at 498–99.
Id. at 499.
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testified,” including the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 10
During her testimony, the Plaintiff described her relationship
with the Defendant, along with her relationship to his family
members and the relationship between him and her son. 11 The two
lived together for over twenty years and, according to the Plaintiff,
had “agreed to commit as husband and wife out in public.” 12 Her
son referred to the Defendant as “dad” and had a close relationship
with him.13 The Defendant’s family referred to her as “‘daughterin-law’ or ‘sister-in-law.’” 14 The Defendant introduced the Plaintiff
as his wife at youth football, and she introduced him as her husband
at her son’s school.15
Although the two lived in a shared home, only the Defendant’s
name appeared on the deed and the mortgage.16 “He paid the
mortgage, taxes, insurance and utilities, while she paid for the
groceries and [her son’s] expenses.” 17 The two briefly shared a bank
account between 1995 and 1998, but had not used the account
since. 18 The Plaintiff stated that, in 1998, the Defendant began
providing health insurance for her and her son and that the form
referred to her as his common law spouse.19 The Defendant also
“named [the Plaintiff] as the sole beneficiary and heir in his will,
and in 2003, the sole beneficiary on his life insurance plan” but “did
not name her as his wife.” 20 She was also the primary beneficiary
of his 401(k) plan, but was listed as his “fiancée.” 21 The two never
filed joint tax returns and when the Plaintiff filed her taxes she
“always filed as ‘single’ or ‘head of household.’” 22 The Plaintiff also
testified that when filling out a FAFSA form for her son’s college
tuition, she listed herself as single.23
In his testimony, the Defendant reiterated much of what the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 499–500.
Id.
Id. at 500.
Id.
Id.
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Plaintiff said, but deviated from her testimony on a few facts. 24 “He
[ ] testified that he gave [the Plaintiff] an engagement ring and
asked her to marry him, and that she agreed.” 25 The Defendant
also bought a ring for himself and wore it on and off until the couple
split up. 26 Despite these gestures, the Defendant stated that “he
did not consent to be [the Plaintiff’s] husband” and that he “never
referred to her as his wife.” 27 He also stated “while he did plan to
marry [her] at some point in the future, he never considered himself
to be married to her.” 28
Eleven other witnesses also testified as to their perception of
the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s relationship.29 Nine of those
witnesses stated that they believed the couple to be married,
crediting that belief to an introduction or a reference in which one
of the two described the other as “wife” or “husband.” 30 The other
three witnesses said that they did not believe the couple to be
married because of statements made by the Defendant in which he
plainly said that the Plaintiff was not his wife, or because he never
mentioned her at all. 31
Relying on the testimony, “the trial justice found by clear and
convincing evidence” that the Plaintiff and the Defendant “were
married at common law since September 1995, concluding that [the
Defendant’s] testimony was not credible and that the [Plaintiff’s]
was mostly credible.” 32 The Defendant filed a timely appeal to the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, arguing that the trial justice had
misconceived the evidence. 33
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the Family Court order, the court sought to
determine whether the Plaintiff proved by clear and convincing
evidence that she was married to the Defendant at common law. 34
Though it did note that the common law doctrine is “arguably
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 501–02.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id.
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outmoded,” the court first defined common law marriage as “a
marriage which does not depend for its validity upon any religious
or civil ceremony but is created by the consent of the parties as any
other contract.” 35 Conducting a de novo review, the court examined
the relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant to
determine whether it satisfied each of the following categories of
common law marriage: “that (1) the parties had the capacity to
marry; (2) the parties seriously intended to enter into a mutual
husband-wife relationship; and (3) the parties’ conduct was of such
a character as to lead to a belief in the community that they were
married.” 36
When addressing the first qualification, the capacity to marry,
the court quickly deemed this prong satisfied because neither party
contested their capacity to marry. 37 Turning to the second prong,
the court noted “the parties must mutually and presently intend to
be husband and wife rather than merely become engaged to be
husband and wife at some point in the future.” 38 In its analysis,
the court distinguished this case from Fravala v. City of Cranston,
where it determined that the couple was married at common law. 39
The court highlighted that the couple in Fravala “pooled their
finances, owned joint shares in a credit union, and were joint
borrowers on a loan.” 40 The court also pointed to Zharkova v.
Gaudreau, where there was no clear and convincing evidence of a
common law marriage despite having “jointly-filed taxes, on which
they identified themselves as being married, and a property deed
referring to them as ‘husband and wife as tenants in the
entirety.’” 41 In Zharkova, the court “upheld the trial justice’s
decision, because he believed the defendant’s testimony that the
couple filed their tax return as ‘married’ in the interest of the
economy alone.” 42 The court declined to address the third
35. Id. at 502–03 (quoting OTTO E. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE AND
ITS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1922)).
36. Id. at 503 (citing Zharkova v. Gaudreau 45 A.3d 1282, 1290–91 (R.I.
1982)).
37. Id. at 503–04.
38. Id. at 505 (quoting Smith v. Smith, 966 A.2d 109, 114 (R.I. 2009))
(emphasis in original).
39. Id. at 504 (citing Fravala v. City of Cranston, ex rel. Baron, 996 A.2d
696, 706 (R.I. 2010)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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qualification. 43
In this case, the court found the evidence presented to be
conflicting “at best.” 44 Despite the Plaintiff’s claim that the couple
was married, she continued to list herself to be “‘single’ or ‘head of
household’ under penalty of perjury, on her tax forms.” 45
Additionally, the Defendant labeled her as his “fiancée” on his
401(k) plan and in his will. 46 In light of these details, the court
found that the evidence “strongly weighed against any serious
intent to be husband and wife.” 47 Upon reviewing the trial justice’s
findings, the court found that the Plaintiff and the Defendant only
“labeled themselves as married” when it was beneficial to them.48
The trial justice determined that the couple had “‘cherry picked’
where, when and how they would portray themselves as married,
single or other.” 49 The court agreed with the trial justice on this
point, but came to a different conclusion, determining that the
sporadic representation of their relationship was not enough to
express a serious intent to be husband and wife and, therefore, their
relationship did not meet the “clear and convincing standard of
proof.” 50 The court held that “the trial justice’s factual findings
[did] not represent ‘a firm belief or conviction’” that the Plaintiff
and the Defendant “intended to enter into a mutual husband and
wife relationship” and that the trial justice misconceived the
evidence. 51 Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the
Family Court and remanded the case.52
COMMENTARY

The court clearly established that inconsistent evidence of a
common law marriage is insufficient to meet the heightened
standard of proof. 53 The court also made clear that it will not
tolerate a couple’s clear intent to gain an advantage by selectively

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 506.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505.
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deciding when they are married or not. 54 From the outset of its
Opinion, the court made its attitude about common law marriage
known, as it subtly nudged the General Assembly to consider the
“modern fluidity of family units . . . to determine [the] doctrine’s
place in Rhode Island jurisprudence.” 55 A wide range of factors
makes each personal relationship unique, now more than ever.
This, in turn, makes the court’s job of distinguishing which
relationships reach the point to warrant recognition of marriage at
common law exceedingly difficult. While the majority opinion was
not persuaded that the trial justice’s conclusion amounted to clear
and convincing evidence, in his dissent, Justice Robinson found that
the findings “more than sufficiently consitut[ed] a basis for [the
trial justice’s] finding that there was clear and convincing
evidence.” 56 Justice Robinson emphasized the deference that the
court owed to those findings and all but scolded his colleagues for
second-guessing the trial justice. 57 He stated that the trial justice
conducted “meticulous and voluminous fact-finding” and made a
conscientious effort in determining the witnesses’ credibility, which
were “the product of what she observed from her front row seat . . .
.” 58 Because the court did not personally observe the testimony,
Justice Robinson was highly critical of the deviation from the trial
justice’s ruling.59 However, the majority opinion in this case
grounded its ruling in strict comparisons of fact from previous cases
dealing with the issue of common law marriage. 60 The issue at
hand is complex by nature and is far from black and white. Because
of the complexity of common law marriage, it is vital that the court
apply a strict standard of clear and convincing evidence and
demonstrate consistency in an already grey area of the law.
CONCLUSION

The court held that an inconsistent showing of serious intent
to enter into a husband and wife relationship is not adequate to
qualify as common law marriage. Giving the trial justice’s factual
findings due deference, the court was not persuaded that “her
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 507 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 509.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504–06 (majority opinion).
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findings amount[ed] to ‘clear and convincing’ evidence.” 61 The
court came to this conclusion by meticulously analyzing the facts of
the case against previous cases regarding common law marriage.
Zoë M. Sperber

61.

Id.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Millette v. State, 183 A.3d
1124 (R.I. 2018). A defendant is not entitled to relief from his
conviction by application of a per se ineffective assistance of counsel
rule when his attorney is not licensed to practice law in Rhode
Island but is so licensed in another state. A defendant may be
entitled to such relief when he is represented by a layperson or one
who is not a licensed attorney in any state.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Sometime between 2002 and 2003, Kevin Millette obtained
representation in a real estate transaction from a Massachusetts
based law firm. 1 The law firm represented Millette again in 2004,
this time in defense to claims of “obtaining money under false
pretenses.” 2 Millette hired the law firm for a third time in 2012
after being arrested in January of that year; this ended his threeyear evasion of an arrest warrant issued in 2009 when he failed to
appear in court after being charged with “obtaining money from
[the victim] under false pretenses with the intent to cheat or
defraud [the victim] and intentionally appropriating [the victim’s]
money.” 3 After his arrest in 2012, Millette was charged with nearly
identical con-man type allegations with respect to a second victim. 4
Before his arraignment on these charges, Millette met with an
associate from the firm who would handle the arraignment in
Rhode Island, while a partner at the firm—who was not licensed to
practice law in Rhode Island at that time—was in Massachusetts

1.
Millette v. State, 183 A.3d 1124, 1127 (R.I. 2018).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. at 1126. See Tim White, Prolific RI Con Artist Looking to Toss
Rekindled Charges, WPRI EYEWITNESS NEWS (Mar. 23, 2016),
https://www.wpri.com/news/local-news/blackstone-valley/prolific-r-i-conartist-looking-to-toss-rekindled-charges/1044521914. An investigation in 2011
revealed that Millette was living “on the run for years . . . in New Hampshire,
Rhode Island, Virginia, and Florida” and was ultimately located in New Jersey,
assuming the alias Howard Ethan. Id.
4.
Millette, 183 A.3d at 1126.
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for an unrelated case. 5 The day before his arraignment, Millette
met with both the partner and the associate, at which point the
partner advised him to take a plea deal that was ultimately agreed
upon after continuing negotiations between the associate and the
State. 6 Accordingly, on July 31, 2012, accompanied by the
associate, Millette pled nolo contendere to intentionally
appropriating the money and property of his victims. 7 Notably, he
did so after confirming to the trial justice that “he had signed the
plea affidavits . . . [that] he had read them and understood them . . .
[that] he had the opportunity to discuss them with [the associate]
before signing them . . . [and] that he was giving up various rights
by entering his pleas.”8 The trial justice sentenced Millette to serve
at least twelve years in prison with probation upon release.9
On December 16, 2013, Millette appealed his conviction, filing
a pro se application for post-conviction relief in the Superior Court
of Rhode Island.10 Millette asserted that his conviction should be
overturned because the partner, whom Millette referred to as “his
lawyer,” was not licensed to practice law in Rhode Island at the time
of his nolo contendere pleas.11 Millette alleged that the partner’s
inability to practice in Rhode Island amounted to per se ineffective
assistance of counsel, despite the fact that the partner was not
present at the 2012 arraignment. 12 On August 3, 2015, the trial
justice held a hearing on Millette’s application for post-conviction
relief, in which the facts outlined above were painstakingly elicited
from Millette and the associate and presented to, as fate would have
it, the same justice who heard Millette’s 2012 nolo contendere
pleas.13
At the 2015 hearing, the associate testified that he knew the
partner was not licensed in Rhode Island, but Millette “knew [the
associate] was the Rhode Island attorney” for the Massachusetts5.
Id. at 1127.
6.
Id.
7.
Id. at 1126.
8.
Id. “The trial justice was satisfied that Millette entered his nolo
contendere pleas ‘knowingly and voluntarily with a full understanding of the
nature and consequences of his plea and corresponding waiver of his
constitutional rights.’” Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 1127.
11.
Id.
12.
Id. at 1128.
13.
Id. at 1127.
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based firm. 14 Millette’s testimony further established that, not
only did the associate appear in court with Millette on the day of
his nolo contendere plea and advise him about the State’s offer, but
the associate also informed Millette of the rights he was waiving in
his plea and signed as a witness to Millette’s plea form, which was
entered into evidence.15 The trial justice determined that Millette’s
nolo contendere pleas “were not invalidated” by the partner’s
inability to practice in Rhode Island and found that it was indeed
the associate, not the partner, who represented Millette during the
pleadings. 16 The trial justice stated that there was “nothing
whatsoever irregular about the proceedings” in question. 17
Accordingly, judgment was entered for the State and, on October
23, 2015, Millette timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. 18
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In conducting a de novo review of the trial justice’s decision in
Millette’s claim for post-conviction relief, the court made clear that
it recognizes a strong presumption that an attorney performed
within the accepted variation of professional advice and strategy
when representing a client. 19 In addition to his per se ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, Millette alleged that there was a
conflict of interest inherent in his defense because, as he put it,
“[the associate] . . . needed to dispose of these matters quickly and
quietly in order to maintain the status quo and avoid” scrutiny of
“[the partner]’s scheme and [the associate]’s cover up” of the
partner’s unauthorized practice of law in Rhode Island.20
The court began by explaining that the test ordinarily
employed for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims
need not be undertaken at all. 21 The Strickland v. Washington
14.
Id. at 1127–28.
15.
Id.
16.
Id. at 1128.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id. at 1129.
21.
Id. “It is well established that, in this jurisdiction, ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims are assessed under the familiar two-pronged test
announced by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).” Id. (quoting Reyes v. State, 141 A.3d 644, 654 (R.I.
2016)).
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effectiveness of counsel test ordinarily requires the claimant to
show that his or her legal representation was “constitutionally
deficient,” and that he or she was so prejudiced by the performance
that there existed a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome
without the deficient representation. 22 The court reasoned that
such an analysis was unnecessary because Millette never alleged
that his representation was deficient—constitutionally or
otherwise—and, to the contrary, had actually conceded that there
was “no question of competency here.” 23
The court explained that in the absence of an allegation of
deficient representation, Millette was actually seeking application
of a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule which would apply,
as alleged here, when a person is represented by an attorney (such
as the partner) who is not licensed in Rhode Island.24 The court
made clear, however, that such an application would be improper
because, as discussed above, the trial justice determined that it was
the associate, not the partner, who represented Millette at the time
of his nolo contendere plea, and the associate was licensed in Rhode
Island. 25 Therefore, unless the trial justice was “clearly erroneous”
in determining who actually represented Millette, the states in
which the partner was licensed to practice law were irrelevant to
the effectiveness of the associate as Millette’s counsel. 26 As it
happened, the court agreed with the assessment that the associate’s
actions of appearing in court on behalf of Millette in 2012,
negotiating with the State as to the terms of the plea deal, and
discussing with Millette the rights he would be waiving all clearly
indicate that it was indeed the associate who represented
Millette.27
Furthermore, the court noted that even if the partner had in
fact been Millette’s attorney, his per se ineffective assistance of
counsel argument still would not hold water. 28 The court proceeded
to outline the approach of several other jurisdictions, by which
application of a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule is
limited to representation by a layperson or one who is not licensed
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1129–30.
Id. at 1130.
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to the bar of any state. 29 One case in particular from the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals helpfully explained that
representation by an attorney who is licensed in another state is
“not of a character that by itself requires relieving the defendant of
an otherwise just conviction” and, thus, does not “requir[e]
automatic vacating of the conviction.” 30 The court stated that it
was “guided by [this] . . . jurisprudence” in ultimately declining to
apply a per se ineffective assistance of counsel rule when counsel is
not licensed in Rhode Island but is licensed in another state. 31
With respect to the alleged conflicts of interest, Millette
claimed “a myriad of reasons” existed for which his conviction
should be overturned. 32 The court, however, considered these
issues waived because they were not raised in 2015 at the trial level
and also for lack of development. 33 In the interest of due diligence,
the court nonetheless continued, considering any distinction
between Millette’s per se ineffective assistance of counsel argument
and his argument that the partner’s “lack of licensure in Rhode
Island” created a conflict of interest to be illusory. 34 The court
repeated that, although representation by an unlicensed attorney
may concededly create a conflict of interest, Millette was in fact
represented by the associate, to whom “this concern is
inapplicable.” 35 Millette’s additional assertion that the partner
was conflicted by way of a personal relationship with one of
Millette’s victims was likewise invalidated by this fact. 36 Millette’s
allegation that the associate also possessed a conflict of interest
because he was somehow involved in a cover-up of the partner’s
unauthorized practice of law was, according to the court, not
supported by “any evidence demonstrating that the associate had
an actual conflict of interest,” and was merely a conclusory
assertion for which he had no proof. 37 The court accordingly
29.
Id.
30.
Id. at 1130–31 (quoting Commonwealth v. Melo, 851 N.E.2d 1124,
1129 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)).
31.
Id. at 1131.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. at 1132.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. “Millette has utterly failed to present evidence that demonstrated
that [the associate] . . . jeopardize[d] his own law license and reputation to
protect [the partner].” Id.
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affirmed the matter on all issues, thus denying Millette’s attempt
to overturn his conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel or conflict of interest. 38
COMMENTARY

The court declined to depart from the jurisprudence of other
courts in its refusal to apply a per se ineffective assistance of
counsel rule when a defendant is represented by an attorney who is
licensed to practice law in at least one state. 39 This was clearly the
correct and prudent decision in this case. Even the most cursory
glance at the facts of the 2012 arraignment indicates that the
associate represented Millette at the time of his nolo contendere
plea, and was licensed to practice law in Rhode Island.40 As such,
any assertion that Millette was entitled to per se relief on the
grounds that he was not represented by an attorney licensed to
practice law in Rhode Island is—at best—misplaced, and more
likely amounts to a transparently frivolous use of the court’s
attention.
Indeed, Millette’s arguments appear to be entirely
disingenuous. The sum of his allegations relied entirely on the
premise that Millette was represented by the partner during his
arraignment, which he clearly was not. 41 His one claim that was
not dependent on such a premise—that the associate had a conflict
of interest—was accompanied by Millette’s having “utterly failed to
present” supporting evidence. 42 To the extent that Millette was not
already condemned by this very truth from the start, the court was
courteous enough to doubly analyze each issue through the
hypothetical lens of “even if” Millette had actually been represented
by the partner. 43 In that regard, the court seized its opportunity to
make absolutely clear that only the completely unlicensed
representation of a defendant is per se ineffective assistance of
counsel in Rhode Island.44

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
See id. at 1131.
Id. at 1129–30.
See id.
Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1130.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court declined to adopt a per se
rule of ineffective assistance of counsel when a defendant’s attorney
is not licensed to practice law in Rhode Island but is licensed to
practice in another state. Such a per se ineffective assistance of
counsel rule may apply where a defendant is represented by a
person who is not licensed to practice law in any state. The court
affirmed that Millette was, in fact, represented by a duly licensed
Rhode Island attorney and thereby reached its holding in spite of
its inapplicability to the claimant before the court.
James Kovach

Labor Law. Sauro v. Lombardi, 178 A.3d 297 (R.I. 2018). A
firefighter who received accidental disability benefits pursuant to
section 17-189(8)(a) of the Providence Code of Ordinances due to a
work-related shoulder injury was not entitled to ongoing accidental
benefits when the work-related injury was no longer the
debilitating ailment preventing him from returning to work. 1
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Plaintiff John Sauro worked as a firefighter from 1991 until
1998, when he injured his right shoulder during the course of his
1. Section 17-189(8)(a) provides:
Re-examination of members retired on account of disability: Once
each year the director of personnel may require all pensioners to
undergo a medical examination, by a physician or physicians engaged
by the director of personnel. In accordance with this section, each
pensioner shall annually provide certification from a physician of
their disability. Should any such pensioner refuse to submit to such
examination his or her pension shall be discontinued until his or her
withdrawal of such refusal, and should his or her refusal continue for
a year, all his or her rights in and to such pension shall be revoked by
the retirement board. If the said examination indicates that the
disability of the pensioner has been removed and said pensioner has
attained the age of service retirement said pension will be converted
to the normal retirement benefit as if he or she had not been disabled.
If the examination indicates that the disability of the pensioner has
been removed and said pensioner is under the age of service
retirement, his or her name shall be placed on such appropriate lists
of candidates as are prepared for appointment to a position in his
department for which he is stated to be qualified in a salary grade
comparable to that from which he or she was last retired. Upon
reinstatement to active service at a salary grade comparable to that
from which he or she was last retired, he or she shall be reinstated as
a member and participate in the benefits of the retirement system
with credit for service rendered prior to disability retirement, and for
the period during which he received the disability retirement
allowance, provided that he or she did not refuse to accept such
reinstatement when it was first offered to him or her; in the event of
such refusal, the pension shall be discontinued and any rights to
further benefits under the retirement system shall be based solely on
his or her service rendered prior to his or her disability retirement.
PROVIDENCE, R.I. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 17-189(8)(a) (1950).
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employment. 2 In 2000, the Retirement Board of the Employees
Retirement System of the City of Providence (the Board) granted
Plaintiff an “accidental disability pension” because his injury
prevented him from performing the essential functions of his job.3
The Board ordered Plaintiff to undergo an independent medical
examination (IME) in 2011 after a local television program depicted
Plaintiff lifting “substantial weights.” 4 Plaintiff complied, and it
was determined that his shoulder remained injured. 5 In 2013, the
Board ordered that Plaintiff submit to another IME.6 This time,
however, Plaintiff refused on account of his alleged “bedridden”
state. 7 The City of Providence subsequently commissioned a
private investigator to surveil Plaintiff, and the investigator
observed Plaintiff performing ordinary errands, absent of any
apparent limitation.8 The Board then voted to suspend Plaintiff’s
disability pension. 9
Plaintiff filed an action in Rhode Island Superior Court on July
8, 2014, seeking to overturn the Board’s decision.10 Plaintiff
subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction to restore his
disability pension. 11 Plaintiff’s motion was denied, and, in light of
this decision, Plaintiff agreed to undergo another IME, which
resulted in the immediate reinstatement of his disability pension. 12
The examining physician opined that Plaintiff had no disability
with regard to his right shoulder, but was disabled due to
psychological and colorectal illnesses that were unrelated to work,
yet rendered him unfit to serve as a firefighter. 13
In April 2015, the Board voted to discontinue Plaintiff’s
disability pension, and the Board did not place Plaintiff on a “list
for appointment to duty.” 14 Neither Plaintiff nor his attorney
2. Sauro v. Lombardi, 178 A.3d 297, 299 (R.I. 2018).
3. Id. The City of Providence and the Board are collectively referred to
as “Defendants.”
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 300.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The Board’s decision was “pursuant to medical documentation
received by the [B]oard confirming that [Plaintiff was] no longer disabled as a
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attended the proceeding, despite receiving notice. 15
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 13, 2015, in
which he alleged that—pursuant to section 17-189(8)(a) of the
pension ordinance—the city was required to provide Plaintiff with
accidental disability pension benefits until his appointment to
another position in the fire department.16 “Before the trial
justice—in a remarkable turn of events—[P]laintiff argued that he
had fully recovered from his shoulder injury and all other maladies,
was no longer disabled, and was ready to return to work . . . .” 17
The trial justice granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
and ordered Defendants to provide Plaintiff with all accidental
disability benefits until the conclusion of a formal determination
after a hearing “as to whether or not [Plaintiff] can, in fact, return
to work.” 18
Defendants appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court and
argued that “§ 17-189(8)(a) does not provide for the situation in
which a pensioner has recovered from the work-related injury but
continues to suffer from non-work-related injuries that prevent him
from returning to service” and, therefore, section 17-189(8)(a) did
not require the Board to place Plaintiff on a list for a position in the
fire department in light of the IME’s findings in 2013.19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The narrow issue before the court was “whether § 17-189(8)(a)
require[d] the [B]oard to place [P]laintiff on a waiting list to be
reinstated with the Providence Fire Department, when [P]laintiff
had demonstrated he [was] otherwise disabled and [could not]
function as a firefighter.” 20 The court answered in the negative.21
The court began its analysis by noting that the same rules of
construction that govern statutory interpretation apply when
interpreting an ordinance. 22 The court found section 17-189(8)(a)
result of [his] July 17, 1998 job-related injury.” Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 300–01.
17. Id. at 302.
18. Id. at 303.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 303–04.
21. Id. at 304.
22. Id. As such, the Court construes ordinances in accordance with the
“plain and ordinary meaning,” of its text, so long as it is unambiguous. In the
event the Court renders an ordinance’s language “unclear and ambiguous,” it
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“clear and unambiguous on its face,” in particular, the language
that “a candidate must be ‘prepared for appointment’ and be ‘stated
to be qualified’ for a position in the department from which he or
she was last qualified.” 23 Given that Plaintiff “vigorously”
maintained his inability to return to work—alleging that he was
bedridden and could not “withstand” a medical examination—the
court found that, “based on his clearly established disability,
[P]laintiff was neither prepared for appointment, nor was he
qualified to resume service in the fire department.” 24 The court
plainly rejected the trial justice’s conclusion that there must be “a
formal determination after a hearing as to whether or not [Plaintiff]
can, in fact, return to work,” finding that the Board did conduct a
hearing on this question, but Plaintiff “abandoned the arena” by
electing not to attend. 25
The fact that Plaintiff later asserted that he was no longer
disabled and was able to return to work was of no consequence to
the court’s decision because he did not “reconcil[e] his current state
of well-being with his own grievous assertions . . . a mere ten
months earlier.” 26 Though the court refused to entertain sua
sponte whether or not Plaintiff was, in fact, fit to return to work, it
found that the Board acted within its authority based on the
“undisputed evidence” before it—that Plaintiff was unable to return
to work with the fire department based on unrelated disabilities
and that it would have been senseless for the Board to place a
disabled firefighter “on a list for a position that he [was] unqualified
to perform.” 27
Returning to the principles of statutory construction, the court
concluded that, had it found otherwise, section 17-189(8)(a) would
have required the city to “pay indefinite accidental disability
pension benefits to a person who [was] no longer accidentally
disabled,” which would have amounted to an “absurd result” in
contravention of its objective: “to compensate work-injury-related
disabilities and encourage qualified persons who are relieved of
must consult the legislature’s intent in enacting the ordinance. Notably, under
no circumstances will the Court construe a statute in a way that produces an
“absurd result.” Id.
23. Id. (quoting § 17-189(8)(a)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 305.
27. Id. at 305–06.
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those disabilities to return to work.” 28
COMMENTARY

In its decision, the court plainly reaffirmed longstanding
principles of statutory construction.29 Having concluded that
section 17-189(8)(a) was unambiguous on its face, the court soundly
deferred to the judgment of the Board, who reasonably terminated
Plaintiff’s accidental disability benefits once the accidental
disability giving rise to such benefits was removed. 30
In contrast, the dissent would have decided this case principled
on a narrow understanding of the rules of statutory construction,
finding that the Board is only permitted to suspend Plaintiff’s
disability benefits under two scenarios, both of which were not
present in this case. 31 “Clear and unambiguous” language does not,
however, license a court to “blindly” construe a statute divorced
from the facts of a particular case; a court’s construction must be
premised on a forward-looking analysis that accounts for the
realities of adjudication in light of the legislature’s purpose and
intent for enacting the particular piece of legislation. 32 As the
dissent recognized, section 17-189(8)(a) “does not specifically set
forth the responsibility of the [B]oard in a situation such as this.” 33
Neither the dissent nor Plaintiff contended that the legislature’s
intent in enacting section 17-189-(8)(a) was to compensate nonwork-injury-related disabilities. A decision that forces the Board to
pay indefinite accidental disability pension benefits to Plaintiff,
who is no longer accidentally disabled, would be an absurd result in
light of the legislature’s clear intent to the contrary. 34
The dissent’s argument is flawed in another respect: it
concluded that the case should be decided on a precise application
of section 17-189(8)(a)’s “clear and unambiguous” language, yet, its
28. Id.
29. See id. at 304.
30. See id. at 304–05.
31. See id. at 306–07 (Flaherty, J., dissenting). According to the dissent,
the only two scenarios that empower the Board to suspend or revoke a
pensioner’s disability benefits under section 17-189(8)(a) are: “one, when a
pensioner refuses to undergo an IME; and, two, when a pensioner whose
disability has been removed and who is under the age of service retirement
refuses reinstatement.” Id. at 307.
32. See id. at 304 (majority opinion).
33. See id. at 306 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 305–06 (majority opinion).
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argument only supports the inference that the language is
ambiguous. Consider the dissent’s departure from the majority’s
interpretation of the words “prepared” and “qualified,” as they
appear in 17-189(8)(a): “First, I am of the firm opinion that the word
‘prepared’ modifies the word ‘lists,’ not the word ‘candidates.’ The
term ‘candidates’ is part of a prepositional phrase . . . that the term
‘prepared’ modifies in its entirety . . . the word ‘qualified’ carries
with it no connotation of physical readiness.”35 The dissent
recognized that the interpretation of these two words were the
“fulcrum of the majority’s interpretation.” 36 While the dissent
opined that section 17-189(8)(a) is unambiguous, the fact that a
panel of appellate justices were divided over its semantic
implications suggests that the language is not nearly as plain as
either the majority or the dissent contend. 37
Irrespective how one may interpret the words “qualified” or
“privileged” in isolation, the majority demonstrates how statutory
interpretation necessarily demands inquiry into the legislature’s
intention in passing a particular piece of legislation to ascribe
proper meaning to its terms. 38 Here, the court’s inquiry suggests
that its decision would not have been affected had it determined
that section 17-189(8)(a) was ambiguous. 39 The decision rests not,
as the dissent suggested, on “an unattractive fact pattern,” but,
rather, on the conclusion that Plaintiff was not fit to return to work
despite having recovered from his accidental work-related injury
and, therefore, forcing the Board to indefinitely provide Petitioner
with accidental disability benefits would be contrary to the
intention of the legislature. 40
CONCLUSION

The court held that section 17-189(8)(a) does not require the
Board to provide accidental disability benefits to a firefighter who
is no longer disabled but is otherwise unfit to return to work due to
unrelated debilitating illnesses. The court reached its decision by
interpreting section 17-189(8)(a) in accordance with its plain

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 308–09 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
Id. at 308.
See id. at 308–09.
See id. at 305–06 (majority opinion).
See id. at 305.
See id. at 307 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
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meaning, which rendered a conclusion that conforms with the
legislature’s intention in enacting it.
Andrew G. Howayeck

Medical Malpractice. Cappuccilli v. Carcieri, 174 A.3d 722 (R.I.
2017). On a motion for a new trial, a trial justice should not disturb
the jury’s verdict when the parties’ expert witness testimony is
evenly balanced or reasonable minds could differ on the verdict. As
for evidentiary matters, the Rhode Island Supreme Court will not
overrule a trial justice’s decision as to admissibility unless a clear
abuse of discretion is apparent.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On March 15, 2006, the Women & Infants Hospital of Rhode
Island (Women & Infants) admitted the Plaintiff, Sevan
Cappuccilli, who was in labor with her fifth child. 1 The Defendant,
Dr. David A. Carcieri, a gynecologist and obstetrician, was working
at the hospital that day. 2 The Plaintiff’s labor was without issue
until the baby started showing signs of distress with a rapidly
dropping heartbeat.3 Because the Plaintiff’s attending physician
was unavailable, the Defendant was called in to perform an
emergency cesarean section (C-section). 4 The Defendant delivered
the Plaintiff’s “very healthy baby,” but thereafter noticed that the
Plaintiff’s uterus had an “odd coloration” and showed signs of a
“Couvelaire uterus.” 5
Consequently, the Defendant removed the uterus through an
incision in the abdominal wall, a process known as exteriorizing the
uterus, 6 and found that the uterine incision where the baby had
been removed was extended two-centimeters.7 Although the
1. Cappuccilli v. Carcieri, 174 A.3d 722, 725 (R.I. 2017).
2. Id. Originally, Dr. Tawfik “Fred” Hawwa cared for the Plaintiff upon
her admittance. Id. The Plaintiff’s primary obstetrician was out due to a
family emergency. Id. at 725 n.3.
3. Id. at 725.
4. Id.
5. Id. “[A] Couvelaire uterus occurs when there is a ‘vascular issue’ with
the uterus, and the uterus usually has blood and purple blotching.” Id. at 725
n.5.
6. Id. at 725. Exteriorizing is used to get a better view of the uterus. Id.
at 725 n.6.
7. Id. at 725. An extension of the uterine incision means that the incision
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Defendant stitched up the entire incision and returned the uterus,
the bleeding continued. 8 Dr. Hawwa joined the Defendant to
attempt to stop the bleeding. 9 Eventually, the doctors discovered
that the bleeding was coming from the retroperitoneum, a thin
layer of tissue that protects the vital organs where the ovarian vein
is located.10 According to the doctors, the bleeding was clotted and
irregular.11 At trial, Dr. Hawwa testified that the blood looked as
if it “had been there for a while,” approximately, “45, 30 minutes to
an hour.” 12
Moreover, the doctors testified that they discovered the ovarian
vein separated into two pieces, which the medical records referred
to as an “ovarian vein laceration.” 13 According to the doctors’
observations, the vein had a “very odd” consistency, “almost like
tissue paper”; it kept breaking away and crumbling both times they
attempted to tie it off to stop the bleeding. 14 After the doctors’
efforts at tying off the vein failed, Dr. Richard Moore was called in
to assist.15 Eventually, Dr. Moore was able to stop the bleeding. 16
However, at that point the Plaintiff had already lost “between 5,000
and 8,000 cubic centimeters of blood—more than she had in her
body.” 17
After the C-section, the Plaintiff required two more surgeries
and remained in a medically-induced coma for a short time in the
Trauma Intensive Care Unit at Rhode Island Hospital. 18 After
leaving the hospital, the Plaintiff received “treatments for what she
testified was diagnosed as lymphedema” and also began seeing a
psychiatrist for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and depression. 19
According to the Plaintiff, in August of 2006, the Women & Infants

has torn longer than the length of the initial opening. Id. at 725 n.7. This is
not an uncommon occurrence. Id.
8. Id. at 725.
9. Id. at 726.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. Lymphedema is a condition that causes swelling in the abdomen,
legs, and upper body. Id.
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risk-management team paid for her Zoloft prescription. 20 The
Plaintiff’s baby had also received a “two-to-three centimeter wound
to his right temple,” which was listed in a medical record as a
“laceration from scalpel” during delivery. 21
One of the major issues contested at trial related to the timing
when the Plaintiff’s ovarian vein was lacerated. 22 The Defendant
testified that the vein ruptured prior to the C-section and the
bleeding from the ruptured vein caused the fetal distress.23
Moreover, all three doctors involved in the surgery testified that the
Plaintiff’s ovarian vein was abnormal, due to the fact that it was so
difficult to tie off. 24 Furthermore, Dr. Moore testified that he could
not see how a scalpel would even reach the ovarian vein in the span
of performing a C-section. 25 The Plaintiff, however, argued that the
Defendant lacerated her ovarian vein during the C-section. 26 She
underscored her argument with the fact that the Defendant never
told her about the abnormal vein and neglected to make note of it
in any of her medical records. 27 The Defendant pointed out that
the medical records are usually written by an intern or medical
assistant who is not involved in the surgery and “there are many
records made in the medical records that are not fact.” 28
At trial, there were eleven expert witnesses who testified on
behalf of the Plaintiff, and four for the Defendant. 29 One of the
Plaintiff’s expert witnesses presented two theories in an attempt to
prove the Defendant’s guilt.30 First, he opined that the lacerated
vein could have occurred during the exteriorization of the uterus. 31
Alternatively, he testified that it could have occurred during the Csection while the retroperitoneum was dissected.32 The Plaintiff’s
expert witness rejected the Defendant’s theory that the laceration

20. Id.
21. Id. at 726–27.
22. See id. at 727.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 728.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. This is contrary to the Defendant’s argument that the scalpel does
not reach that area during a C-section. Id. at 727.
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occurred before the C-section and pointed to the fact that the
Plaintiff’s medical condition would have “destabilized more than it
had” if the vein ruptured prior to the C-section. 33 He also testified
that the “tissue-paper-like quality [of the vein] is ‘to be expected.’” 34
Conversely, the Defendant presented expert testimony explaining
that, based on the amount of blood, changes in the anesthesia
records, and the Couvelaire uterus, the Plaintiff’s vein ruptured at
approximately 12:15 p.m., which was before the baby exhibited
signs of distress. 35 The Defendant’s expert witness also rejected
the theory that exteriorizing the uterus could cause injury to the
vein, stating it “‘anatomically and physically doesn’t make
sense.’” 36
The trial justice instructed the jury on two theories of
negligence: “(1) a traditional departure from the standard of care;
and (2) res ipsa loquitur.” 37 The jury ultimately rendered a verdict
for the Defendant, and the Plaintiff moved for a new trial. 38 At the
motion hearing, the Plaintiff argued that the Defendant’s “theory
that the vein ruptured spontaneously was ‘manufactured’ and
stemmed solely from” the three doctors involved in the C-section
and the jury “‘bought’ the story . . . despite overwhelming
circumstantial evidence that the injury occurred during the Csection . . . .” 39 The Plaintiff believed that this “story” was not
credible due to the contradicting evidence and urged the trial court
to “‘make a finding that those three doctors are not worthy of
belief.’” 40 The trial justice denied the Plaintiff’s motion and
explained that, based on his review of the evidence, “‘reasonable
minds could differ on this critical issue.’” 41 He described “the battle
of the experts . . . as a draw,” and that one of the expert witnesses
was not “‘substantially better qualified or more credible and more
worthy of belief than the others.’”42 In the trial justice’s opinion,
the evidence pertaining to the Defendant’s negligence was

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728–29.
Id. at 729.
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“equivocal.” 43 Consequently, the Plaintiff appealed to the Rhode
Island Supreme Court.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Plaintiff raised three issues on appeal: (1) the trial justice
“overlooked or misconceived material evidence” by not addressing
the credibility of the Defendant’s theory about the laceration of the
ovarian vein when deciding the motion for a new trial; (2) the trial
justice “abused his discretion” when excluding evidence of the
Plaintiff’s son’s “laceration” on his face; and (3) the trial justice
“abused his discretion” by excluding the document referring to
Women & Infants’ risk-management team paying for the Plaintiff’s
prescription. 44 The court applied a different standard for the
credibility and evidentiary issues. 45 As to the denial of the motion
for new trial, the court stated that if a trial justice decides that the
evidence is evenly balanced, then it will not disturb his decision.46
Furthermore, the court noted that the trial justice does not need to
“engage in an exhaustive review . . . of the evidence . . . [but] need
only make reference to such facts” that motivated his decision.47 As
for the evidentiary issues, the court stated that it would not reverse
the trial justice’s ruling unless there was a clear abuse of
discretion.48
The court applied an abuse of discretion standard to the
Plaintiff’s first issue on appeal, noting it was “careful not to stray
from the applicable standard.” 49 The Plaintiff argued that the trial
justice failed to “resolve the credibility gap” between the medical
records and the Defendant’s testimony. 50 Although the court noted
that the trial justice did not expand on his decision that “reasonable
minds could differ” on the issue of the Defendant’s negligence,51 it
43. Id.
44. Id. at 729–30.
45. Id. at 729 (quoting Bates-Bridgmon v. Heong’s Mkt., Inc., 152 A.3d
1137, 1143 (R.I. 2017)).
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting Hough v. McKiernan, 101 A.3d 853, 856 (R.I. 2014)
(emphasis in original).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 730.
50. Id.
51. Id. (“Based on the extent of evidence presented in this case, it is
certainly conceivable that the trial justice could have articulated the basis for
his decision that reasonable minds could differ as to Dr. Carcieri’s negligence
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concluded that the trial justice did not need to perform an
“exhaustive review” of the evidence. 52 Ultimately, the court was
“satisfied that his concise overview of the evidence that motivated
his decision was sufficient.” 53
The court also addressed the Plaintiff’s argument regarding
the credibility of the testimony that centered around the cause and
timing of the lacerated ovarian vein. 54 The court stated that the
Defendant refuted all of the Plaintiff’s testimony and evidence on
this issue with his own evidence and testimony. 55 The Plaintiff
pointed specifically to the medical records that described the injury
as a “lacerated ovarian vein” and argued that the trial justice “failed
to reconcile the ‘wealth of documentary evidence . . . .’” 56 The court
considered Dr. Moore’s testimony that the word “laceration” can
differ in medical terminology and “‘could also mean blunt[ ] trauma,
or physiologic changes causing the vein to bleed rather than refer
to a cut made by a sharp instrument.’” 57 The court ultimately
agreed with the trial justice that the evidence presented by both
parties’ witnesses was “evenly balanced,” concluding that the trial
justice made the correct decision after conducting his own analysis
of the evidence. 58
Next, the court discussed the Plaintiff’s challenge to the trial
justice’s evidentiary ruling excluding the Plaintiff’s son’s
photograph and medical records.59 In her argument, the Plaintiff
gave two reasons why the photograph of the cut on her son’s face
was “highly probative and should survive a Rule 403 analysis.” 60
The Plaintiff first contended that the photograph would help the
jury understand the meaning of the word “laceration” because a
sharp surgical instrument caused the “laceration” in the
more expansively.”).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. Id. at 730–31.
57. Id. at 731.
58. Id. (“In our opinion, the trial justice did not ‘overlook[] . . . significant
credibility issues;’ rather he found each side equally credible, hence ‘mak[ing]
an independent appraisal of the evidence[,] and assessing the credibility of the
witness.’”).
59. Id. at 732.
60. Id. The standard for a Rule 403 analysis is: “[R]elevant evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.” Id.
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photograph, and this definition of “laceration” should be used to
define the term in the Plaintiff’s medical records relating to the Csection. 61 In response to this argument, the court held the issue
was waived pursuant to Rhode Island’s long-standing “raise-orwaive” rule;62 however, it did “pause to consider its merit.” 63 To
refute the Plaintiff’s argument, the court referred to Dr. Moore’s
testimony that, medically, the word “laceration” can have more
than one meaning, and concluded that “[t]he photograph would not
be meaningfully probative of Women & Infants’ interpretation of
‘laceration,’ but rather, would only be minimally probative of one of
many possible interpretations.” 64 Alternatively, the Plaintiff
posited that the photograph should not have been excluded from
evidence because it would demonstrate the Defendant’s skill (or
lack thereof) during the C-section. 65 The court reasoned that a
photograph of the son’s cut was not relevant to the issue of the
Defendant failing to meet the standard owed to the Plaintiff (and
not her son) during the C-section. 66 Accordingly, the court ruled
that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding this
evidence because “[t]his indeed [was] a situation where the
evidence was marginally relevant and enormously prejudicial.” 67
In addition to the photograph, the Plaintiff argued that her
son’s medical records should be included in the evidence. 68 The
Plaintiff sought to introduce the medical records once during the
hearing on the Defendant’s motion in limine and twice during the
trial.69 Each time, the trial justice reserved his ruling because he
wanted to hear more about how a typical C-section and the
documentation of it works. 70 Despite the fact that the trial justice
never gave a definitive ruling on this issue, the court concluded that
61. Id.
62. Id. at 733. Under this rule, the court will only hear issues that are
“raised and properly preserved in the court” and then are addressed in the
appellate briefs. DAVID A. WOLLIN, RHODE ISLAND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
§ 16:6 (2017–2018 ed.). The rule explicitly states: “Errors not claimed,
questions not raised and points not made ordinarily will be treated as waived
and not be considered by the Court.” Id.
63. Cappuccilli, 127 A.3d at 733.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting State v. Husband, 162 A.3d 646, 658 (R.I. 2017)).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 733, 734.
70. Id. at 734.
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the Plaintiff’s use of the evidence was inappropriate. 71 The court
also stated that the Plaintiff did not preserve the issue for the trial
justice to rule on and that she abandoned the argument because it
was never brought up again at trial. 72 The court declined to discuss
the issue further because it can only rule on definitive decisions
made by a trial justice and, here, the trial justice did not rule on the
son’s medical records.73
The Plaintiff’s final issue on appeal was whether the trial
justice erred in excluding evidence of a record that showed that the
hospital’s risk-management team paid for the Plaintiff’s Zoloft
prescription after the C-section.74 The trial justice ruled, and the
court agreed, that this evidence was inadmissible under Rhode
Island General Laws section 9-19-35, and it was unfairly prejudicial
to the Defendant under Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 403.75
Despite the Plaintiff’s arguments that she intended to use this
evidence to show that the doctors may have been influenced by the
risk-management during the C-section, the trial justice ruled it
inadmissible under section 9-19-35, explaining that it could be
construed as “‘acceptance of responsibility.’”76 The court agreed
with the trial justice’s decision because of his explanation “that the
jury might misconstrue it as an admission [of liability].” 77
Alternatively, the trial justice ruled that the evidence was
inadmissible under Rule 403 because it “mimicked inadmissible
liability insurance evidence prohibited under Rule 411 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Evidence.” 78 The Plaintiff argued that this evidence
was probative because it showed the Defendant’s bias, evidence of
her psychological injuries, and that the doctors were influenced by
risk-management to say that the vein ruptured spontaneously. 79
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (“Where the applicable standard confines us to consider only the
trial justice’s decision, absent a definitive ruling it is improper for this Court
to consider plaintiff’s argument.”).
74. Id. at 735.
75. Id. The court refers to section 9-19-35 of the Rhode Island General
Laws, which is a law that “excludes evidence of medical provider’s failure to
bill in medical malpractice cases,” and the evidence of the “services rendered
shall not be constructed as an admission of liability and shall not be admissible
in evidence as to liability . . . .” Id. at 735 & n.17.
76. Id. at 735.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 736; R.I. R. EVID. 403, 411.
79. Cappuccilli, 127 A.3d at 736.
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The court ruled that the reasons the Plaintiff provided were of
“little assistance when weighed against” what the trial justice
feared: that “there could be ‘an extreme, if not, incurable prejudice
that would flow from that document’ that would ‘really taint the
juror’s deliberations.’” 80 As such, the court affirmed the trial
justice’s exclusion of this evidence.
COMMENTARY

The court was careful not to disturb the trial justice’s rulings
on witness testimony and admissibility of evidence absent a finding
that the trial justice “misconceived or overlooked” important
evidence. Ultimately, the court held that the trial justice did not do
so. 81 The majority opinion states that the “trial justice could have
articulated the basis for his decision” with regard to the credibility
of the witnesses and denying the motion for a new trial. 82 There
were a total of fifteen expert witnesses who testified at trial, and
the only explanation from the trial justice with respect to witness
credibility was that it was a “draw.” 83 In fact, as Justice Goldberg
points out in her dissent, after sixteen days of trial, the trial justice
“explained” his decision for denying the motion for a new trial in
just two paragraphs. 84 Despite the trial justice’s summary
decision, the court affirmed his ruling because he was not required
to “engage in an exhaustive review” of the evidence. 85
However, there is a difference between an “exhaustive review”
and “articulating a basis”—a difference the court did not discuss.
As the dissent states, “the trial justice overlooked and misconceived
the critical issue raised by the Plaintiff and failed to pass upon the
credibility of the witnesses.”86 In order to determine whether a
trial justice properly denied a motion for a new trial, the court must
look to the trial justice’s discussion of the evidence. 87 In this case,
the trial justice failed to “reference any facts that motivated the
ruling . . . .” 88 The dissent was dissatisfied because, although the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id. at 729, 736.
Id. at 730.
Id. at 729.
Id. at 736 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 730 (majority opinion).
Id. at 736 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 738.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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trial justice reviewed the witness testimony, he overlooked the
evidence of the medical records and did not weigh in on the
credibility of the witnesses in comparison to the contents of the
medical records.89
It is important to note, as the dissent did, that the Plaintiff
made serious accusations about the Defendant’s credibility in that
the doctors manufactured their story about the vein after the Csection.90 The trial justice did not comment on the weight of this
argument or the value of the medical records that contradicted the
Defendant’s expert testimony. The problem lies in that the trial
justice “limited his analysis to ‘the testimony of the expert
physicians offered to establish the standard of care applicable to
plaintiff’s surgical procedure.’” 91 The trial justice overlooked the
critical issue in the case—the timing of the lacerated vein—and
erred by not assessing more probative value to the medical records
the Plaintiff presented at trial. 92
The dissenting opinion agreed with the trial justice with
respect to the exclusion of the Plaintiff’s son’s photograph and
medical records and the record of the hospital’s risk-management
team paying for the Plaintiff’s prescription.93 The fact that the
doctor who performed the C-section also injured the baby during
the process should not go unnoticed. Even if the photograph itself
was too unfairly prejudicial to the Defendant to show the jury, as
the trial justice and the court were concerned,94 the son’s medical
records should have been admitted into evidence so this fact could
have been used at trial to determine the Defendant’s negligence. If
evidence of the son’s injury was admitted into evidence, there is a
possibility both parties could have presented expert testimony
regarding the frequency of these injuries during a C-section. The
trial justice “reserve[d] his ruling” on this issue, and because the
Plaintiff did not bring it up again, the court held that the Plaintiff
abandoned this issue altogether.95 This evidence should have been
discussed further at the trial level and a definitive ruling should
have been given.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 739.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hefner v. Distel, 813 A.2d 66, 80 (R.I. 2003)).
Id.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 732 (majority opinion).
Id. at 734.
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CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court upheld the trial justice’s
denial of the Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial and his evidentiary
rulings to exclude certain documentary evidence. The court held
that it would not interfere with the trial justice’s decision on the
motion for a new trial because the trial justice concluded, after his
analysis of the expert witness testimony, that reasonable minds
could differ on the verdict. The court also determined that, because
there was no clear abuse of discretion by the trial justice, it would
not disturb his evidentiary rulings to exclude certain physical
evidence.
Carla Centanni

Tax Law. Balmuth v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth, 182 A.3d 576
(R.I. 2018). Statutory ambiguity will be resolved in favor of
taxpayers to permit tax appeals based on the fair market value of
property each year, rather than the last year of tax revaluation.
Taxpayers are not “locked into” the assessed value of their
properties on the date of the last revaluation when challenging tax
valuations.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

A group of Portsmouth, Rhode Island taxpayers, who owned
real property in the same condominium complex, initiated this
action against the Defendant tax assessor; their cases were
consolidated over the course of litigation. 1 On December 31, 2007,
consistent with statutory obligations, the Defendant, in his capacity
as tax assessor for Portsmouth, conducted a full-scale revaluation
of all real estate in the town, including the Plaintiffs’ properties. 2
Both parties agreed that the tax assessor’s valuations, at this time,
were correct. 3 Then, in 2008, the United States endured the worst
economic downturn since the Great Depression, and Rhode Island
was not immune from its effects. 4 As a result, real estate
throughout the country and Rhode Island depreciated. 5 Despite
this economic downturn, in 2008 and 2009, the Defendant assessed
the Plaintiffs’ property taxes based on the fair market value of the
properties as of the last year of tax revaluation, which was 2007. 6
Both parties agreed that the Plaintiffs’ property value had
decreased in both 2008 and 2009 and that the Plaintiffs’ 2008
1. Balmuth v. Dolce for Town of Portsmouth, 182 A.3d 576, 578, 579 (R.I.
2018).
2. Id. at 578–79 (“The defendant determined that, as of December 31,
2007, the full and fair cash value of plaintiffs’ properties were as follows: the
Balmuth Property, $4,430,200; the Qua Property, $5,320,800; and the Antle
Property, $4,076,500.”).
3. Id. at 578 n.3.
4. Id. at 579.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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valuations of their properties were correct.7
Pursuant to the statutory procedure, the Plaintiffs sought
review of the tax assessor’s 2009 and 2010 assessments, arguing
that their tax rates were too high and improperly based on the 2007
fair market value of their properties. 8 The Defendant denied their
appeal. 9 The Plaintiffs then appealed to the Portsmouth Tax
Assessment Board of Review; the Board also denied their appeal. 10
The Plaintiffs then petitioned for relief in Rhode Island Superior
Court, seeking to challenge the 2009 and 2010 tax assessments on
grounds that the tax assessor should have relied on the fair market
values of their properties as of December 31, 2008 and December
31, 2009, respectively, rather than December 31, 2007.11
A trial justice of the Superior Court granted relief in favor of
the Plaintiffs, concluding that the Plaintiffs were not confined to
the December 31, 2007 property valuations. 12 The trial justice held
that the Plaintiffs could challenge the Defendant’s tax assessments
for the tax years of 2009 and 2010 using the fair market value of
their properties as of December 31, 2008 and December 31, 2009,
respectively, reasoning that the Plaintiffs satisfied the
preconditions necessary to prevail on their tax appeals. 13 The trial
justice entered judgment for the Plaintiffs, citing Rhode Island
General Laws section 44-5-30, which provides, in pertinent part:
If the taxpayer has given in an account, and if on the trial
of the petition, either with or without a jury, it appears
that the taxpayer’s real estate * * * has been assessed * *
* at a value in excess of its full and fair cash value, * * *
the court shall give judgment that the sum by which the
taxpayer has been so overtaxed, * * * with his or her costs,

Id.

7. Id.
As of December 31, 2008, the parties stipulate that the fair market
values of plaintiffs’ properties were as follows: the Balmuth Property,
$4,107,333; the Qua Property, $4,788,720; and the Antle Property,
$3,668,850. As of December 31, 2009, the fair market values of
plaintiffs’ properties were as follows: the Qua Property, $4,256,640;
and the Antle Property, $3,261,200.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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be deducted from his or her tax * * *” 14
The trial justice, focusing on the use of the term “shall” in the
statute, entered judgement in the Plaintiffs’ favor.15 The Defendant
filed a timely appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 16
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

Upon review of the trial justice’s decision, the court sought to
determine whether, pursuant to chapter 5 of title 44, the Plaintiffs
were “locked into” the fair market valuations of their properties as
of December 31, 2007, the year of the last revaluation, when they
appealed the Defendant’s assessments for the tax years 2009 and
2010.17 Conducting de novo review of the relevant statutory
language, the court first inquired into any potential ambiguity in
the statutory language. 18 If the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, the court must “interpret the statute literally and
must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meanings.” 19 However, if the language of the statue is ambiguous
or “one that contains a word or phrase susceptible to more than one
reasonable meaning” the court will then “employ [its] wellestablished maxims of statutory construction in an effort to glean
the intent of the Legislature.” 20
The court looked to section 44-5-1, which vests the power to tax
in cities and towns, and states that “the tax is apportioned upon
assessed valuations as determined by the assessors of the city or
town as of December 31 in each year at 12:00 A.M. midnight, the
date being known as the date of assessment of city or town
valuations.”21 The court then looked to section 44-5-26(b) which

14. Id. at 579–580.
15. Id. at 580. The court noted that the trial court found in favor of the
Plaintiffs because it determined that the Plaintiffs had “(1) given an account;
(2) been assessed taxes in excess of their properties’ full and fair cash value for
tax years 2009 and 2010; and (3) timely paid their taxes for tax years 2009 and
2010.” Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (quoting Whittemore v. Thompson, 139 A.3d 530, 540 (R.I. 2016)).
20. Id. (quoting Drs. Pass and Bertherman, Inc. v. Neighborhood Health
Plan of R.I., 31 A.3d 1263, 1269 (R.I. 2011); In re Proposed Town of New
Shoreham Project, 25 A.3d 482, 505 (R.I. 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21. Id. (quoting 44 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-5-1 (1956)).
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provides that “appeals to the local office of tax assessment are to be
on an application and that the application shall be in a particular
form.” 22 The court noted that the form accompanying section 44-526(b) makes two mentions of fair market value being assessed “as
of December 31 in the year of the last update or revaluation for real
estate.” 23 The Defendant relied on the pertinent language in
section 44-5-26(b) and the language of section 44-5-15, which
requires “the annual filing of an account stating the value of real
estate as of December 31 in the year of the latest update or
revaluation.” 24 The Defendant argued that the language of those
two statutes, when read together, indicates a mandate that the
Plaintiffs must base their tax appeal on the date of Portsmouth’s
last revaluation: December 31, 2007.25
The Plaintiffs disagreed. 26 They contended that the law
permitted them to challenge the Defendant’s tax assessments using
annual valuations, not just when the town conducted its last
valuation. 27 To support this argument, the Plaintiffs cited Wickes
Assessment Management, Inc. v. Dupuis.28 In Wickes, the court
held that “a property owner disputing an assessment carried over
from a prior year is not precluded from challenging the assessment
and is therefore not necessarily ‘locked into’ the value until the next
decennial valuation.” 29 However, the court distinguished this case,
noting that Wickes was decided under a statutory scheme where
revaluations were conducted every ten years, which the General
Assembly had since amended.30 In 1997, one year after the Wickes
decision, the General Assembly overhauled the revaluation process
by mandating that “each city and town shall conduct a revaluation
within nine (9) years of the date of the prior revaluation and shall
conduct an update of real property every three (3) years from the
last revaluation” in an effort to address issues of inequitable results
22. Id. at 581–82 (quoting § 44-5-26(b)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
23. Id. at 582 (quoting § 44-5-26(b)) (emphasis added).
24. Id. (quoting § 44-5-15) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis
added).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. (quoting Wickes Assessment Mgmt., Inc. v. Dupuis, 679 A.2d 314,
320 (R.I. 1996)).
30. Id. at 583.
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for taxpayers.31 Furthermore, the court noted that the relevant
language in sections 44-5-26(b) and 44-5-15 were added by an
amendment to earlier language in 2001, four years after the Wickes
decision.32 The court acknowledged that the General Assembly’s
actions in the wake of Wickes lessened the case’s persuasive effect
and did not settle the inquiry of whether or not the Plaintiffs were
“locked into” the values of their properties as of December 31,
2007. 33
The court stated that a plain reading of section 44-5-1 would
seem to support the Plaintiffs’ argument that they may challenge
the assessments of their properties using annual valuations,
finding that section 44-5-1 provides, in pertinent part, “as of
December 31 in each year.” 34 However, the court acknowledged
that this language directly contradicts the language of section 445-15 and the form accompanying section 44-5-26(b), which state, in
pertinent part, “as of December 31 in the year of the last update or
revaluation.” 35 A plain reading of these provisions, when read
together, supported the Defendant’s argument that the Plaintiffs
were only able to challenge their tax assessments using the fair
market value of their properties as of December 31, 2007, and not
the annual valuations conducted in tax years 2008 and 2009. 36
The court then concluded “the only thing that appears clear to
us now is just how unclear the conflicting statutory language is,”
finding that there was “no shortage of doubt about whether the
General Assembly intended to” lock the Plaintiffs in to the
December 31, 2007 valuation.37 The court found that it was readily
31. Id. (quoting §§ 44-5-11.6(a)(2)(i)–(ii)).
32. Id. at 584.
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting § 44-5-1) (emphasis added).
35. Id. (quoting § 44-5-15; § 44-5-26(b)) (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 584–85.
Unfortunately, the conflict between the language of § 44-5-1 and that
of § 44-5-15 and the statutory form required by § 44-5-26(b) is only
the most glaring, but not the sole, ambiguity lurking in chapter 5 of
title 44. To cloud matters further, there is also the language of § 445-12(a), which states that “[a]ll real property subject to taxation shall
be assessed at its full and fair cash value, * * * to be determined by
the assessors in each town or city[.]” And, lest we forget, the language
of § 44-5-13—that “[t]he assessors shall assess all valuation and
apportion any tax levy on the inhabitants of the city or town and the
ratable property in the city or town according to law, and the assessed
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apparent that chapter 5 of title 44 is littered with ambiguous
statutory language, or language “that contains a word or phrase
susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning.” 38 To resolve
this statutory ambiguity, the court looked to its own maxims of
statutory construction with the most relevant being, “taxing statues
are to be strictly construed with doubts in favor of the taxpayer.” 39
By applying this maxim, the court affirmed the decision of the
trial justice, concluding that the “[P]laintiffs had the right to appeal
the yearly tax assessments for tax years 2009 and 2010 based on
the fair market valuations of their properties as of December 31,
2008 and December 31, 2009.” 40 Stated differently, the Plaintiffs
were not locked into the December 31, 2007 valuation when they
appealed the Defendant’s 2009 and 2010 tax assessments. 41 The
court reached this holding “because [it was] confronted with a tax
statute so plainly afflicted with significant ambiguity, [the court
was] firm in [its] view that [it is] best guided by the maxim which
directs that taxing statutes are to be strictly construed with doubts
resolved in favor of the taxpayer.” 42 The court further noted that,
given the presumption “that the General Assembly knows the state
of existing relevant law when it enacts or amends a statute . . . it
could have repealed or amended any statute that was contradictory
or conflicting” when it amended the relevant language of sections
44-5-26(b) and 44-5-15, but “[i]t chose not to do so.” 43
valuation of the ratable property is made as of the date of assessment
provided in § 44-5-1”—and the language of § 44-5-30—which instructs
that “the court shall give judgment” in favor of the taxpayer “[i]f the
taxpayer has given in an account, and if on the trial of the petition
[filed pursuant to § 44-5-26], * * * it appears that the taxpayer’s real
estate * * * has been assessed, if assessment has been made at full
and fair cash value, at a value in excess of its full and fair cash value
* * *.” Those provisions add further uncertainty to the resolution of
the issue at hand; that is, whether the General Assembly intended
that plaintiffs be locked in to the December 31, 2007 valuations per
chapter 5 of title.

Id.
38. Id. at 585.
39. Id. (quoting Maggiacomo v. DiVincenzo, 410 A.2d 1332, 1333 (R.I.
1980) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. Id. at 586.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Maggiacomo, 410 A.2d at 1333) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43. Id. at 587 (quoting Power Test Realty Co. Ltd. P’ship v. Coit, 134 A.3d
1213, 1222 (R.I. 2016)).
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COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court was clearly faced with
abundantly ambiguous statutory language.44 The majority applied
a reasonably straightforward maxim of interpretation that
compelled the court to strictly construe taxing statutes in favor of
the taxpayer, giving less weight to two other potentially applicable
maxims. 45 The majority was unpersuaded by the fact that, in 2001,
the General Assembly added the relevant language to sections 445-15 and 44-5-26(b), after the language found in section 44-5-1, and,
thus, rejected the Defendant’s suggestion that the later provision
should govern here. 46 The majority also gave little weight to the
canon that would call for the specific provisions of sections 44-5-15
and 44-5-26(b) to govern over the more general provision of section
44-5-1. 47
This was a point of contention pointed out by the dissent. 48 The
dissent and majority both acknowledged three applicable rules of
statutory construction for ambiguous statutes: “(1) taxing statutes
should be strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer; (2) specific
statutes should control over general statutes if they cannot be
construed harmoniously together; and (3) legislation enacted later
in time should prevail over earlier inconsistent language.” 49
However, while the majority relied upon only the first maxim, the
dissent deemed the last two maxims more appropriate to glean the
intent of the General Assembly.50 The dissent maintained that the
more specific and subsequent provisions of sections 44-5-15 and 445-26(b) should control over the more general and earlier language
found in section 44-5-1. 51 Therefore, the dissent opined that the
General Assembly intended for taxpayers to be “locked into” the
valuations of the last update or revaluation when appealing. 52 The
dissent further noted:
We gain comfort in this view when considering the possible
ramifications of the majority’s interpretation. Some
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 585.
See id. (quoting Maggiacomo, 410 A.2d at 1333).
Id. at 586.
Id.
See id. at 587–89 (Indeglia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588.
Id.
See id. at 588–89.
Id. at 589.
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taxpayers could seek a revaluation every year, requiring
municipalities, such as defendant, to expend funds in
justifying them. Interpreting the statute in that manner
would unnecessarily burden already strained municipal
budgets, ultimately passing the costs on to taxpayers.
Likewise, the loss of revenue, which occurred in this case,
would leave cities and towns attempting to recoup their
losses by, again, looking to remaining property owners. In
these times when most owners do not have expendable
income, we cannot fathom the General Assembly wanting
to do that.53
I sympathize with the dissent’s position that the majority
should have considered all three maxims of construction in-depth
and with the policy argument regarding the potential undue burden
placed on the cities and towns of Rhode Island under the majority’s
view. 54 Ultimately, however, I think that the majority was correct
in its reliance on the principle that “taxing statues are to be strictly
The
construed with doubts in favor of the taxpayer.” 55
considerations pointed out in the dissent, while important, are
outweighed by the importance of viewing these statutes in the light
most favorable to the taxpayer. 56 The Plaintiffs in this case were
paying taxes based on valuations of their properties that were
hundreds of thousands of dollars more than the current worth of
the property. 57 That would not be a just outcome. The court
correctly sided in favor of the taxpayers.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that taxpayers can
appeal the tax assessments of cities and towns with the valuations
of their properties for that tax year and not the last year of an
update or revaluation. Taxpayers are not “locked into” the value of
their property from the last revaluation when appealing but,
rather, can challenge the assessment using the fair market value of
the property from that tax year. When taxing statutes are
53. Id.
54. See id. at 588–89.
55. See id. at 585 (majority opinion) (quoting Maggiacomo v. DiVincenzo,
410 A.2d 1332, 1333 (R.I. 1980)).
56. See id.
57. Id. at 588–89 (Indeglia, J., dissenting).
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ambiguous, more weight is given to the maxim of construction
stating that “taxing statues are to be strictly construed with doubts
in favor of the taxpayer.”
Zachary Carlson

Tort Law. Dent v. PRRC, Inc., 184 A.3d 649 (R.I. 2018). In a slipand-fall case, a plaintiff must present evidence of an unsafe
condition on the premises of which the defendant was aware or
should have been aware, and that the condition existed for a long
enough time that the owner of the premises should have taken steps
to correct it. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a
plaintiff can present direct or circumstantial evidence to show
notice as a genuine issue of material fact.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On August 22, 2012, Karen Dent (Plaintiff) was shopping with
her husband at PRRC, Inc. (Defendant or Price Rite). 1 In aisle six,
Plaintiff’s husband placed two bottles of Sunny Delight (SunnyD)
into their shopping cart, and then Plaintiff went to locate a
restroom. 2 Upon her return to aisle six, Plaintiff slipped and fell
on a “‘brownish oily substance’ and was immobilized.” 3 Video
evidence from the store’s security camera showed that when
Plaintiff fell, a porter 4 was mopping up liquid in the adjacent aisle.5
Additionally, Plaintiff’s husband observed a bottle of SunnyD
leaking from his cart while he shopped. 6
On November 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint
in Superior Court, and in February 2016, Plaintiff amended the
complaint to consist of five counts: negligence; breach of contract;
“mode of operation”; failure to warn; and breach of the implied
warranties of merchantability, fitness for use, and fitness for a
particular purpose.7
During their depositions, David Walmsley, the store manager,
1. Dent v. PRRC, Inc., 184 A.3d 649, 651 (R.I. 2018). The store was
located at 325 Valley Street in Providence. Id.
2. Id. at 651.
3. Id.
4. “A porter is an employee of Price Rite whose duty it is to maintain the
floors and restrooms of the store.” Id. at 651 n.2.
5. Id. at 651 n.3.
6. Id. at 651.
7. Id.
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and Jeffrey Sparfven, the former manager, testified to how the
SunnyD bottles arrive at the store, how they are inspected by
employees for defects, how they are stored, and how they are put
out on display to be sold.8 Walmsley also testified that the store’s
protocol for a spill was: “If [an employee] see[s] something on the
floor, the protocol is for them to stand at that spot until they can
get [the] attention of a porter, and they stay there until the porter
arrives.” 9
Prior to the filing of the amended complaint, Defendant moved
for summary judgment on the negligence claim, and the trial justice
granted Defendant’s motion.10 After Plaintiff was granted leave to
amend, Defendant moved to dismiss the remaining counts under
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure.11
Plaintiff responded by filing a motion for
reconsideration on the order granting summary judgment. 12
Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under a strict products
liability theory. 13 At a motion hearing in March 2016, the trial
justice granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the remaining
counts, and denied Plaintiff’s two motions.14 Plaintiff timely
appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court.15
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

A. Summary Judgment
The court reviewed the trial justice’s decision to grant
summary judgment on the negligence claim in favor of Defendant
de novo.16 The court focused its review on how to prevail on a slipand-fall claim of negligence. 17 The court explained that a plaintiff
8. Id. at 651–52.
9. Id. at 652.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
“While there is no procedural vehicle for a motion for
“reconsideration,” th[e] Court considers such motions under Rule 60 of the
Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, entitled “Relief from Judgment or
Order.” Id. at 652 n.5.
13. Id. at 652.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 653.
17. Id. “[A] plaintiff must establish a legally cognizable duty owed by a
defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate causation between
the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage.” Id.
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“must present evidence of an unsafe condition on the premises of
which the defendant was aware or should have been aware, and
that the condition existed for a long enough time so the owner of the
premises should have taken steps to correct [it].” 18 Price Rite, a
business, clearly owed a legally cognizable duty to Plaintiff, a
customer, due to the nature of the relationship between the two
parties.19 Under common law premises liability, a property owner
has an affirmative duty “to exercise reasonable care for the safety
of persons reasonably expected to be on the premises.” 20
Having determined that Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff,
the court then looked to whether Defendant had notice of the
dangerous condition on its premises, which was a question of
material fact.21 In a premises liability case, a plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case of negligence if it shows that the defendant had
actual or constructive notice of the spill, and the jury ultimately
determines whether the defendant was negligent. 22 Accordingly,
the court concluded that whether Defendant had actual or
constructive notice of the spill was not a question for the trial justice
at the summary judgment stage because “issues of negligence are
ordinarily not susceptible of summary adjudication, but should be
resolved by trial in the ordinary matter.” 23
Additionally, the court noted that it was “not the function of
the trial justice . . . to comment on the probative value of the
evidence” where a genuine issue of material fact exists.24 The court
concluded that Plaintiff met her burden of producing competent
evidence to show an issue of material fact by providing the security
camera footage from Defendant’s store and the deposition
testimony from Defendant’s employees. 25 The video raised a
question of fact with respect to how long the dangerous condition
existed before Plaintiff slipped and fell.26 The testimony of Price
(quoting Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 42 A.3d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 2016)).
18. Id. (quoting Habershaw, 42 A.3d at 1276).
19. Id. at 654.
20. Id. (quoting Cooley v. Kelly, 160 A.3d 300, 304 (R.I. 2017)).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (quoting Gliottone v. Either, 870 A.2d 1022, 1028 (R.I. 2005)).
24. Id. at 655.
25. Id. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Id.
26. Id. The court found significance in the video because the recording is
only triggered by movement in the store and does not provide timestamps. Id.
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Rite’s employees presented an issue of fact regarding the store’s
safety protocols.27 Lastly, in addressing Defendant’s argument
that Plaintiff failed to establish the element of notice, 28 the court
concluded that direct evidence of notice is not required at the
summary judgment stage; circumstantial evidence of how long the
spill existed on the floor is sufficient. 29 Accordingly, the court held
that the trial justice erred in granting Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and vacated the judgment.30
B. Motion to Dismiss
In deciding Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court applied
“the same standard as the trial justice,” conducting a de novo
review. 31 The court stated that it was “confined to the four corners
of the complaint and must assume all allegations are true, resolving
any doubts in plaintiff’s favor.” 32 Ultimately, the court was unable
to find in Plaintiff’s favor because the remaining claims lacked
merit and were mischaracterized; the court therefore affirmed the
dismissal of the remaining counts in Plaintiff’s amended
complaint. 33
In response to Plaintiff’s argument that she entered Price Rite
as a business invitee and Price Rite breached its contract by failing
to safely maintain the property, the court stated, “It appears that
[P]laintiff is attempting to shoehorn a straightforward premisesliability claim into a breach of contract claim.” 34 Similarly, the
court found that Plaintiff mischaracterized her failure-to-warn
claim, stating that it was “simply another inaccurately articulated
negligence claim,” and was therefore duplicitous. 35 Additionally,
the court found no merit in either Plaintiff’s breach of implied

27. Id.
28. Defendant argued that Plaintiff failed to “produce evidence with
respect to the length of time the liquid substance was on [the] floor.” Id. at 655–
56.
29. Id. at 656.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 653 (quoting Narragansett Elec. Co. v. Minardi, 21 A.3d 274,
278 (R.I. 2011)).
32. Id. “Additionally, ‘[a] motion to dismiss may be granted only if it
appears beyond a reasonable doubt that a plaintiff would not be entitled to
relief under any conceivable set of facts[.]’” Id. (citation omitted).
33. Id. at 657–58.
34. Id. at 656.
35. Id.
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warranty for merchantability claim or her breach of implied
warranty for a particular purpose claim because, under the facts,
there was no sale of goods, and thus no contract was formed. 36 As
for the last claim in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the court found
that “mode of operation” is not a separate and distinct cause of
action, as Plaintiff had argued it to be. 37 The court described “mode
of operation” as a theory that alters the burden of proving notice in
a premises liability case, and requires a plaintiff to request the trial
justice to instruct the jury accordingly. 38 Consequently, the court
affirmed the dismissals of each count other than the negligence
claim. 39
COMMENTARY

In deciding whether to vacate the summary judgment, the
court emphasized the burden that a plaintiff faces at the summary
judgment stage in a premises liability case.40 Although a
defendant, as a store owner, has an affirmative duty to exercise
reasonable care, it is the plaintiff who must produce evidence of the
dangerous condition and the owner’s actual or constructive notice
of that condition, if he or she wishes to succeed on a negligence
claim. 41 At the summary judgment stage, however, a plaintiff must
only present evidence to show “the existence of a disputed issue of
material fact.” 42 The majority determined that the video recording
and deposition testimony presented a disputed issue of material
fact, prompting the court to reverse the trial justice’s judgment.43
Moreover, this case hinged upon whether Plaintiff needed to
produce direct evidence of notice in order to establish a disputed
issue of fact. 44 The majority made clear that notice can be shown
by circumstantial evidence. 45
However, Justice Robinson, in his dissenting opinion, argued

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
2013)).
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 656–57.
Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 657–58.
See id. at 656.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655 (quoting Wyso v. Full Moon Tide, 78 A.3d 747, 750 (R.I.
Id.
See id. at 656.
Id.

572 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:567
that the trial justice’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor
of Price Rite was proper. 46 In his view, this was a case where no
reasonable jury could have found for Plaintiff. 47 He stated, “In
Rhode Island the general rule is that negligence is a question for
the jury unless the facts warrant only one conclusion.” 48 Although
he acknowledged that “disposition of civil cases by summary
judgment is a procedural tool that should be engaged in with
particular caution and circumspection,” there can be instances
where summary judgment is appropriate even for a case involving
alleged negligence.49 Here, the dissent concluded that there was
no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that proved Defendant “had
actual or constructive notice of the unsafe condition that
purportedly caused [Plaintiff] to fall.” 50 Because the security
camera did not record continuously, Justice Robinson found issue
with the video footage, stating that “it does not in any way support
an inference that the spill existed for a long enough time to amount
to constructive notice; and, for that matter, it does not establish a
genuine issue of material fact.” 51
Although the dissent pointed to possible flaws in the evidence,
the majority highlighted the importance of not weighing the value
of the evidence at the summary judgment stage, and therefore made
a more persuasive argument. 52
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that, at the summary
judgment stage of this premises liability case, Plaintiff proved that
a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendant
46. Id. at 658 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. (quoting DeNardo v. Fairmont Foundries Cranston, Inc., 399 A.2d
1229, 1234 (R.I. 1979)).
49. Id. at 658 n.1. Justice Robinson states that there are “exceptional
perhaps, but nonetheless real” cases where summary judgment is appropriate
for cases of alleged negligence. Id. at 658.
50. Id. at 659.
51. Id. at 660.
52. See id. at 655 (majority opinion).
It is the function of the jury to determine the significance and weight
of the evidence that relates the claim of negligence, and a trial justice
should not “arrogate to [himself] the function of determining such
facts under the guise of deciding what legal duty is owed to the
plaintiff.”
Id. (quoting Volpe v. Gallagher, 821 A.2d 699, 705 (R.I 2003)).
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had actual or constructive notice of the spill. 53 Additionally, the
court held that direct evidence of the disputed issue was not
required to establish notice; rather, circumstantial evidence was
sufficient. 54 Accordingly, the court vacated the trial justice’s grant
of summary judgment. 55 Concerning the motion to dismiss,
however, the court affirmed the trial justice’s decision to dismiss
the remaining counts in Plaintiff’s amended complaint because they
were meritless and mischaracterized.56
Danielle Beauvais

53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 649.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 656–57.

Tort Law. Flynn v. Nickerson Community Center, 177 A.3d 468
(R.I. 2018). A community center whose van was stolen by a juvenile
does not owe a duty of care to the general public and, thus, cannot
be liable in negligence for damages that resulted from a third party
who crashed the stolen van into Plaintiffs. In a negligence case, the
analysis of whether a duty existed hinges on either a special
relationship or an analysis of the facts as they apply to the fivefactors identified in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d
1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987).
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On September 25, 2010, a fourteen-year-old boy stole a van
from Nickerson Community Center (Nickerson). 1 He took the van
for a joyride, struck another vehicle, and fled the scene.2
Providence police pursued the boy, and he sped up as he attempted
to evade police. 3 The boy struck a black Honda, causing the van to
cross over into the opposite lane of traffic. 4 The van collided with
Stephanie Flynn and her two minor daughters, Nevaeha and Alexis
(collectively, Plaintiffs). 5 Alexis sustained fatal injuries, and Flynn
and Nevaeha suffered severe injuries.6
Later that day, Nickerson reported a breaking and entering. 7
The building was closed for the weekend when the break-in
occurred.8 A Nickerson employee, Kingray Rojas, told police that a
rear window was broken and he believed that an individual had
1. Flynn v. Nickerson Cmty. Ctr., 177 A.3d 468, 471 (R.I. 2018).
Nickerson Community Center is a nonprofit organization located in the
Olneyville section of Providence. It offers social services to residents in the
area, such as daycare and after-school programs. Nickerson also provides
services for veterans and houses a food pantry and a clothing donation center.
Id.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.

574

2019]

SURVEY SECTION

575

entered the building. 9 Rojas explained that the intruder had gone
through a cabinet that was left open. 10 He stated that the keys to
the van were stored in that cabinet, and both the keys and the van
had been taken. 11 Nickerson’s stolen van was later identified as
the same van driven by the boy who collided with Plaintiffs. 12
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Providence Superior Court on
September 18, 2013, alleging negligence against Nickerson and
Aetna Bridge Company. 13 Plaintiffs claimed Nickerson owed them
a duty of care and breached that duty when Nickerson failed to
secure the van’s keys.14 Nickerson filed a third-party complaint
against the boy for indemnity.15
On July 9, 2015, Nickerson filed a motion for summary
judgment, asserting that it owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs
because it did not have a special relationship with Plaintiffs or the
boy who stole the van. 16 Nickerson submitted an affidavit from the
Executive Director and then-President of Nickerson’s Board of
Directors, explaining that the boy broke into Nickerson’s building
when it was closed and “ransacked” certain areas.17 She also stated
that the van keys were always kept in the reception area when not
being used and no vehicle owned by Nickerson had ever been stolen
in the past. 18
Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion, arguing
three supporting assertions. 19 First, Plaintiffs presented two
conflicting statements from the boy. 20 In his statement to police,
the boy said that a Nickerson employee informed him where the
keys were located. 21 In a later statement to a social worker, the boy
contended the keys to the van were in the ignition.22 Plaintiffs
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Aetna Bridge Company was originally a named defendant in this
action, but Plaintiffs dismissed all claims against it on May 28, 2014. Id. at
471 n.3.
14. Id. at 471.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 472.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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asserted that the keys were in the ignition.23 Second, Plaintiffs
attached numerous police reports and an affidavit from a Nickerson
employee detailing unrelated criminal activity at Nickerson.24 The
police reports and affidavit documented break-ins, vandalism, and
reports of vehicles broken into and stolen from Nickerson. 25
Plaintiffs argued that this put Nickerson on notice that the theft of
the van and subsequent auto accident were possible. 26 Finally,
Plaintiffs provided Nickerson’s security policies and argued, had
the policies been followed, the boy would not have been able to gain
access to the keys. 27
The hearing justice granted Nickerson’s motion for summary
judgment on February 23, 2016.28 The hearing justice determined
that Nickerson did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs because no special
relationship existed between Nickerson and the Plaintiffs or
Nickerson and the boy who caused the accident.29 Additionally, the
hearing justice found there was no evidence that the keys were
made available to the boy. 30 Even if the boy found the keys in the
ignition, the hearing justice stated that he declined to expand the
current duty vehicle owners owe to the public and ruled the theft
was “an unforeseeable independent cause of [p]laintiff[s’] harm.” 31
Plaintiffs timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 32
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The Rhode Island Supreme Court ruled that the boy’s
conflicting statements to the police and the social worker were not
“competent evidence” because the Plaintiffs did not document the
statements “in any way that [was] sufficient at a hearing on
summary judgment.” 33 As such, the court concluded the hearing
justice’s declination to consider those statements was proper. 34 The
remaining issue for the court to consider was whether Nickerson
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id. at 476
Id.
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was negligent in failing to follow security protocols which would
have made the van keys less easily accessible to the boy. 35 The
court reviewed this issue de novo.36
In a negligence action, a plaintiff must show that he or she is
owed a duty before the trial court will consider breach, proximate
causation, and damages.37 Whether a defendant owes a duty is a
matter of law. 38 The court first examined whether Nickerson owed
a duty stemming from a special relationship between Nickerson
and the boy.39 Because the boy was trespassing and there was no
evidence to show that the boy was known to Nickerson, the court
found no special relationship based upon Nickerson’s status as a
landowner alone. 40
Further, the court reasoned that the
recognition of a duty based on a premises liability theory would
amount to “imposing a duty of care on victims of illegal entries to
unknown plaintiffs.” 41 The court was unwilling to recognize this
duty.42
With no special relationship found, the court then analyzed the
facts as they applied to the five “Banks Factors.” 43 None of the five
factors leaned in favor of finding a duty. 44 The court first found
that, while it may have been foreseeable that Nickerson could
become a victim of crime as a result of its employee violating
security procedures, the boy’s break-in, theft of keys and van, and
resulting auto accident that caused Plaintiffs’ injuries were not

35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 478.
40. Id. at 479.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. There is no set formula for determining a duty, therefore duty
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See id. at 477. The factors
considered in the ad hoc approach adopted by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in Banks v. Bowen’s Landing Corp., 522 A.2d 1222, 1225 (R.I. 1987) are:
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (3) the closeness of connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, (4) the policy
of preventing future harm, and (5) the extent of the burden to the
defendant and the consequences to the community for imposing a duty
to exercise care with resulting liability for breach.
See id. (quoting Banks, 522 A.2d at 1255).
44. Id. 480–81.
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foreseeable. 45 Further, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that
Nickerson’s location in a high-crime area was a determinative
factor in considering foreseeability. 46
Next, the court looked to the closeness of the connection
between Nickerson’s purported violation of security protocol and
Plaintiffs’ injuries.47 The theft of the van was a voluntary decision
on the part of the boy, and the voluntariness of the act distanced
the closeness of connection to the failure to follow security
protocol.48 Also, the court explained that because the boy hit two
cars, fled the scene while being pursued by the police, and drove
across the median into Plaintiffs’ car, the accident was not close in
time or distance to the theft of the van. 49
The court then explored policy considerations, specifically the
extent of the burden to Nickerson and the consequences to the
community for imposing a duty. 50 The court found the potential
burden to impose here was unreasonable. 51 The court agreed with
Nickerson that the recognition of a duty here would open victims of
theft up to civil liability for a perpetrator’s misuse of their stolen
goods. 52 The court was reluctant to impose this duty because it
would require sufficiently adequate security on buildings and
locking vehicle keys inside of a building.53 This was considered too
high a burden, and the court declined to impose this duty as it
would be an impermissible step outside judicial bounds.54
“Dire consequences,” as the court said, could result from an
imposition of a duty under these facts that was based solely on the
high-crime location in which Nickerson is located. 55 Resulting
policy implications included: businesses may react by relocating
from poorer areas with crime, or businesses may stay and engage
in “elaborate security precautions” (the cost of which they would
45. Id. at 480.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 480.
50. Id. at 481.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The Court expressly stated, “it is not the function of this Court to
act as a super legislative body and rewrite or amend statutes already enacted
by the General Assembly” and “it is not our role to “creat[e] * * * new causes of
action.” Id. (alteration in original).
55. Id.
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pass on to low income customers). 56 Both of these options,
according to the court, were even more concerning because
Nickerson is a nonprofit. 57 The court found that if it were to impose
a duty on Nickerson, the individuals who benefit from Nickerson’s
services would suffer if Nickerson were forced to relocate, pass on
added costs to its customers, or terminate its current programs. 58
For the foregoing reasons, the court held that Nickerson owed
no duty of care in this case, and Plaintiffs’ negligence claims failed
as a matter of law. 59
COMMENTARY

While the court was thorough in its review of the extent of the
burden and public policy concerns of imposing a duty, the court
relied very heavily on Nickerson’s status as a nonprofit
institution. 60 Under the facts of this case, Nickerson may not have
owed a duty; however, it seems as though a business entity or
landowner’s status as a nonprofit institution should not impact a
plaintiff’s right to recover from a culpable defendant. 61 Perhaps an
entity’s status as a nonprofit should not entitle it to special
consideration when determining if a duty exists. The court could
have considered low-cost solutions to the burden of maintaining
adequate security, such as employee training and engaging local
police to make security suggestions. Further, many nonprofits have
insurance policies. This negates much of the financial burden on a
nonprofit to pay any judgment rendered against it.
The court was “of the opinion that the burden on the defendant
in such cases would be unreasonable because it would require both
adequate security on buildings and locking of vehicle keys within a
building.” 62 Locking vehicle keys inside a secure building does not,
on its face, appear to be too burdensome and, in most cases, is likely
a best practice for any business. The court was right not to base a
duty solely on location in a high-crime neighborhood. However, the
court may have missed an opportunity to opine on the positive
public policy implications of implementing adequate security
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 482.
See id. at 481.
See id. at 482.
Id. at 481.
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measures which consider location and crime rate. 63
CONCLUSION

Citing the absence of a special relationship, the lack of
foreseeability of the harm, and policy reasons against finding that
Nickerson owed a duty, the court declined to extend a duty on the
owner of vehicles to prevent vehicular theft by third parties.
Colleen P. Giles

63.

See id.

